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THE AIDS PANDEMIC 
 
 
Summary of Argument 
 
This paper claims to provide an alternative theoretical approach to explaining how the 
AIDS pandemic is perceived and acted upon politically in Mozambique and other 
Southern African Developing Countries. Moreover, it is argued that this approach—
embodied by social medicine as a subset of political economy—provides a broader 
contextualisation of societal processes and factors relevant to HIV/AIDS than much past 
and contemporary research. It facilitates the unveiling and comprehension of complex 
epidemiological regional differences in national HIV prevalence rates. It identifies a host 
of complex historically given and economically driven geopolitical, environmental, and 
social processes, which underpin the existence and spread of HIV/AIDS. Additionally, it 
presents a promising economic cost-benefit assessment of the direct costs and potential 
macroeconomic benefits of an AIDS programme containing a component of anti-
retroviral therapy. Furthermore, social medicine allows for the portraying of 
international political and economic power relations between key national and foreign 
actors as determining for the configuration and formulation of Mozambique’s AIDS 
strategies and interventions. Lastly, it is argued that the findings brought about by this 
approach have implications for future policy recommendations that a) crystallise only as 
direct result of this particular theoretical orientation; and b) hold the potential to 
significantly mitigate the most severe obstacles to full-scale provision of anti-retroviral 
therapy due to an understanding of the realities underlying lacking human resources 
and capacitive weaknesses in public health care sector institutions. 
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Abstracts 
 
Português  *  Dansk  *  English 
 
Este mestrado utiliza uma abordagem de medicina social como subcategoria de economia política em 
analisar a pandemia da SIDA e obstáculos ao aumento do acesso à terapia anti-retroviral no sector da 
saúde publico de Moçambique contemporâneo. Depois de um breve capítulo introdutório no qual a 
natureza epistemológica de medicina social é esclarecida, o capítulo dois pergunta porque 
Moçambique tem sido—e continua sendo—muito vulnerável ao HIV/SIDA. Uma investigação de 
desconstrução histórica responde por revelar um número de fatores geopolíticos, socioeconômicos e 
ambientais que crescem e fortalecem a crise da SIDA de Moçambique. Subseqüentemente, o terceiro 
capítulo segue a totalidade da resposta Moçambicana nacional à pandemia durante as últimas duas 
décadas bem como as suas características epidemiológicas e regionais. Capítulo quatro introduz o 
sujeito de terapia anti-retroviral e retrata as dificuldades financiais, práticas e éticas das quais a sua 
provisão está repleta em qualquer cenário de recursos limitados. Capítulo cinco examina o sujeito 
especificamente em relação às condições nacionais de Moçambique de dependência das instituições e 
atores estrangeiros. Capítulo seis apresenta uma discussão que sugere que falta de recursos humanos 
e baixos níveis capacitivos das instituições do setor da saúde publico constituem os obstáculos mais 
sérios ao aumento completo da provisão de terapia anti-retroviral em Moçambique. Capítulo sete 
sumariza e conclui numa discussão das contribuições da medicina social à nossa compreensão da 
pandemia da SIDA e ao aumento da provisão de anti-retrovirais. Ademais, esse capítulo descreve as 
implicações das descobertas desta tese para recomendações de políticas no futuro. Exemplificações e 
relatos de outros paises de desenvolvimento do sul da África são incluídos com intuito de comparação 
e contextualização. 
 
* 
 
Dette speciale benytter en tilgang af social medicin som en underkategori af politisk økonomi i en 
analyse af AIDS pandemien og hindringer for at opskalere adgang til anti-retroviral HIV/AIDS terapi i 
den offentlige sundhedssektor i samtidens Mozambique. Efter et kort introducerende kapital, i hvilket 
social medicins epistemologiske natur uddybes, spørger kapitel to hvorfor Mozambique har været—
og fortsat er—meget sårbar overfor HIV/AIDS. En historisk dekonstruerende undersøgelse svarer ved 
at afsløre et antal geopolitiske, socioøkonomiske og miljømæssige faktorer som fremmende og 
understøttende for Mozambiques AIDS krise. Efterfølgende sporer det tredje kapitel helheden af 
Mozambiques nationale svar på pandemien gennem de sidste to årtier, såvel som dens 
epidemiologiske og regionale karakteristika. Kapitel fire introducerer emnet anti-retroviral terapi, og 
portrætterer de finansielle, praktiske og etiske besværligheder som dens administration er befængt 
med i ressourcebegrænsede scenarier. Kapitel fem undersøger emnet med særligt henblik på 
Mozambiques nationale omstændigheder af afhængighed af udenlandske institutioner og aktører. 
Kapitel seks præsenterer en diskussion, der indikerer manglende menneskelige ressourcer og 
kapacitetssvagheder i den offentlige sundhedssektors institutioner som de mest alvorlige hindringer 
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for fuld opskalering af administrationen af anti-retroviral terapi. Endvidere beskriver dette kapitel 
implikationerne af dette speciales fund for fremtidige politikanbefalinger. Eksemplifikationer og 
beskrivelser fra andre udviklingslande i det sydlige Afrika er inkluderet for sammenligningen og 
sammenhængens skyld. 
 
* 
 
This thesis utilises an approach of social medicine as a subset of political economy in analysing the 
AIDS pandemic and obstacles to scaling up access to anti-retroviral HIV/AIDS therapy in the public 
health care sector of contemporary Mozambique. After a brief introductory chapter in which the 
epistemological nature of social medicine is clarified, chapter two asks why Mozambique has been—
and continues to be—very vulnerable to HIV/AIDS. A historically deconstructing investigation 
responds by unveiling a number of geopolitical, socioeconomic, and environmental factors that foster 
and underpin Mozambique’s AIDS crisis. Subsequently, the third chapter traces the entirety of 
Mozambique’s national response to the pandemic through the past two decades, alongside its 
epidemiological and regional characteristics. Chapter four introduces the subject of anti-retroviral 
therapy and portrays the financial, practical, and ethical difficulties that its provision is fraught with 
in resource constrained settings. Chapter five examines the subject specifically with respect to 
Mozambique’s national circumstances of dependency upon foreign institutions and actors. Chapter 
six presents a discussion that suggests that lacking human resources and capacitive weaknesses in 
public health care sector institutions constitute the most severe obstacles to full-scale provision of 
anti-retroviral therapy in Mozambique. Chapter seven summarises and concludes in a discussion on 
the contributions of social medicine to our understanding of the AIDS pandemic and role-out of anti-
retrovirals. Moreover, this chapter outlines the implications of the findings of this paper for future 
policy recommendations. Exemplifications and accounts from other southern African developing 
countries are included for the sake of comparison and contextualisation. 
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Abbreviations 
 
ADPP Ajuda de Desenvolvimento de Povo para Povo, People to People Development 
Aid 
AIDS Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome 
AMETRAMO Associação Nacional dos Médicos Tradicionais de Moçambique, National 
Association of the Traditional Healers of Mozambique 
AMODEFA  Associação Moçambicana para a Defesa da Família, Mozambican Association 
for the Defence of the Family 
ANC African National Congress 
ART Anti-Retroviral Therapy 
ARV Anti-Retroviral 
CBO Community Based Organisation 
CCF  Cease-Fire Commission 
CCM  Country Coordination Mechanism 
CCS  Centro de Coordenação da SIDA, Centre for AIDS Coordination 
CNCS  Conselho Nacional de Combate à SIDA, National Council to Fight AIDS 
CNS  Comissão Nacional da SIDA, National AIDS Commission 
CSO  Civil Society Organisation 
CVM Cruz Vermelho de Moçambique, Mozambican Red Cross 
DANIDA Danish International Development Agency 
DAI Drug Access Initiative (Uganda) 
DOT Directly Observed Therapy 
FADM Forças Armadas de Moçambique, Armed Forces of Mozambique 
FBO Faith Based Organisation 
FRELIMO Frente de Libertação de Moçambique, Liberation Front of Mozambique 
GATVs Gabinetes de Aconselhamento e Testagem Voluntária, Voluntary Counselling 
and Testing Centres. 
GIPA Greater Involvement of People with AIDS 
GTM Grupo Técnico Multisectorial, Technical Multisectoral Group 
HAART Highly Active Anti-Retroviral Therapy 
HAI  Health Alliance International 
HDD Hospital de Dia, Day Hospital 
HDI Human Development Index 
HIPC Heavily Indebted Poor Countries 
HIV Human Immunodeficiency Virus 
IDPs Internally Displaced People 
IMF International Monetary Fund 
INDE Instituto Nacional de Estatística, National Institute of Statistics 
IRIN Integrated Regional Information Networks 
MANU Mozambican African National Union 
MAP II  Multi Country AIDS Programme, Africa Region (World Bank) 
MISAU Ministério da Saúde, Ministry of Health (of Mozambique) 
MNR Movimento Nacional de Resistência, National Resistance Movement (later 
RENAMO) 
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MONASO  Mozambican Network of AIDS Service Organisations  
MSF  Médecins Sans Frontières, Doctors without Borders 
MSM Men-having-sex-with-men (homosexual males) 
NGO  Non-Governmental Organisation 
NORAD Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation 
ONUMOZ United Nations Operations in Mozambique 
PEN Plano Estratégico Nacional, National Strategic Plan 
PEPFAR President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief 
PLWA People Living with AIDS 
PMTCT Prevention of Mother-to-Child Transmission 
PNCS  Programa Nacional de Combate à SIDA, National Programme to Fight AIDS 
PPP Public Private Partnerships 
PRE Programa de Reabilitação Econômica, Economic Rehabilitation Programme 
PRSP Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 
PSI  Population Service International 
RENAMO Resistência Nacional Moçambicana, Mozambican National Resistance 
RENSIDA Rede Nacional de Associações de Pessoas Vivendo com HIV/SIDA, National 
Network of Associations of People Living with HIV/AIDS 
SADC Southern African Developing Country 
SADCC  Southern African Development Coordination Conference 
SANASO Southern African Network of AIDS Service Organisations  
SAP Structural Adjustment Programme 
SAT Southern Africa AIDS Trust  
STD Sexually Transmitted Disease 
STI Sexually Transmitted Infection 
TB Tuberculosis (mycobacterium tuberculosis) 
TRIPs Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
UDENAMO União Democrática Nacional de Moçambique, National Democratic Union of 
Mozambique 
UDI Unilateral Declaration of Independence (Rhodesia) 
UK United Kingdom 
UN United Nations 
UNAIDS Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS 
UNAMI União Africana de Moçambique Independente, National African Union of 
Independent Mozambique 
UNFPA United Nations Population Fund 
US United States (of America) 
USAID United States Agency for International Development 
USSR United Socialist Soviet Republic 
VCT  Voluntary Counselling and Testing  
WB World Bank 
WHO World Health Organisation 
ZANLA Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army 
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A Brief Introduction 
 
 
THE AIDS PANDEMIC 
 
 
1 – Introductory remarks 
 
One article of the Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN) was entitled ‘The 
Treatment Era’ [Saint Egidio 2006c]. This title illustratively captures the contemporary 
trend in international HIV/AIDS discourse; namely that ‘prevention’ has stepped into the 
background and given way for the integration of new and innovative treatment efforts in 
the struggle to curb the global HIV/AIDS pandemic. In this struggle, the nations of the 
western World—and a few other countries not usually caught within the frame of that 
expression (particularly Brazil and Cuba)—have long provided special pharmaceutical 
products capable of significantly prolonging the length and improving the quality of the 
lives of AIDS patients, albeit not permanently curative; namely highly active combination 
anti-retroviral therapy (ART, henceforth). 
 Due to well-founded concern voiced over multiple ART related issues—which shall 
each be dealt with in depth in this paper—ART was previously thought of as an unfeasible 
and implausible mean of combating the pandemic in resource limited settings, 
particularly Southern African Developing Countries (SADCs). However, as the heading of 
the IRIN article suggests, the provision of ART as a viable treatment intervention in these 
countries has become increasingly credible, primarily due to lower costs of drug 
procurement; due to a growing body of positive reports from tentative ART pilot projects 
realised by international NGOs; and due to increased donor funding and political will. 
Nonetheless, more serious concern has been voiced regarding the capacity of the 
governments of developing countries to overcome the practical (and ethical) difficulties 
that successful and sustained ART-provision is fraught with. In sub-Saharan Africa—
which is tragically the region hardest hit by AIDS in the world—these constraints to ART 
‘scale-up’ or ‘role-out’ are particularly severe and challenging, yet it is imperative that 
they be overcome, lest the pandemic will undermine and thwart the growth of nations. 
 As the situation (pro time) is that ART remains largely inaccessible to the vast 
majority of AIDS patients in sub-Saharan Africa, and since the undesirable social and 
economic consequences of continued inaccessibility are legion (including the premature 
death of literally millions—in the presence of ART), any future solution to this grim 
problem will involve an inherent understanding not only of the impediments to full-
scale access to ART, but also of their underlying causes. Therefore, this paper studies and 
analyses these obstacles in the specific context of Mozambique for the purpose of 
assessing the nature of the constraints to and perspectives of a rapid scale-up of 
universal access to anti-retroviral therapy in the public health care system. 
 
1.1 – Epistemology: the political economy of a health problem 
The purpose of this first chapter is twofold. First of all, we shall here explicitly clarify the 
theoretical and analytical instruments that form the methodological spine of this thesis. 
Yet, at the same time, this section is also intended as a guide to the reader as to how our 
 * 10 *
 
CHAPTER ONE: A BRIEF INTRODUCTION 
 
 
conceptual apparatus, or theoretical orientation, constitutes a lens through which 
specific issues and a broader contextualisation of the societal factors relevant to HIV/AIDS 
are discernable. The analogy of a theoretical framework as a ‘lens’ is useful because it 
figuratively illustrates how an intellectual orientation cues or rather forces us to ask 
certain questions about certain topics; just as a lens focuses a spectrum of light according 
to its own properties. 
 Until the mid-1990s, much HIV/AIDS research was occupied with promoting and/or 
investigating sexual behaviour changes; with examining the impacts of diverse 
prevention interventions; and with ethnographic or cultural analysis in a quest to reveal 
a special ‘African sexuality’. For what else could have fostered the rapid spread of the 
pandemic in Africa if not a ‘different’ or ‘exotic’ sexual behaviour pattern (as compared 
to western standards, or rather western ideology)? Fortunately, a small body of modern 
research later scrutinised much of this ‘research’ and found it to suffer from a ‘syndrome 
of over-generalisation’ assuming African cultural homogeneity; to be racist for seeing 
sexual behaviour as racially determined; and to contain a host of self-invented myths 
about polygamy and homosexuality. Among the more notable of these critiques are 
Stillwaggon [2003] and Oppong & Kalipeni [2004]. 
 The AIDS phenomenon has been approached in many different ways, but in much 
past and current research—in the still widely accepted and dominant mainstream 
discourse—there is a persistent focus on either a host of simplistic explanations or on 
purely clinical explanations. Biomedical studies still dominate and there is an emphasis 
upon preventive efforts such as condom distribution, encouraging abstinence, 
information and education campaigns, or changing (allegedly promiscuous) individual 
sexual behaviour. 
 Hence, as two decades of research has unfortunately, yet quite obviously, failed in 
crystallising into effective means of curbing the spread of the pandemic—and later also 
in solving the problem of inaccessibility to ART—there is an ‘unknown’ that we are still 
after. It is this ‘unknown’ that we cannot clearly see and have yet to discover. What fans 
the flames of the pandemic to make it smoulder ever more ominously across sub-
Saharan Africa? Where are its underpinnings to be found? This paper claims to provide 
an alternative research approach; a different ‘lens’, which is not quite as simplistic nor as 
purely clinical in nature as much previous and contemporary research. The theoretical 
foundation of this approach rests upon one primary and one secondary term: political 
economy and social medicine, respectively. Both terms are explained in the following. 
 
1.1.1 – Political economy 
Political economy is potentially a vast and virtually inexhaustible subject as it has, or at 
least so it can be argued, contributed to the rise of the principal political and economic 
philosophies of the past two or perhaps three centuries. One needs but to mention the 
names of only a handful of the protagonist authors of political economy to understand 
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how an almost infinite range of research topics and discussions can stem from this term: 
John Locke, Adam Smith, David Ricardo, Karl Marx, and Thomas Malthus. Therefore, we 
shall have to content—first of all— with a very simplistic and brief introduction to the 
term, and—second but most important of all—with an elaboration of how this term is 
functional here and what it signifies in the present context of HIV/AIDS and access to anti-
retroviral therapy in Mozambique. 
 Originally, in the 18th century, political economy was used to term the study of 
production, procurement, and distribution vis-à-vis legislation, taxation, and 
governments, or simply put: the economies of new nation states. Gradually, the role of 
economies in social relationships became an integrated concern rather than just the 
structural relationships within production and consumption. Leaving out mercantilism 
for our purpose here, two poles crystallised from such contemplation; namely liberalism 
and Marxism1 (not to confuse the latter with Russian and/or Chinese communism). 
Representatives of either ideological camp have since been—and are to this day—
engaged in a heated argument over key concepts, which they actually share, but have 
profoundly different ideas about; concepts that do not stand alone, but each play a part 
in the webs of meaning woven by each worldview: state, firm, market, capital, and 
labour. According to Pettman et al [1996]: 
 
“Despite an intensive search for neutral language with which to address both kinds of 
classical political economy, none has yet been found that provides a clearly specified account 
of the international political economy that all can accept. Even the ‘scientific method’—so 
fruitful in understanding the natural universe—has been shown to be an ideologically loaded 
discourse when applied to international political economy. This does not mean that such a 
search should be abandoned, or that we should turn our back on any attempt to be 
analytical. It does suggest, however, that we may always have incommensurable accounts of 
wealth making in the world; and that these accounts may never be reconciled because of the 
different value they espouse and the different views of human nature that underpin them” 
[Pettman et al 1996: 18]. 
 
In more recent times, from the 1970s and on, political economy has seen at least three 
new disciplines, which each focuses on one of three key dimensions of world affairs. 
Pettman et al [1996: 8-9] defines these disciplines and their dimensions as such: 
international relations (IR: the state-making dimension), international political economy 
(IPE: the wealth making dimension), and international political culture (IPC: the mind-
making dimension). IR is the domain of foreign ministries and policies, diplomacy, armed 
forces, strategic might and the ‘balance of power’. IPE concentrates on ministries of 
trade, transnational companies, labour markets and productivity, global ‘development’, 
and international financial institutions (such as the WTO, the IMF and the World Bank). IPC 
                                                        
1 ‘Neo’ can be applied as a prefix to either of these terms to signify the separation of relatively new ideas 
from more classical conceptualisations. 
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deals with ministries of education, the media, cultural formation and the ‘balance of 
ideologies’ [ibid]. These disciplines and dimensions overlap, so to speak, in most studies 
of political economy. According to Pettman et al [1996: ix], for instance, the studies of 
international political economy are concerned with understanding “the intricacies of 
world production and trade; describing and explaining the patterns of capital 
accumulation and work; [and] making clear the connections among state-making, 
international marketeering, and world development”. In short, political economy is the 
study of relations and causalities in the state-, wealth-, and culture-making dimensions 
of world affairs. 
 As touched upon in the introductory remarks, intense scientific work on HIV/AIDS 
has led to the development of effective combination drug therapies (ART). However, the 
majority of people living with AIDS in the world are not benefiting from such advances 
because of extreme poverty. This paper focuses on the pandemic as a reflection of a 
complex trajectory of social, political, and economic forces that create widening 
disparities in wealth and health and concomitant biological niches for the emergence of 
new HIV infections. While the biomedical approach to HIV/AIDS is necessary, it cannot, in 
isolation, explain HIV/AIDS and improve the health of populations. To achieve the latter 
will require a broader understanding and addressing the social causes of the pandemic. 
In this context, studying the political economy of AIDS appears to be a sound strategy 
because it directs us towards questions that facilitate such understanding. Political 
economy will ask, for instance, how national responses to the AIDS crisis have been 
influenced by international politics through foreign institutions and governments. How 
do international financial policies (such as patents or import taxation) affect the 
accessibility of poor countries to pharmaceutical products (anti-retrovirals) crucial to 
curative AIDS interventions? Moreover, it will inquire about the political rationales, 
interests, and relationships between key actors involved with the formulation of 
HIV/AIDS policies and/or policies affecting the biosocial realities of the disease. It might 
also shed light on how economic need and dependency lead to activities that magnify the 
risk of HIV transmission. How do socioeconomic circumstances influence the spread of 
HIV/AIDS, and how have complex geopolitical forces shaped these circumstances over 
time? How do intermingled political and economic relationships between institutions 
and governments affect an underlying reality of HIV/AIDS? 
 However, any particular health intervention, such as that of ART, is far from being 
the central topic area of political economy. Therefore, classical political economy does 
not provide the conceptual framework required to address the concerns that a study of 
AIDS and anti-retrovirals entails. For instance, when viewing the pandemic in, say, a 
historical perspective, our conceptual apparatus requires more than what classical 
political economy offers; it clearly needs to expand to encompass more than just a 
historical study to also embrace and consider epidemiological, biomedical, cultural, and 
pragmatic and technical elements and considerations; issues that all relate to HIV/AIDS 
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and ART. But how do we expand our conceptual apparatus without loosing the broader 
perspective of political economy? We do so by coupling political economy with a 
theoretical subset conceptualised in the term ‘social medicine’. Of course, this calls for 
elaboration. 
 
1.1.2 – Social medicine 
In 1996, Farmer et al published a book discussing women, poverty and AIDS, which 
suggested that determinants of sexual behaviour should be seen as a function not only of 
individual and social, but of structural and environmental factors as well. Paul Farmer, a 
clinician and an anthropologist, also reported that as late as October 1994 two of his 
colleagues stated that they were “not aware of other investigators who have considered 
the influence of socioeconomic status on mortality in HIV-infected individuals” [Farmer 
et al 1996: xiv]. 
 Since then, a minority group of researchers has lent solid credence to the 
assumption that poverty and precarious socioeconomic conditions can be linked directly 
to increased vulnerability to and risk of HIV infection. The operation of unmasking these 
linkages, and the factors underpinning them, is one of the cardinal tasks of social 
medicine. Or as Farmer puts it in another publication [Farmer 1996] … 
 
“[…] few have examined the contribution of social inequalities to disease emergence. Yet 
such inequalities have powerfully sculpted not only the distribution of infectious diseases, 
but also the course of disease in those affected. Outbreaks of Ebola, AIDS, and tuberculosis 
suggest that models of disease emergence need to be dynamic, systemic, and critical. Such 
models […] are critical of facile claims of causality, particularly those that scant the 
pathogenic roles of social inequalities. Critical perspectives on emerging infections ask how 
large-scale social forces influence unequally positioned individuals in increasingly 
interconnected populations; a critical epistemology of emerging infectious diseases asks 
what features of disease emergence are obscured by dominant analytic frameworks. 
Research questions stemming from such a re-examination of disease emergence would 
demand close collaboration between basic scientists, clinicians, and the social scientists and 
epidemiologists who adopt such perspectives” [Farmer 1996: 259]. 
 
In a third publication, Farmer [1999: 5] argues that in order to understand that “the 
disparities of risk and outcome […] are embedded in biosocial realities”, it is necessary to 
perform a ‘biosocial analysis’ that combines clinical medicine and social theory linking 
molecular epidemiology to history, ethnography, and political economy in an 
interdisciplinary approach. 
 What is becoming increasingly apparent here is that social medicine suggests the 
parallel (co)existence of different explanations to the factors underpinning the AIDS 
pandemic and that we cannot fully understand the nature and existence of these factors 
if we do not create interdisciplinary linkages or bridges between these explanations and 
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allow for them to form a symbiosis. Hence, we can now begin to see the formation of an 
analytical strategy; namely that to study reticulated links between social inequalities and 
disease is to ask: what are the precise mechanisms by which these diseases come to have 
their effects in some bodies but not in others? What propagative effects might social 
inequalities per se contribute? [Farmer 1996: 265]. 
 Farmer [1999: 8-9] takes a philosophical detour in explaining to us the lack of 
interconnectedness in parallel explanations. He does so by discussing the subjectivity of 
anthropological science and literature, and the tendency of anthropologists to focus on 
‘culture’ and ‘community’, and thus overlook the economic nexus, context, or underlying 
causes of disease. For instance … 
 
 “When we were face to face with sexual practices or AIDS outcomes that were manifestly 
linked to poverty and inequality, we wrote instead about the exotic reflections of cultural 
difference. Animal sacrifice, zoophilia, ritualized homosexuality, scarification, and ritual 
beliefs all figure prominently in the early anthropology of AIDS” [Farmer 1999: 9]. 
 
Farmer refers to this as the ‘visual-field defect’ in anthropology and medicine; the latter 
being oblivious to the social (and economic) context of disease: “[…] medicine, if it is to 
improve the health of the public,” he says, “must attend at one and the same time to its 
biological and to its social underpinnings” [Farmer 1999: 8]. 
 So far, this chapter has sketched out the primarily qualitative research approach of 
social medicine as a subset of political economy. In relation to HIV/AIDS and anti-
retrovirals, it appears sound to employ this method of research in an investigation of the 
pandemic in Mozambique (set in its global context) due to its potential of bridging 
parallel explanations by unveiling the interconnectedness between social, political, 
economical, and epidemiological phenomena. In other words, this approach is 
appropriate—it is argued here—because it enables us not only to explain the clinical 
phenomena of HIV/AIDS in relation to social inequalities, but also to recognise the large-
scale political, economic, environmental, and social forces and processes that produced 
these inequalities and shaped the pandemic in the first place, which might also enable us 
to hypothesise something about its future. 
 
1.2 – Analytical strategy and operational research questions 
Having now introduced and chosen the ‘lens’ of social medicine as the theoretical 
framework most appropriate, we now have an idea as to the kinds of questions that this 
approach directs us towards. But these questions are still rather abstract and theoretical 
in nature. In other words, they need to be translated into concrete research questions 
about the AIDS pandemic and about Mozambique in particular. In order to achieve this, 
we must ask what kinds of empirical data and pragmatic knowledge that we need for our 
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theoretical questions to be answered, because in doing so, the tasks at hand begin to 
unfold. 
 In other words, what follows here is the specific analytical strategy of this paper as 
defined and determined by social medicine as a subset of the overarching theme of the 
political economy of a specific health problem. Keep in mind, though, that the following 
is a) somewhat schematised in its form and not all-encompassing; and b) included to 
exemplify to the reader how certain theoretical research questions call for certain 
empirical investigations and rule others out as irrelevant; it is how our ‘lens’ filters a 
flimsy empirical light. Furthermore, presented below are a handful of (underscored) 
research questions, which guide the empirical emphasis and field of analysis of each 
chapter. 
 
1.2.1 – Chapters two and three 
Social medicine prompts us to inquire about the nature of the linkages between clinical 
and social spheres. Therefore we must ask: how, in the broader perspective of political 
economy, can international geopolitical and economic realities, environmental forces, 
and socioeconomically and historically determined circumstances come to be linked to a 
phenomenon that is fundamentally biological and traditionally only explicable from a 
clinical perspective?
 In this relation, an outset in history is ideal as a point of departure because history 
inherently ‘contains’ all of the larger elements—all events: politics, economics, social 
processes, etc—that the political economist is concerned with. By way of also employing 
social medicine in an historical reading of the AIDS pandemic in Mozambique, this study 
is not merely historical; it also consistently inquires about the significance of 
geopolitical, environmental, and socioeconomic forces vis-à-vis Mozambique’s apparent 
vulnerability to HIV/AIDS. Such an approach dictates that it is where these relationships 
are strongest that our empirical investigations must be centred. Bearing this in mind, the 
analysis takes off in chapter two by tracing the history of AIDS against the background of 
the changing political and economic forces that have shaped Mozambican society, 
mainly from independence in 1975 and up to present day. As a footnote, it should be said 
here that, contrarily, most contemporary HIV/AIDS research does not even consider the 
events of the 1980s and 1990s. 
 Apart from the historical context of the pandemic, we must also understand as 
much as possible about the national response to HIV/AIDS in Mozambique. Here, the 
dominant international discourse on AIDS is of paramount importance because it dictates 
the ’proper’ way of dealing with the disease, and thereby also the allocation of donor 
funds upon which many Southern African Developing Countries (SADCs) are utterly 
dependent. Hence, chapter three investigates the international political and institutional 
aspects of Mozambique’s response to HIV/AIDS. In this respect, the subjects that merit 
attention from the perspective of political economy relate to the power relations 
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between the key actors of this response; to the economic realities between them; to the 
historically determined path dependencies of government institutions (especially the 
health care sector); and to the wider global political environment by which national 
responses were inspired and moulded. Therefore, the questions that chapter three is 
chiefly concerned with are: how can structural relationships of political and financial 
power between national and international institutions and key actors working within 
the ambit of HIV/AIDS come to influence and configure a nations response to this 
emergency? What are the underlying realities of huge regional differences in HIV 
prevalence rates? How is AIDS morbidity and mortality likely to affect Mozambican 
society and economy in the (near) future?
 Finally, chapter three also aims to obtain a more practical knowledge of the 
structural characteristics of (health relevant) civil society. 
 
1.2.2 – Chapters four and five 
Chapter four is devoted to issues surrounding anti-retroviral therapy. It clarifies what 
ART actually is, and concentrates upon all of the factors that can be imagined to either 
negatively or positively influence its successful provision. Therefore, this chapter 
initially appears to stand out as the most pragmatic and technically oriented, but under 
the surface loom the socio-political and economic causalities and forces, which to some 
extent control the dominant discourse on AIDS, donor funding, and elements crucial to 
ART accessibility (such as global trade legislation, drug patents, pharmaceutical taxation, 
etc). It is exactly such forces that social medicine and political economy must scrutinise 
in order to see how they influence and shape the existence of anti-retrovirals, especially 
in sub-Saharan Africa. Initially, we simply ask this: what are the political and economic 
reasons why ARVs were not introduced in SADCs as soon as they became available? 
 Since answering this question unveils a range of relatively complex reasons, 
further operational research questions are presented in the text and relate to economic, 
organisational, and ethical considerations. 
 Based upon the historical, institutional, structural, financial, and technical 
foundations laid by previous chapters, chapter five investigates the political economy of 
Mozambique’s national introduction of anti-retrovirals, which began some five years 
ago. As this role-out is found to be ‘less national’ (meaning that several foreign actors are 
involved), we must ask: how can a national health intervention in sub-Saharan Africa be 
seen as a reflection of larger international political and economic forces and interests? 
What are the political realities behind the relatively late introduction of ART in 
Mozambique? To which extent is Mozambique’s ART intervention dependent upon the 
funding and administration of foreign powers? Moreover, social medicine cues us to ask: 
to what extent can social inequalities be a determining factor in limiting access to ART? 
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1.2.3 – Chapters six and seven 
By the time that the analysis gets to chapter six, enough will have been said to 
contemplate the implications of its findings for future policy advice. As the single most 
important institution to the successfulness of ART-provision is found to be the public 
health care sector, we put its most severe shortcomings under the microscope and 
perform an analysis in terms of its structural and human resource capacities. What are 
the political and economic circumstances, which directly or indirectly generate the most 
severe obstacles to effective ARV role-out in the public health care sector, and what 
measures might be taken to appease such forces? The results of this analysis—spawned 
by political economy and social medicine—have implications for future policy advice 
that significantly differ from the widely accepted mainstream discourse and shed better 
light on the AIDS pandemic and ART interventions in SADCs. Lastly, the seventh and final 
chapter summarises and concludes. 
 
1.2.4 – Cardinal questions 
Thus, in an effort to convince the audience that social medicine—contrary to much 
contemporary research—holds the potential to bring about a broader contextualisation 
of societal factors in the explanation of the pandemic, the single most important 
questions sought answered throughout this thesis are: what is the theoretical 
contribution of social medicine to our comprehension of the AIDS pandemic; what has it 
taught us on the area of anti-retrovirals; and what are the implications of this for future 
policy advice on role-out of universal access to anti-retroviral therapy in the public 
health care sector of contemporary Mozambique? 
 
1.3 – Further comments and delimitations 
According to the requirements of the analytical strategy, specific empirical data were 
discerned from a review of published literature including structured surveys and site 
visits performed by various researchers concerned particularly with anti-retroviral 
therapy. Also included are excerpts from a range of interviews with government officials 
and experts conducted by international news media, as well as empirical data published 
by national Mozambican institutions, and material obtained through personal 
communications with Mozambican academics, health care personnel, and international 
NGOs. 
 When supportive of comprehension and argumentation, maps, photos, tables and 
figures have been included in the text and as appendices. Where articles and books in 
Portuguese are cited in discussions, an English translation has been supplied and the 
original text kept in footnotes. While this paper was certainly written with the ambition 
of being of relevance to professionals and researchers, an effort has been made to make 
its contents as comprehensible as possible for readers not normally concerned with the 
subject of HIV/AIDS and anti-retroviral therapy by providing—in the beginning and 
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throughout and/or at the end of each chapter—an analytical topography, so to speak, so 
as to firmly link the range of empirical investigations to their larger overarching 
theoretical orientation.  
 Due to this emphasis, and the nature of social medicine, a number of issues are 
merely touched upon and left partially unexplored. There will be no discussion or deeper 
analysis of Mozambican ethnography or culture vis-à-vis HIV/AIDS. Nor will there be any 
focus on sexual behaviour change, except hypothetically in relation to anti-retroviral 
therapy. Moreover, although much can be said on the subject of gender inequalities in 
HIV/AIDS, this subject is treated only superficially in a section on Mozambican 
epidemiology. 
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2 – Why speak of the past? 
 
Last year, some 40.3 million people were estimated to be infected with the Human 
Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) and/or to suffer from the Acquired Immunodeficiency 
Syndrome (AIDS) worldwide. Of these, a staggering 25.8 million (64%) were located in sub-
Saharan Africa. Of all HIV-infected people, an estimated 1.5 million, or 5.8%, resided in 
Mozambique alone [UNAIDS/WHO 2005: 8-9 & 77-78]. Globally, between 2003 and 2005, 
1,800 infants were born with HIV every single day [Zarocostas 2006b]. 
 Once prevalent, HIV/AIDS generates poverty, contributes to famine, consumes both 
household and government resources, and induces instability, as well as the social 
exclusion and discrimination associated with its stigma [Jones 2004: 388]. Today, 
Mozambique’s national HIV/AIDS prevalence rate has risen to 16.2%2 according to a 
national surveillance system [GTM 2005]. Interpreting how and why this country would 
be so vulnerable to HIV/AIDS is a necessary prelude to any assessment of methods by 
which the negative impacts and spread of the pandemic might be curbed. Or as 
formulated in our analytical strategy: how, in the broader perspective of political 
economy, can international geopolitical and economic realities, environmental forces, 
and socioeconomically and historically determined circumstances come to be linked to a 
phenomenon that is fundamentally biological and traditionally only explicable from a 
clinical perspective? 
 A minority group of social scientists—Schoepf [2004]; Stillwaggon [2002]; Oppong 
& Kalipeni [2004]; Whiteside [2002], to name a few studies—advances credible arguments 
that risk of and host susceptibility to HIV/AIDS are—in a number of ways that shall each 
be dealt with in depth—significantly influenced by factors such as poverty, malnutrition, 
parasitosis, Sexually Transmitted Infections (STIs) and other opportunistic infections 
(tuberculosis and malaria in particular), national and international infrastructure, 
population mobility (especially when related to migrant labour systems), culturally or 
socioeconomically conditioned behaviour patterns, gender relations and inequities, and 
the practices (and states) of health care facilities and networks.  
 In this light, present chapter aims to draw an outline of the modern history of 
Mozambique, while at the same time highlighting a range of themes, which have 
crucially influenced and shaped the above-mentioned factors. As we shall see, this paper 
identifies 10 essential factors to have played pivotal roles in fostering and deepening 
Mozambique’s HIV/AIDS pandemic in the past, while some still continue to do so 
contemporarily: 
 1) The endemic and merciless RENAMO violence and the ensuing civil war—
sponsored by apartheid with the silent acquiescence of western powers, particularly the 
                                                        
2 HIV/AIDS prevalence rates vary significantly from province to province within Mozambique. One health 
post (C.S. Ponta-Gêa) located in Beira in the Sofala province reported 34.4% prevalence while another (C.S. 
Marrupa) reported just 2.7% in the Marrupa district of the Niassa province [GTM 2005]. 
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US and the UK—fostered HIV/AIDS in complex ways, especially by destroying more than 
half of all educational and health care facilities and by limiting access to large parts of 
the country. 
 2) The uprooting and subsequent mobility of nearly half of Mozambique’s 
population during the war resulted in the internal displacement of millions of people 
(usually referred to as IDPs) who experienced elevated risks of contracting and 
transmitting HIV infection. 
 3) The presence of thousands of HIV-infected foreign soldiers in places clustered 
with IDPs where transactional sex was a vital part of the local economy. 
 4) High numbers of refugees returning from long stays in neighbouring states with 
high HIV/AIDS prevalence rates accelerated the spread of the retrovirus; firstly along the 
major transport corridors, and ultimately into rural villages and inland towns. All actors 
failed to address the problem. 
 5) The structural adjustments and economic policies imposed on Mozambique by 
international institutions and foreign donors, which have restricted or limited access to 
health care crucial to withstand HIV infection, especially for the poorer strata of 
population. 
 6) The legacy of colonial rule, which left Mozambique with its persisting migrant 
labour system; with an almost non-existent health care infrastructure; and with very low 
levels of literacy and education. 
 7) Injections and infusions with HIV-infected blood and the use of unsterilised 
medical equipment (the practices of some ‘traditional healers’ included). 
 8) Mozambique’s considerable dependence upon foreign donors to survive, which 
led to organisational chaos and weakened government’s capacity to effectively plan and 
implement HIV/AIDS strategies and programmes. Furthermore, post-war donors have 
been unwilling to seriously redress the health care infrastructure that was severely 
damaged by civil war. 
 9) Natural disasters such as prolonged periods of drought, famine, and destructive 
floods caused malnutrition and diseases, which increase host susceptibility to HIV. 
 10) The poor socioeconomic living conditions of some 75% of all Mozambicans 
living in ‘absolute poverty’ put them at higher risk of HIV/AIDS. This can in part be seen 
as the cumulative result of most of the above factors. The increased vulnerability to 
HIV/AIDS resulting from ‘poverty’ (as a broad concept) has led some to suggest that the 
abbreviation ‘AIDS’ really stands for the ‘Acquired Income Deficiency Syndrome’, thus 
drawing a direct parallel between poverty and AIDS, which is not entirely reprehensible 
[Setel 1999]. 
 The following eight sections identify and discuss the historical context of each of 
these unfortunate circumstances. 
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2.1 – Before June 25th 1975: Pre-Independence 
The vast 800,000-km2 that the modern boundaries of Mozambique enclose were 
demarked by colonial powers in 1891 during the ‘scramble for Africa’ (see MAP I: 
Mozambique, political map). Consequently, the level of Mozambican national unity was 
highly questionable even at independence3. When Antonio Salazar was put in power 
through the 1926 coup in Portugal, the fascist dictator reclaimed control over 
Mozambique—which was previously held by private colonial companies—and 
implemented the ‘indigenous peoples rule’, which manifested a brand of Portuguese 
apartheid of forced labour for the African populace regulated by collaborating 
‘traditional’ clan chiefs (régulos) [Hanlon 1991: 12]. By 1975, only 1% of the African 
population had ‘assimilated’ and gained civil rights, whereas approximately two million 
people had fled the oppression to neighbouring states [Waterhouse 1996: 6-8]. 
 The economic policies of colonial rule were almost exclusively extractive and 
exploitative. This is revealed by the locations of major transport corridors—roads, 
railways, and oil pipelines—that run from the interior of the country and from 
landlocked neighbouring countries to the Indian Ocean port cities of Beira, Maputo, and 
Nacala, which serve as important export outlets (see MAP III: Road Corridors in 
Mozambique). The system of forced labour laid the foundations for a tradition of migrant 
labour, which persists to this day, and has sent millions of Mozambicans to the South 
African goldmines of Witwatersrand, plantations, and construction sites, primarily along 
the transport corridors [Beckmann & Rai 2005: 10]. Such work involves long contracts of 
up to 11 month. Away from family life, and living in single sex hostels, workers seek 
sexual intimacy from sex workers, or elsewhere, thus boosting the risk of HIV infection 
[Collins 2006: 9]. Once home, many unknowingly infect their wives or lovers in rural 
areas or towns. According to Oppong & Kalipeni [2004: 54-5], the women left behind are 
likely to experience a decreased household income and migrate to cities “where some 
engage in one of the very few options open to them: prostitution […]”. Thus, in this 
respect, the relatively high number of sexual partners is a direct consequence of the 
economic circumstances of the labour market. 
 By 1960, resistance against colonial rule had begun mobilisation from abroad, and 
in 1962, three resistance fractions (MANU, UDENAMO & UNAMI4) merged in Tanzania to form 
FRELIMO (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique / Front for the Liberation of Mozambique), a 
Marxist-Leninist revolutionary movement, which began a 10-year guerrilla war against 
                                                        
3 Presently, Mozambique’s population is comprised of ethnic groups Makua-lowe (47%), Tsonga (23%), 
Malawi (12%), Shona (11%), Yao (4%), and others (3%) [Watts 2005: 34]. Religiously, there are 20% Christian, 
30% Muslim and 50% honouring ‘traditional’ religious beliefs. Apart from the official Portuguese—which 
many Mozambicans do not speak—people speak Swahili and more than 20 Bantu languages [Hansson 2004: 
4]. 
4 The Mozambican African National Union, the National Democratic Union of Mozambique (União 
Democrática Nacional de Moçambique), and the National African Union of Independent Mozambique (União 
Africana de Moçambique Independente). 
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Portuguese colonial rule. The Portuguese received military support from the US, whereas 
FRELIMO left the west in favour of the USSR and China that offered military support. The 
1974 Carnation Revolution in Portugal gave sudden victory to FRELIMO, which was handed 
state power, and colonial capital Lourenço Marques was renamed Maputo [Waterhouse 
1996: 9]. 
 
2.2 – 1975-1980: Independence and the consolidation of a socialist state 
Commencing one year before official independence, some 200,000 Portuguese fled the 
country in a mass exodus destroying their property and taking with them everything of 
value as they left [Hartmann: 1994: 16]. As rural and urban commerce collapsed, FRELIMO 
was left alone at the steering wheel with institutional structures distorted after more 
than 400 years of colonial rule, but set out enthusiastically to socialise and modernise the 
nation. 
  A public health care system—crucial to countering an emerging HIV epidemic—
was nearly non-existent since colonial rulers had spent practically nothing on public 
health care. When the Portuguese left, only 86 of 519 doctors remained leaving most of 
the population with access to only ‘traditional healers’ (curandeiros) and a handful of 
mission churches [Collins 2006: 10]. Moreover, when responding to a national health 
emergency such as HIV/AIDS, the population’s level of education and literacy is of 
paramount importance. At independence, 95% of all Mozambicans were illiterate and 
70% had no access to educational facilities at all, seriously obstructing any efforts of 
information dissemination [ibid: 11]. 
 Socially, so-called ‘dynamising groups’ (grupos dinamizadores) became the 
administrative and local-level political bodies [Hanlon 1991: 12-3]. Due to the new 
political ideology of ‘scientific’ socialism, these groups marginalised the collaborators of 
colonial rule and outlawed ‘traditionalism’ and ‘backwardness’, i.e. traditional healers, 
polygamy, initiation rites, etc [Hansson 2004: 14]. In the same spirit, all private medical 
practices were officially banned, and not reintroduced until as late as 1992 [Kaarhus & 
Rebelo 2003: 11]. An agenda of massive social change was initiated through the 
nationalisation of health, education, and key economic sectors [Hanlon 1991: 11]. 
Economically, new industry and large state-run farms were prioritised first and 
foremost. By 1977, economic decline had stopped and relative order had been attained. 
 Mozambique, however, had joined the United Nations (UN) sanctions against UDI 
Rhodesia (later Zimbabwe), which brought trade to a costly standstill there. South Africa 
had—in return—imposed sanctions on Mozambique, and in 1975, Rhodesian security 
forces created the surrogate rebel movement MNR (later RENAMO—Resistência Nacional 
Moçambicana / Mozambican National Resistance) in retaliation of FRELIMO’s support to 
Zimbabwean and South African freedom fighters (ZANLA & ANC5) [Newitt 1995: 564]. 
                                                        
5 Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army and African National Congress. 
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During 1977-1979, RENAMO attacked central Mozambique heavily in atrocious ways, 
barbarously targeting civilians and infrastructure. 
 The following year, however, the newly modernised and mechanised Mozambican 
army defeated Rhodesian military in a series of artillery won victories. Zimbabwe 
became independent and the Southern African Development Coordination Conference6 
(SADCC) was founded, which resulted in increasing foreign financial inflows due to 
increases in trade, but also in the growing antagonism towards Mozambique of the US, 
the UK, West Germany, and South Africa in particular [Hanlon 1991: 56]. In consolidation 
of political and economic independence, a new Mozambican currency—the metical—
replaced the old colonial banknotes [ibid: 16]. Finally, FRELIMO announced an ambitious 
10-year development plan and declared that the 1980s would become ‘the decade of 
victory over underdevelopment’. 
 At this point, it seemed that the economy was back on track, and most notably, 
Mozambique won international praise for extending health care and increasing literacy. 
In the first 6 years, primary school enrolment doubled and annual secondary school 
intake increased from 20,000 to 135,000. 90% of the population were vaccinated against 
small pox, tetanus, and measles and infant mortality rate fell by 20% [Waterhouse 1996: 
10]. The number of doctors increased (from 86 to 300), and the number of rural health 
posts grew from 326 to 1,195 [Lindelow 2002: 5]. A 1982 World Health Organisation (WHO) 
survey indicated that 81% of rural children were seen at least once by a government 
health worker—an incredibly high proportion for Africa—and that two thirds of all 
health posts were sufficiently stocked with essential drugs [Hanlon 1991: 10]. 
Furthermore, health budget expenditure grew from 3.3% in 1974 to an annual average of 
10% between 1976 and 1982 [Collins 2006: 10]. Incontestably, this was the victory for 
which FRELIMO gained the most popularity. 
 
2.3 – 1981-1983: A turn for the worse 
During this period, a series of dramatic events occurred that had devastating and tragic 
impacts on Mozambique in several ways. First of all, southern Africa was struck by the 
worst drought of the century causing widespread famine [Newitt 1995: 554-6]. In 
Mozambique, foreign emergency relief from major western donors did not increase—as 
would have otherwise been expected—due to their hostility towards the SADCC and 
Marxists states in general [ibid: 560-2]. 
 Furthermore, the world’s political cold-war climate took a sharp turn to the 
right—with Reagan in the US and Thatcher in the UK. The second oil price rise triggered 
world recession (global financial crisis), which hit Mozambique’s exports, pushed up 
interest rates, and cut off new credit [Hanlon 1991: 18 & 113]. 
                                                        
6 Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe and (from 
1990) Namibia. 
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 Worst of all, South Africa took the ‘constructive engagement’7 policy of the Reagan 
administration towards South Africa as a licence to roll out its policy of ‘destabilisation’ 
on its Marxist neighbours: Angola and Mozambique. Understanding destabilisation is 
essential to the comprehension of the causes underlying the troubles that Mozambique 
was to experience in the time to come. In short, it was a very violent mean to a very 
political end. The strategy of destabilisation was to curtail food to the target’s 
population; to paralyse the productive and economic base; and to create social instability 
in order for the people to direct its frustration at the target’s regime, thus weakening it 
and causing it to loose legitimacy and power to the furthest extent possible [Hanlon 
1991: 20 & 82]. RENAMO, which would have otherwise faded away along with Rhodesia in 
1980, was therefore adopted by South Africa that provided it with strong military 
support and training. 
 Operating within Mozambique, RENAMO ‘successfully’ carried out South Africa’s 
strategy of destabilisation by committing literally unspeakable atrocities; by massive 
destruction of infrastructure (communication and power lines, roads, rails, bridges, etc); 
and by attacking industrial and public institutions such as factories and schools [Hanlon 
1991: 31-3]. This paper argues that this violence played a significant role in accelerating 
and worsening the HIV/AIDS epidemic in Mozambique in a number of ways. During the 
war, villages and rural communities were uprooted and 4 million people were internally 
displaced (IDPs) as they fled their lands and clustered around the major transport 
corridors that the government sought to keep safe [Waterhouse 1996: 14]. IDPs had their 
family patterns disrupted, which caused changes in sexual behaviour [Collins 2006: 11]. 
Furthermore, they came to suffer from a range of other ailments (malnutrition, 
untreated STIs, etc). As we are coming to understand, HIV transmission is not simply a 
matter of (primarily hetero) sexual behaviour. 
 In an examination of the biomedical effects of economic conditions in Africa—an 
analysis referred to as an interdisciplinary ‘economic/biomedical hypothesis’—
Stillwaggon [2002: 1] demonstrates “a correlation of economic and epidemiological 
variables (nutrition, distribution of income, and urbanisation) with [prevalence] rates of 
HIV”. Two factors present throughout sub-Saharan Africa have been documented to 
undermine the responsiveness of the human immune system; namely malnutrition and 
parasite infection [ibid: 3-4]. In other words, if an individual does not perish from 
recurrent malnutrition and parasitosis, these will leave it in a weakened state. Therefore, 
Stillwaggon [2002: 4] finds that “[…] malnutrition and parasite infection increase HIV 
susceptibility, not only to opportunist infection after HIV infection, but also to HIV 
transmission, just as they increase susceptibility to other infectious diseases”. This is 
                                                        
7 US policy devised by the Reagan administration for the purpose of encouraging change in South Africa’s 
apartheid system through a quiet dialogue with that country’s white minority leaders. The policy failed, 
and the US were ultimately forced to impose economic sanctions in late 1984 due to a dramatic surge of 
anti-apartheid protests and political activism in the US. 
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worrisome given the context of frequent draught and famine in sub-Saharan Africa, 
especially when recollecting that in the 1970s and 1980s—where the AIDS pandemic had 
its origins—the region saw worsening poverty, drought, and malnutrition to the extent 
that up to half of the population suffered serious malnutrition [ibid: 4]. It follows that it 
is paramount to the understanding of Mozambique’s vulnerability to HIV/AIDS to 
acknowledge that regardless of the number of sexual contacts, the risk of contracting HIV 
associated with each contact is far greater for malnourished individuals [ibid 8-9]. 
 The public education and health care systems were severely hit by RENAMO because 
they contributed much to FRELIMO’s popularity [Hanlon 1991: 179]. Teachers and health 
care workers became primary military targets and were killed, kidnapped, or mutilated. 
As vaccination clinics and maternity hospitals were targeted, many areas—especially 
rural communities—lost primary health care services all together. 50-75% of all health 
posts, clinics, and schools were annihilated or abandoned for fear of RENAMO violence 
[Lindelow 2002: 6; Waterhouse 1996: 14], severely limiting access to testing for HIV 
infection, condoms, neonatal care, and public HIV/AIDS education programmes [Collins 
2006: 15]. By 1986, the health care gains of Mozambique’s first decade of independence 
had largely been reversed [ibid: 14]. Politically, in the west, an image was being 
promoted that RENAMO consisted of freedom fighters battling an evil Marxist regime in 
the effort of liberating their people. 
 The new Mozambican army was totally unable to respond to a guerrilla war and 
experienced difficulties in defending major transport corridors critical to national and 
international commerce [Hanlon 1991: 26-27]. Therefore, Mozambique signed a mutual 
defence agreement with Zimbabwe in 1981. The number of Zimbabwean troops present 
along the Beira corridor reached 10,000 by 1985 [Collins 2006: 12]. While these troop may 
have succeeded in defending the corridor, they also increased HIV infection rates in 
Mozambique. As we have seen, the corridor was overcrowding with malnourished IDPs in 
search of security. These (and other) impoverished people often resorted to 
transactional sex to survive, which actually became a vital part of the local economy 
[ibid: 12-3]. Just as the truck drivers and migrant workers already traversing the 
corridor, the wealthier Zimbabwean soldiers were themselves away from their families 
(and men in their sexual prime). The estimated HIV/AIDS prevalence rate among 
Zimbabwean soldiers in this period was 55% and “Zimbabwean military […] was 
estimated to have an STD rate of 80%” [ibid: 13]. 
 The global financial crisis, drought, famine, and destabilisation came just at a time 
when FRELIMO began to face some of the consequences of its own administrative errors. 
Import of raw materials and consumer goods stopped, halted industry, and led to 
shortages that generated a major black market [Hartmann 1994: 69-71; Hanlon 1991: 114]. 
By the end of 1983, the import/export surplus had shifted and FRELIMO was loosing 
control politically, administratively, and economically. 
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2.4 – 1984-1986: Forced to concede 
During 1984, 100,000 Mozambicans died of starvation in widespread famine, and 
malnutrition was endemic to many regions, especially the southern [Waterhouse 1996: 
34]. Meanwhile, FRELIMO sought to negotiate a peace treaty with South Africa to end its 
support of RENAMO. South Africa agreed, so long as Mozambique would stop supporting 
the ANC, which it did accordingly. The Nkomati peace treaty was signed, but less than six 
month later in mid-1984, South Africa sharply increased assistance to RENAMO, 
completely dishonouring the treaty [Hanlon 1991: 29-30; Newitt 1995: 567]. 
 Previously, FRELIMO had always—perhaps naïvely so—believed that it could lead a 
politics of non-alignment with neither east nor west, and a top priority had always been 
to stay out of the International Monetary Fond (IMF) and the Lomé Convention. Now, 
having already joined the European Community’s Lomé Convention in 1982, not for 
economic benefits, but for its symbolic ‘western’ value … 
 
“[…] FRELIMO realized that destabilisation was the central problem, and that it needed 
international help to end the war. In practice, that meant reducing the hostility of the 
Reagan administration. […] South Africa was in the US sphere of influence, and the only way 
to end destabilisation was for Washington to put pressure on Pretoria” [Hanlon 1991: 27-8]. 
 
In 1984, Mozambique announced that it could not repay its debts, as did many other 
southern African countries at the time. Creditors conditioned a rescheduling of loans 
with Mozambican membership of the IMF [Hanlon: 1991: 113]. Hence, Mozambique 
eventually turned west and was forced to formally join the IMF and the World Bank in 
late 1984. Over the next two years, only limited liberalisation and privatisation took 
place [Waterhouse 1996: 42]. Though western donors poured in—in a virtual aid 
invasion—they held back aid in order to force policy change in spite of thousands of 
people dying of starvation. 1986 experienced production levels half of what they had 
been on the eve of independence in 1975. 
 In early 1987, much to the surprise of everyone, Mozambique announced its own 
‘version’ of a structural adjustment programme (SAP): the Economic Rehabilitation 
Programme (PRE—Programa de Reabilitação Econômica) [Hanlon 1991: 118-120]. This 
effective acquiescence to IMFs SAP portrays FRELIMO’s failure in finding a way out and its 
concession to western pressure. Furthermore, the economic adjustments deepened the 
national HIV/AIDS crisis by reducing access to health care for Mozambique’s most 
vulnerable and impoverished people. The IMF and the World Bank insisted that 
Mozambique ought to cut public health care subsidies and introduce a fee-based system. 
In 1981, government expended 11.0% of state budget on health (US$ 4.26 per capita 
expenditure). In 1988, the figure had plummeted to 3.5% (US$ 0.68 per capita) [Hanlon 
1991: 179-180]. In a 2002 study, Lindelow analysed the impact of different policy changes 
on access to treatment for poor Mozambicans. According to him … 
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“[…] in the simulation, even a relatively modest increase in user fees at public facilities 
results in a large reduction in health care demand, and an increase in the probability that 
individuals do not consult with a medical practitioner in the event of illness. […] the data 
suggest that even relatively small price changes would have a substantial impact on access to 
public health care, in particular for poorer households” [Lindelow 2002: 75 & 78]. 
 
In 1985, user charges had earned 3% of the health budget. Yet after the introduction of 
the new higher prices, less was earned signifying a sharp fall in the use of the system 
[Hanlon 1991: 180]. Thus, the cumulative results of PRE on health care were that a) public 
clinics in poorer areas were left with very limited resources; b) the poorest had to 
increasingly rely on curandeiros (with no scientific knowledge about HIV/AIDS); and c) the 
wealthiest population strata could now receive high quality health care [Collins 2006: 18]. 
 
2.5 – 1987-1992: Structural adjustment and peace at last 
Destabilisation peaked in late 1986. In 1989, 7.7 million people (50% of population) 
depended on food aid [Hanlon 1991: 37]. FRELIMO had given up its Marxist-Leninist 
philosophy declaring Mozambique a democratic state with a free market economy, rights 
to free expression, and political rights in the new constitution of 1990. 
 With the end of the Cold War and because of waning ideological justification of 
RENAMO—due to the end of Apartheid; the democratisation of Malawi; and FRELIMO’s 
move to the west—its military chances began to seem bleak. Moreover, 1990-1992 saw 
severe drought. In the 1992 drought, 90% of all crops withered away and wasted because 
of absent rains [Hartmann 1994: 29]. Thus, it became clear that no one could decisively 
win the exhausting civil war, and so direct peace talks began in 1990. The war officially 
ended in Rome October 4 1992 when a cease-fire was signed and a general amnesty 
agreed [Hansson 2004: 15]. 
 To summarise the results of the war (destabilisation): foreign donor agencies 
dominated the country and 80% of the entire state budget was financed by foreign aid 
(1992). Mozambique had suffered US$ 15-18 billion in economic looses, 1 million dead, 
and 4 million IDPs [Newitt 1995: 571]. National industry was in ruins and 50-75% of all 
health posts, clinics, and schools were destroyed or had been abandoned [Lindelow 2002: 
6; Waterhouse 1996: 14]. 2 million still depended on food aid, two thirds of the population 
were living in ‘absolute poverty’, and 70% had no access to primary health care (or could 
not afford it after the PRE price adjustments) [Waterhouse 1996: 26-7 & 50; Hartmann 
1994: 23]. For an illustration of the degree of damage that infrastructure had sustained in 
1990, see MAP IV: Mozambique: Conditions of Accessibility, February 1990. 
 The relative isolation and inaccessibility of large parts of Mozambique no doubt 
sheltered from the rapid spread of HIV/AIDS and kept prevalence rates low compared to 
those of neighbouring states of which some had the highest HIV prevalence rates in 
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southern Africa at the time. Conversely, not mentioned in the above are the 1.7 million 
refugees (10% of population) that fled Mozambique during the war [Waterhouse 1996: 
26]8. Now, they began to return to their homelands throughout Mozambique, mainly via 
the already congested transport corridors, where they often paused in cities waiting for 
their homelands to be cleared of landmines [Collins 2006: 15]. There are three factors to 
be considered in relation to the higher risk of contracting HIV in refugee camps: a) 
limited access to health care and clean water undermine capacity to prevent HIV 
infection; b) with nothing to do but wait, sex is often the only recreational activity 
available and refugees are often too poor to buy condoms; and c) refugees separated 
from spouses have increased numbers of sexual partners [ibid]. Consequently, many 
became infected with HIV during their stay in refugee camps abroad. According to Collins 
[2006: 15-6], “virtually no HIV testing or monitoring of refugees was done, either on 
arrival at refugee camps or when repatriated” and “virtually no HIV/AIDS programmes 
were provided for refugees outside the country”. 
 
2.6 – 1993-1994: Demobilisation and free elections  
The UN mission (ONUMOZ9)—paid for by multilateral donors—that had facilitated the 
peace agreement between FRELIMO and RENAMO forces stayed on in Mozambique with 
7,000 troops to oversee the difficult task of demobilising the opposing armies and to 
monitor the realisation of free multiparty elections [Hansson 2004: 15]. Demobilisation 
was completed. In spite of much trouble, some 75,000 troops were discharged and joined 
the ranks of the unemployed. The new joint Armed Defence Forces of Mozambique 
(FADM) succeeded in conscribing only 10-12,000 troops due to low wages and war fatigue 
[Waterhouse 1996: 16-9]. 
 Multiparty elections officially ended the UN mandate. FRELIMO won the relatively 
peaceful elections gaining 129 seats in parliament, while RENAMO won 112. When ONUMOZ 
withdrew, violent crime and robberies began because a Cease-Fire Commission (CCF) 
failed at collecting arms. That problem persists to this day, along with a grim landmine 
problem, largely due to hopelessly incomplete landmine maps, especially those of 
RENAMO [Hansson 2004: 15]. Anti-personnel mines in large quantities were placed mainly 
around villages or public installations—to protect them from RENAMO attacks—or 
planted to disrupt trade routes or rural tracks to destabilise FRELIMO. Consequently, the 
primary victims were, and continue to be, civilians [Waterhouse 1996: 20-22]. 
 
                                                        
8 Their destinations included Malawi (1.1 million refugees), South Africa (250,000), Zimbabwe (230,000), 
Tanzania (72,000), Swaziland (25,000), Zambia (24,000), and 1,000 in other countries [UN 1995 in Collins 
2006: 15]. 
9 For details on ONUMOZ: http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/onumozF.html (United Nations 
website). 
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2.7 – 1995-2006 Peacetime and growth 
In 1995, 60% of the state budget and 90% of the investment budget were financed by 
foreign aid putting Mozambique in hock to its foreign donors and financers [Waterhouse 
1996: 42-4]. The price of such high dependency was that donors used foreign aid to gain 
leverage over and influence Mozambique to “adopt more capitalist, pro-market policies 
and to reduce the governments role in services and the economy” [Collins 2006: 16-7]. 
This process marginalised Mozambican government officials and reduced the level of 
national sovereignty in decision-making and in the planning of HIV/AIDS programmes. It 
also sapped the institutional capacity of the country’s health care sector because the 
attractiveness of higher wages—and the status associated with employment in 
international NGOs—led to the departure of professional, but low-paid health personnel 
from government entities [ibid: 17]. Moreover, the uncoordinated and unsystematic way 
in which a multitude of foreign NGOs set up their individual HIV/AIDS programmes added 
to the organisational chaos.  
 During the post-war period, people returned to their lands; the economy began to 
recover; and thousands of production enterprises were privatised [Hansson: 2004: 20]. In 
1997, the economic growth rate hit an impressive 12% and 1998 saw the first HIPC debt 
reduction (Heavily Indebted Poor Countries) [ibid 2004: 15-6 & 29]. In the initial post-war 
period, debt repayments had consumed as much as US$ 1 million a day, which otherwise 
could have been spent on health and education [Collins 2006: 18]. 
 The following year, FRELIMO won the presidency once more with 52% of the votes, 
but government refused to realise municipal election in rural areas resulting in RENAMO 
protests and civil unrest [Watts 2005: 35; DANIDA 2000: 8] 
 In 2000-2001, tragedy struck once more when floods killed 700 and caused massive 
damage to (reconstructed) agriculture and infrastructure. More than half a million was 
displaced, entire cities washed away, and widespread epidemics ensued [Hansson 2004: 
16]. The following year, draught replaced flood and threatened to cause famine, which 
once more undermined the potential of large parts of the population to withstand HIV 
infection [Watts 2005: 35]. 
 While the public health care infrastructure did see some reconstruction following 
the peace accord of 1992, ironically, the health care sector might have fuelled the AIDS 
pandemic unintentionally. In fact, researchers have estimated that perhaps 20-40% of all 
HIV infections in Africa have been acquired through injections and infusions with HIV-
infected blood or through the use of unsterilised medical equipment [Bate & Tren 2004: 
2]. Data from Mozambique show that an average of 8.5% of all blood donors were HIV-
positive in 2003 [CNCS 2004: 28]. In Maputo province, the figure was as high as 23.6%, so 
some infected blood donations are likely to have escaped the eyes of quality control 
[ibid]. See APPENDIX C: Unsafe Practices for examples. 
 In 2004, FRELIMO won elections for the third time. In most recent times, 70-80% of 
all Mozambicans still live in ‘absolute poverty’ (i.e. living for less than US$ 1.0 per day), 
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particularly in rural areas [Hansson 2004: 18 & 24-25]. The country ranks 168 of a total 
177 countries on the UN Human Development Index (HDI) [UNDP 2006]. 
 
2.8 – Structural violence 
The concept of ‘structural violence’, as presented by Farmer et al [1996: 369], is defined as 
“a series of large scale forces—ranging from gender inequality and racism to poverty—
which structure unequal access to goods and services”. The experiences recounted in 
this chapter describe a political economy of risk of HIV transmission and infection and 
serve to demonstrate why the AIDS pandemic has grown so quickly. They also portray 
Mozambique as a victim of structural violence, which means that some people are at 
high risk of HIV infection from the outset. According to Farmer et al [1996]: 
 
“Their sickness may be thought of as a result of ‘structural violence’, because it is neither 
nature nor pure individual will that is at fault, but rather historically given (and often 
economically driven) processes and forces that conspire to constrain individual agency. 
Structural violence is visited upon on all those whose social status denies them access to the 
fruits of scientific and social advances” [Farmer et al 1996: 23]. 
 
This entails a clouded perspective not just for Mozambique, but for the rest of sub-
Saharan Africa as well. In fact, literally millions of people in circumstances similar to 
those of the Mozambicans are likely to meet similar fates of HIV infection independently 
of their diverse cultural traits and ‘ethnographic’ characteristics. Perhaps, the most 
important lesson to be learned from the story told here is that Mozambique’s population 
has been rendered vulnerable to HIV/AIDS through social processes. This should be taken 
to mean “economic, political, and cultural forces that can be shown to shape the 
dynamics of HIV transmission” [Farmer et al 1996: 23].  
 Alternatively, one could identify structural violence as a central and key concept of 
social medicine, which signifies the combined effects of all of these forces and their 
ensuing biological consequences. This can be demonstrated by ordering the 10 essential 
factors presented in the beginning of this chapter in accordance with a) the empiric 
findings of the previous eight sections; and b) the theoretical framework embodied by 
the initial operational research question: 
 In relation to geopolitical and economic realities, Mozambique suffered 
destabilisation and civil war largely due to external political circumstances and interests 
(factor 1), which led to the uprooting and mobility of large parts of the population (factor 
2), and the presence of large numbers of HIV-positive Zimbabwean soldiers (factor 3) on 
account of a defensive pact. After the war, HIV-positive refugees returned from 
neighbouring countries (factor 4), whereafter SAPs (PRE) and restrictions on government 
expenditure (factor 5) were imposed upon Mozambique debilitating its efforts to 
effectively redress a trampled and broken health care (and education) sector. 
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 With respect to historically determined circumstances (path dependencies), 
Mozambique’s colonial legacy (factor 6) left the country with traditional migrant labour 
systems and an almost non-existent and poorly educated health care sector, which 
almost certainly resulted in unsafe medical practices (factor 7). The war, dept, and poor 
institutional capacities (to name a few causes) left Mozambique dependent upon foreign 
donors and NGOs (factor 8), which led to organisational chaos within government 
structures. 
 In terms of environmental factors, Mozambique was frequently struck by natural 
disasters (factor 9) in the shape of draught and floods, which resulted in famine, 
malnutrition, and disease. 
 All in all, the above contributed much to great poverty (factor 10), or to reuse 
Setel’s [1999] terminology, it contributed to the ‘Acquired Income Deficiency Syndrome’. 
 It seems appropriate to round off this second chapter by recollecting the words of 
Farmer [1999: 14]: “[t]hus do fundamentally social forces and processes come to be 
embodied as biological events”. Whereas this chapter has focused largely on the 
historical setting of Mozambique—and a political economy of risk of HIV transmission 
and infection—the following chapter concentrates specifically on the national response 
to the AIDS pandemic. 
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3 – The national HIV/AIDS response 
 
With the historical context of the emergence of HIV/AIDS in Mozambique in mind, 
present chapter aims to identify the specific efforts undertaken to monitor and fight the 
pandemic since the first case of HIV infection was reported two decades ago. Presented at 
first is an overview of the course of Mozambique’s response to its HIV/AIDS crisis, which is 
then followed by more elaborative discussions of subjects that merit closer attention. 
Recollecting our analytical strategy for this chapter, the primary questions sought 
answered are: how can structural relationships of political and financial power between 
national and international institutions and key actors working within the ambit of 
HIV/AIDS come to influence and configure a nations response to this emergency? What 
are the underlying realities of huge regional differences in HIV prevalence rates? How is 
HIV/AIDS likely to affect Mozambican society and economy in the future? 
 
3.1 – A belated response 
This paper argues four essential reasons to the belatedness of Mozambique’s response to 
HIV/AIDS. First of all, Mozambique was fighting an exhausting civil war and attempting to 
implement structural adjustments as imposed (or forced) by the Bretton Woods 
institutions. Therefore—and due to other pressing issues such as drought and famine—
HIV/AIDS received low priority. Secondly, one has to consider the humiliation of 
recognising the ignorance and incompetence of the government in the face of a new 
emerging problem. Thirdly, AIDS was associated with severe stigma and damning 
prejudice, chiefly in terms of special or promiscuous ‘African sexualities’ widely accepted 
in the international academic discourses of the era. Stillwaggon [2003: 809-32] and 
particularly Oppong & Kalipeni [2004: 47-57] reveal these discourses as racially biased 
and highly prejudiced10. Namely Rushing [1995], Caldwell et al [1989], and Rushton & 
Bogaert [1989] are mentioned as the protagonists of such ‘research’. Finally, the 
government (meaning FRELIMO) was undergoing internal disputes on political ideology 
and direction. As we have seen, Mozambique had only recently turned west and the 
ideals propagated by the socialist revolution were still around11. Sexual immoralities, 
prostitution, homosexuality, and AIDS were associated with western bourgeoisie 
decadence and moral decay in contrast to the ‘ideologically enlightened’ socialist 
proletariat. Hence the denial and negation of anything negatively associated with 
capitalism. Let us now turn to an examination of Mozambique’s response to AIDS and see 
how these circumstances came to influence it. 
 
                                                        
10 See—for instance—Stillwaggon’s [2003: 814-5] discussion on (ab)use of metaphors (homo ancestralis), 
African ‘exceptionalism’, and misplaced focus on African sexual behaviour. 
11 The USSR saw AIDS as a ‘sickness of capitalism’. 
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3.1.1 – Initial efforts 
As Mozambique did not possess laboratorial equipment capable of performing 
diagnostics in 1986, its first case of HIV/AIDS was discretely diagnosed in a South African 
facility. At that point in time, the primary preoccupation of the World Health 
Organisation (WHO) was the establishment of a global response to HIV/AIDS and to 
inscribe the pandemic as a legitimate public health problem that merited institutional 
and technical attention, as well as inclusion into the social and political consciousness of 
Mozambique [Matsinhe 2005: 36]. The WHO largely dominated this process, which went 
on until 1992. 
 In 1986—with the resources and structural guidance of the WHO for National AIDS 
and STD Control Programmes—Mozambique’s Ministry of Health (MISAU) created a 
National AIDS Commission (CNS—Comissão Nacional da SIDA), which would be the 
administrative organ in the fight against HIV/AIDS, and a Central AIDS Coordination (CCS—
Centro de Coordenação da SIDA), which would act in the everyday implementation of a 
National AIDS Programme (PNCS—Programa Nacional de Combate à SIDA) [Matsinhe 2005: 41]. 
MISAU was obligated to specify which parts of civil society that would operate in the 
implementation of PNCS. Mozambique, however, had a one party regime and no 
traditional and officially registered NGOs or Civil Society Organisations (CSOs). Therefore, 
MISAU indicated FRELIMO’s Democratic Mass Organisations12; the army (for its ability to 
easily access distant rural areas); the ‘dynamysing groups’; the curandeiros (traditional 
healers and birth attendants)13; religious organisations; and the mass media [MISAU 1988: 
23 in ibid]. Additionally, ministerial orders would be carried out in the provinces and 
districts through the establishment of Provincial AIDS Nuclei (Núcleos Provinciais de 
Combate à SIDA). The CCS would produce educational and informative material (pamphlets 
and posters) to be distributed by the WHO [ibid: 43]. 
 In 1987, the WHO entered Mozambique and set up laboratory equipment, performed 
diagnostic evaluations, and counselled MISAU by way of specialists and consultants14. The 
WHO also held the mandate to execute the first Short-Term Plan (Plano De Curto Prazo), 
which consisted in installing administrative personnel for later intervention schemes, 
distribution of educational material in Portuguese, and distribution of small quantities of 
condoms. One year later, MISAU had drawn up plans for the first national Medium-Term 
Plan (Plano de Médio Prazo), which was based directly on the orientation of a group of WHO 
consultants. The plan would cover 1988-1990, its principal objectives being to “evaluate 
the magnitude and measure the progression of the epidemic; to lower instances of sexual 
                                                        
12 For instance, the Mozambican Youth Organisation (OJM—Organização de Juventude Moçambicana), the 
Organisation of Mozambican Labourers (OTM—Organização dos Trabalhadores Moçambicanos), and the 
Mozambican Women’s Organisation (OMM—Organização da Mulher Moçambicana). 
13 The role curandeiros is explored in depth in section 3.4. 
14 The Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD) and the Mozambican Red Cross also 
initiated their first HIV/AIDS initiatives during this early period [Matsinhe 2005: 38]. 
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transmission; to prevent transmission through blood […]; to reduce mother to child 
transmission; and to secure diagnosis, treatment and counselling to people diagnosed 
HIV-positive or sick with AIDS“ [MISAU 1988: 9-10]15. 
 The programme received less than half the money earmarked for its 
implementation, which began as late as March 1989 and was partial and highly 
fragmented. MISAU listed the ongoing civil war and a lack of human resources as the main 
obstacles [Matsinhe 2005: 44]. Without the presence of a countrywide epidemiological 
vigilance system capable of tracing and diagnosing the retrovirus, it is difficult to assess 
the (in)efficiency of the programme, especially when it comes to measuring change in 
sexual behaviour, which was seen as somewhat synonymous with prevention at that 
point in time. As we shall see, a national monitoring system was absent in Mozambique 
until 1992. Available data from this early period is from Maputo City where the National 
Institute of Statistics (INDE—Instituto Nacional de Estatística) reported an HIV prevalence 
rate as low as +/-1% 1988-1990 [INDE 2002: 8]. 
 
3.1.2 – Political aperture 
Without significant alterations or adjustments—and still with much support from the 
WHO—Mozambique presented a second Medium-Term Plan supposed to cover 1990-1992. 
However, two major changes did occur. In this plan, MISAU included a call for aid as “[…] 
the national Health Service will not be able to carry out counselling and psychosocial 
support for patients and their families alone”, we are told, “Local NGOs and especially 
religious organizations will hopefully become involved in this work” [MISAU 1990: 18]. 
While remembering that 1990 was the year of the new constitution—which effectively 
ended the one party FRELIMO regime and gave way to peace talks—it must be stressed 
that the new constitution also established a base for the emergence of NGOs and CSOs 
other than the Democratic Mass Organisations of the government. This can be viewed as 
a prelude to the disintegration of totalitarian socialism and an approximation to the 
concepts and notions of the social organisation of liberal societies [Matsinhe 2005: 44]. 
Consequently, national NGOs began mushrooming across the nation. 
 Another novelty in the second plan was a strong emphasis on condom promotion16, 
perhaps in part due to returning refugees and the internally displaced who were 
categorised as ‘high risk population groups’ “who for social reasons have demonstrated a 
certain tendency towards promiscuity” [MISAU 1990: 16]. This serves to demonstrate 
Mozambique’s main attitude towards HIV/AIDS; namely that it was a problem emerging 
‘from without’—due to the high HIV prevalence rates of neighbouring countries—and 
from certain ‘high risk groups’ such as refugees, soldiers, commercial sex workers, or 
                                                        
15 “[…] avaliar a magnitude e medir a progressão da epidemia; diminuir a transmissão por via sexual; prevenir a 
transmissão através do sangue [...]; reduzir transmissão de mãe para o filho; assim como assegurar o diagnóstico, 
tratamento e aconselhamento às pessoas diagnosticadas HIV positivas e doentes de SIDA”. (my translation) 
16 NGOs involved with HIV/AIDS are discussed separately in section 3.2 and condom promotion in section 3.3. 
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migrant workers (mainly truck drivers and miners), which were also predominantly 
linked to something ‘external’ [Matsinhe 2005: 50]. Consequently, HIV/AIDS was 
considered a problem of ‘others’ and of the ‘promiscuous’. 
 During the next and third Medium-Term Plan (1992-1994), foreign WHO specialists 
and consultants were still occupying positions that were supposed to be filled by locals. 
Once more, condom promotion was to be massively scaled up; a national epidemiological 
vigilance system was to be established; and NGO participation was accentuated, but this 
time without a single reference to the Democratic Mass Organisations [MISAU 1992: 14]. 
 As we have seen, more than 50% of Mozambique’s population became mobile and 
large armies were demobilised after the peace accord of 1992. Perhaps consequently, 
HIV/AIDS prevalence rates in the central provinces exploded “almost overnight” 
[Beckmann & Rai 2005: 4]. What followed between 1994 and 1996—in a now democratic 
Mozambique with FRELIMO and RENAMO collaborating—was a massive effort to extend the 
national AIDS response to all cities and provinces. In this fourth and final phase of the 
Medium-Term Plans, the principal actions “sought to integrate the routine activities of 
the primary health care services and to improve programme management on the 
provincial level” [Matsinhe 2005: 48]17. Furthermore, the plans “aimed at the education of 
health care workers to diagnose and treat STDs; establishment of epidemiological 
vigilance systems; and activities of information, education and communication” [ibid]18. 
 Due to the growing recognition in the global HIV/AIDS discourse of the close 
linkages between STIs and HIV (co-infections and increased host susceptibility), the 
National STD Control Programme (Programa Nacional de Controlo de DTSs) merged with PNCS 
in 1995 to form a National STD & HIV/AIDS Programme (Programa Nacional de Controlo de 
DTSs/HIV-SIDA) [Matsinhe 2005: 48]. The merging programmes had previously worked 
independently of each other with separate management and funding. The fusion 
occurred also to simplify administration. 
 In its quest to integrate a growing number of actors in the HIV/AIDS response, MISAU 
began subcontracting foreign and national NGOs. Most importantly, MISAU contracted—
with USAID funding—Public Service International (PSI) that launched an elaborate 
campaign of ‘social marketing’ of condoms, which would eventually expand to the entire 
nation as discussed later on in section 3.3. Another significant change was that changes 
in the WHO’s mandate caused it to either phase out or scale down its operations in 
Mozambique in order to give way to UNAIDS, which was mandated to aid in the 
consolidation of the PNCS and to coordinate aid granted by the UN. 
 To summarise the period from the initial responses up towards the end of the 
1990s, Mozambique’s response to HIV/AIDS clearly occurred with permanent support and 
                                                        
17 “[…] procurando integrar os serviços prestados nas atividade rotineiras de saúde primária e melhoramento da gestão 
do programa no plano provincial“. (my translation) 
18 “[…] visavam a formação do pessoal de saúde no diagnóstico e tratamento de DTSs, estabelecimento de sistemas de 
vigilância epidemiológico e atividades de informação, educação e comunicação“. (my translation) 
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orientation of foreign organisations. Thus, the changes in the contents and 
implementation of plans largely reflect the international evolution of HIV/AIDS 
knowledge as well as national circumstances such as the civil war; the process of a 
political and ideological paradigm shift (transition from totalitarian socialism to liberal 
capitalism); a new constitution (1990); and the first free elections in 1994. Worth noting 
is also that the efforts to “extend the actions to fight AIDS to other institutions other than 
MISAU […] failed”19 and that the “efforts to mobilise commissions composed of personnel 
from other institutions and organisations to intervene in the National AIDS Councils 
resulted in idleness” [Matsinhe 2005: 50]20. For example, the Provincial AIDS Nuclei that 
was scheduled for creation as early as 1986 never became operational [ibid: 62]. 
Furthermore, on account of the limited time span of the short- and mediums term plans, 
it is also likely that AIDS was actually regarded as a temporary problem. 
  
3.1.3 – The new magic word 
Since 1999, the modifications and structural changes made to HIV/AIDS programmes in 
Mozambique were made to align concepts and adjust to financial packages such as those 
of the World Bank, the Global Fund, and the William J. Clinton Foundation (just to 
mention the three most extensive programmes). Meanwhile, ‘lesser’ NGOs, CSOs, and 
multi- & bilateral donors criss-crossed the country promoting a plethora of schemes and 
plans of their own making. When many paradigms coexist—and when financing donors 
are virtually free to choose their allies—benefiting organisations are likely to be less 
sceptical in their adoption and adjustment to varying donor agendas. Therefore, the 
strategies and programs developed promise to realise an infinite range of interventions, 
and in most of the programmes “new emphasis is placed on discourses about 
‘multisectoral approach’, ‘human rights’, ‘gender inequalities’, ‘horizontal coordination’, 
and new terminologies fluctuating in the international developmentalist jargon are 
successively integrated into the daily agenda […]” [Matsinhe 2005: 75]21. 
 The late 1990s saw a growing consensus within the ambit of the global HIV/AIDS 
response; namely that AIDS was not merely a public health issue calling exclusively for 
involvement of health related entities and structures. Experiences from the few 
countries with relatively successful AIDS programmes—such as that underway in 
Uganda—were taken to indicate that countries that had opted for a ‘multisectoral’ 
approach had achieved better results in curbing the spread of HIV by unifying society 
                                                        
19 “[...] estender as ações de combate á SIDA para outras instituições além do MISAU [...] fracassaram”. (my translation) 
20 “[...] esforços de mobilização das Comissões compostas por gente proveniente de outras instituições e organizações 
para intervir nos Conselhos Nacionais de Combate à SIDA redundaram em inoperância”. (my translation) 
21 “[...] novas ênfases são postas nos discursos sobre ‘resposta multi-sectorial’, ‘direitos humanos’, ‘disparidades de 
gênero’, ‘coordenação horizontal’ e sucessivamente novas terminologias flutuantes no jargão desenvolvimentista 
internacional [...] são integrados no ordem do dia [...]”. (my translation) 
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towards this common end22. Therefore, ‘multisectoral’ progressively established itself as 
a new magic word repeated ad infinitum, particularly when developing countries lobbied 
for donor funds. 
 In most governments that had embraced the guidance of the WHO in their HIV/AIDS 
responses, administrations and structures were focused in a public health ministry and 
saw little involvement of other parts of civil society, a few NGOs excepted—like in 
Mozambique. According to the multisectoral approach, professional medical knowledge 
alone would not suffice in the fight against AIDS, which ought to also integrate economic, 
religious, and sociocultural actors and be lend legitimacy from the highest political 
instances. One can draw a direct parallel here to some of the trends that had emerged in 
the HIV/AIDS literature of the time. We may, for instance, recollect Farmer’s [1999: 8-9] 
concept of ‘visual field defects’ from the introduction; a term intrinsic to the idea of 
social medicine, which refers to the potential incapacity of professionals to see beyond 
the boundaries of their own disciplines. The emerging multisectoral approach no doubt 
sought to remedy these debilitating ‘defects’. 
 In 1999, the World Bank entered the scene arguing that AIDS was not to be seen as a 
mere health problem, rather it should be looked upon as a ‘developmental crisis’. In 
order for changes to occur, the WB would mobilise and channel financial and technical 
resources to its African partners and to its already ongoing projects in Africa, which 
would then integrate components relevant to the fight against HIV/AIDS. The WB 
prepared an ‘ideal strategic programme’, which included a set of guidelines and 
multisectoral structural recommendations exemplified by a reality-based fictive 
country23 [World Bank 1999 in Matsinhe 2005: 58-9]. 
 In tacit acceptance of these new international recommendations—and following 
the ideal plan of the WB to the letter—Mozambique approved a National Strategic Plan 
(PEN 2000-2002—Plano Estratégico Nacional) in late 1999. The plan mentioned that more than 
60 national and international institutions had been involved in the elaboration of the 
document [Matsinhe 2005: 60]. With much pomp, May 2000 saw the creation of a new 
National AIDS Council (CNCS—Conselho Nacional de Combate à SIDA) mandated to coordinate 
and implement the PEN. The presidency of the new CNCS was held by the prime minister 
and the vice presidency by MISAU followed by a host of government and civil society 
agents and finally by a new Executive Secretariat [ibid: 64]. In practice, MISAU had 
previously dominated the national AIDS response (PNCS) wholly, and the contracting of 
personnel for the CNCS with no affiliation with the health ministry angered MISUA. 
Tensions between the CNCS and MISAU aggravated as they degenerated into silent 
competition, which served to confuse international and national NGOs. As a result, many 
of these delayed the materialisation of promised resources and funds [ibid]. 
                                                        
22 In regards to Uganda, modern research suggests that good results were also largely due to additional 
imperative factors such as ‘population readiness’ and (popular) high-level political involvement. 
23 … named ‘Muzumbuca’ (!). 
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 The following year, the WB approached Mozambique to incorporate the country 
into its Multi Country AIDS Programme (MAP II – Africa Region). Once more, the cohort of 
Mozambicans directly involved with the administration and management of the AIDS 
programmes had to divert their attentions to yet another long process of negotiation 
and planning. In basic terms, the outcome was that no major changes were made to PEN 
2000-2002, except that the roles of the CNCS and MISAU became more clearly defined 
[Matsinhe 2005: 65]. Moreover, MISAU developed a strategy of its own known as the 
Integrated Approach (Abordagem Integrada), which consisted in improved integration and 
interaction between the multiple AIDS related entities of the health ministry [ibid: 68]. 
Furthermore, this new package of the WB was the first to introduce anti-retroviral AIDS 
treatment in Mozambique; a subject explored in depth in chapters four to six. 
 Meanwhile—that same year and well into 2003—Mozambique had to mobilise all 
of its AIDS partners and competences once more to respond to the call of the Global Fund 
to Fight HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria that had proposed a package, which 
necessitated the creation of a so-called Country Coordination Mechanism (CCM) 
[Matsinhe 2005: 69]. The CNCS and MISAU were to jointly develop a proposal applying for 
the package of the Global Fund. The ensuing discussion, however, about which of these 
entities that were to head the CCM, fanned the flames of their previous hostilities, but 
eventually an agreement was reached that much resembled the redistribution of roles 
achieved during the negotiations of MAP II. 
 During the same period still, 42nd US president (1993-2001) William J. Clinton, 
visited Mozambique. This opened for an opportunity to obtain resources and technical 
assistance for a wider introduction of anti-retroviral therapy from the Clinton 
Foundation [Matsinhe 2005: 70]. MISAU saw this as an opportunity to balance its HIV/AIDS 
prevention and treatment efforts. As we shall see, ART became a priority from here on. 
 In the years to come, MISAU and the CNCS continued to adjust and modify their 
strategic plans. In 2004, MISAU published another PEN 2004-2008 and then yet another PEN 
2005-2009 in 200524. Meanwhile, the CNCS also published a new National Strategic Plan 
referred to as PEN II25. These plans were all developed with the assistance of international 
organisations such as UNICEF, WHO, UNFPA, UNAIDS, and the WB. What they have in common 
is that they—each in their own way—accentuate the multisectoral approach [Matsinhe 
2005: 72]. 
 The problem with innovative and frequently changing paradigms is that a short 
memory combined with a rapid pace of constant change serves to silence or limit critical 
reflection and comprehension about the paradigms that are sold (or imposed) in 
Mozambique. Worse, however, is that many of the aspects of these ‘grand strategic plans’ 
are never carried out in real life and never leave the peripheries of the urban centres 
                                                        
24 Plano Estratégico Nacional de Combate às ITSs, HIV-SIDA do Sector da Saúde, 2004-2008 / 2005-2009. 
25 Plano Estratégico Nacional de Combate ao HIV/SIDA, 2005-2009. 
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where they are conceived [Matsinhe 2005: 76]. Moreover, the fact that such a large part 
of the already strained human resources of Mozambique is continuously devoted to 
readjustments and negotiations leaves competent personnel with little time to actually 
carry out the plan that was last agreed upon. 
 
3.1.4 – Further events 
April 4 2006, it was announced in Maputo that in an effort to streamline the fight against 
AIDS … 
 
“Mozambique's government and seven donor partners have established a common fund and 
a new code of conduct. Mozambique's National AIDS Council will manage the account. Under 
the new system, donors will commit money to the council, rather than to individual projects, 
and the council will make program-funding decisions. The new procedure, which seeks to 
reduce duplication and bureaucracy, was hailed as ‘an important step toward a more 
efficient, harmonized, and coordinated response to the AIDS pandemic’, UNICEF representative 
Leila Pakkala said at Monday's ceremony debuting the fund. Mozambique's partners in the 
effort are the World Bank, Sweden, Britain, Canada, Ireland, Denmark, and the Global Fund to 
Fight AIDS, TB and Malaria. Prime Minister Luisa Diogo said Mozambique is the first country in 
which the Global Fund has committed to channelling its allocations through a common fund” 
[Associated Press 2006b].
 
In a related article [Associated Press 2006a] PM Luisa Diogo described the new plans as 
“qualitative leaps” that “open a new era in our work, with a more objective and 
consolidated common vision”. Diogo also commented that under the agreement, 
Mozambique would now have “a single coordinating body, a single strategic plan against 
AIDS, and a single monitoring system”. The main objective of the code of conduct, she 
said, was “to reduce the transaction costs of cooperation, making it more effective, 
transparent and cohesive” [ibid]. 
 In light of the contents of this chapter, this initiative initially appears sound, but 
efforts to enhance the efficiency and reach of HIV/AIDS programmes in Mozambique have 
been announced several times before—without much effect. Recollecting Mozambique’s 
dependence upon foreign donors, it is no surprise that this initiative is, in fact, the result 
of changes in donor policies. According to one donor [DANIDA 2005] … 
 
“Growing recognition of the threat that the HIV/AIDS epidemic is posing has lead to an 
increase in the flow of resources to low- and middle-income countries to prevent new 
infections, treat those already infected and mitigate the impact of AIDS. The increase in 
resources has been followed by an increase in the number of actors at country level, often 
overwhelming national efforts to coordinate an inclusive and multisector response based on 
national priorities” [DANIDA 2005: 16]. 
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As a response to these concerns, UNAIDS developed three principles in partnership with 
several other donors. These are usually referred to as the ‘three ones’ and consist of a) 
one agreed AIDS action framework that provides the basis for coordinating the work of all 
partners; b) one national AIDS coordinating authority with a broad-based multi-sector 
mandate; and c) one agreed country level monitoring and evaluation system [UNAIDS 
2005]. The events of April 4 2006 was the direct result of an earlier joint donor mission to 
Mozambique, which, according to UNAIDS [2005], “resulted in the adoption of the ‘three 
ones’ principles that must be applied to strengthen national AIDS responses, led by the 
affected countries themselves”. The effects of this effort remain to be seen. 
 Upon leaving this general review of Mozambique’s AIDS response, we shall now 
turn to concentrate on a series of ‘components’, so to speak, whose national 
characteristics are central to any AIDS intervention. First of all, the key actors in HIV/AIDS 
in Mozambique are investigated (section 3.2), along with an examination of the main 
vehicles chosen to carry out prevention programmes (section 3.3). Furthermore, since 
virtually all Mozambicans have access to and make use of ‘traditional healers’—as is also 
the case in many other SADCs—their role is the centre of attention in section 3.4. This is 
followed by a discussion on efforts to monitor and understand the spread of the virus in 
Mozambique, such as the emergence of Voluntary Counselling and Testing sites and a 
national epidemiological surveillance system (in sections 3.5 and 3.6, respectively). 
Finally, we shall assess the potential economic and societal impact of AIDS in section 3.7. 
 
3.2 – Key actors 
There seem to be a persistent dilemma in regard to Mozambican civil society 
organisations. In general, there are two basic types of NGO. First, there is the essentially 
urban-based, professional NGO, modelled on foreign counterparts, and dependent upon 
external donor funding. Secondly, there is the rural-based informal NGO with no external 
funding and very limited economic resources [Kaarhus & Rebelo 2003: 3]. The dilemma 
consists in the fact that the first urban-based NGO is not firmly rooted in civil society, but 
favoured and supported by foreign donors—without which it would not survive. The 
rural-based NGO usually have local constituency and is very coupled with local issues and 
demands, but for formal reasons, they hardly ever qualify for external economic support. 
Therefore, it is questionable to which extent that foreign-based NGOs working in 
Mozambique are actually parts of Mozambican civil society. 
 PEN II of the CNCS—the AIDS strategy plan—lists no less than 1,471 NGOs involved 
directly in AIDS-related issues nationwide (primarily prevention) [CNCS 2004: 71]. Mostly, 
these organisations attempt to segment society so as to work with one particular socio-
demographic group such as orphans, miners, sex workers, soldiers, students, etc. 
Problematically, the mass of these NGOs is invented (founded) to respond to the 
conceptual demands of the larger programme models, which usually procure local level 
involvement. International NGOs, working in general development, also provide target 
 * 44 *
 
CHAPTER THREE: THE NATIONAL RESPONSE 
 
 
funding to local organisations working with health or HIV/AIDS prevention. Strong local 
NGOs cannot survive without donor support. This promotes opportunism, making it 
necessary to seize funding opportunities, and to turn to activities where the money is—
such as HIV/AIDS at the moment [Kaarhus & Rebelo 2003: 15-17]. Some of these local 
‘suitcase’ NGOs are staffed by no more than two or three people (i.e. the president, the 
vice-president, and their secretary). In fact, PEN II of the CNCS recognises that … 
 
“Many of the civil society organisations that register indicate that they develop activities in 
many different areas in the prospective of having a greater chance of being financed. There 
are, in fact, no mechanisms to verify whether these organisations actually develop these 
activities. In this way, a lot of the information supplied by the system is fictive” [CNCS 2004: 
71-2]26. 
 
Obviously, some of these NGOs are less important, if not completely irrelevant. We shall 
therefore concentrate solely on the most significant and internationally recognised 
Mozambican NGOs. 
 The change of political climate that occurred in the wake of the events of 1990 
enabled the legitimate emergence of Mozambican NGOs and CBOs27. One of the first NGOs 
to emerge was the Mozambican Association for the Defence of the Family (AMODEFA—
Associação Moçambicana para a Defesa da Família), a member of the International Planned 
Parenthood Federation. AMODEFA was created by a group of MISAU health professionals 
and has since grown to work broadly within the ambit of HIV/AIDS [Matsinhe 2005: 51]. 
The work of AMODEFA to support people living with AIDS (PLWA) gave rise to the creation 
of the first PLWA organisations in 1996. 
 Kindlimuka28 and similar PLWA organisations (Kulupira, Kubatana, etc) are involved 
with the destigmatisation of HIV/AIDS and support of PLWA on various levels. Kindlimuka 
[2006: 5] describes its institutional mission: “Kindlimuka exists to contribute to the 
process of restoration of hopes and improvement of the life of the individual; of the 
community; and of the society through support of an infected/affected person and his 
family”29. This organisation also aims to raise awareness of HIV transmission and 
                                                        
26 “Muitas das organizações da Sociedade Civil que se registaram indicam que desenvolvem actividades em muitas 
áreas, na expectativa que assim tenham mais possibilidades de serem financiadas. De facto não existe nenhum 
mecanismo para verificar se essas organizações desenvolvem de facto essas actividades. De modo que muitas das 
informações fornecidas pelo sistema são fictícias”. (my translation) 
27 These ‘changes in political climate’ were structural adjustments that the World Bank and the IMF 
demanded in order for international NGOs to respond to a series of emergencies in Mozambique (drought, 
famine, flood, etc). 1990 was also the year of the new constitution (see section 2.5). 
28 In Mozambique, PLWA groups commonly use expressions from local languages to designate their 
organisations. These expressions bear connotations of either solidarity or reaction against discrimination. 
Kindlimuka means ‘to-get-up’ or ‘to awaken’ in Changana. Kubatana means ‘embrace’ in Ndau and kulupira 
means ‘mutual support’ in Sena [Matsinhe 2005: 52]. 
29 “A Kindlimuka existe para contribuir no processo de restauração de esperanças e melhorar de vida da pessoa, da 
comunidade e da sociedade através de apoio a pessoa infectada/afectada e sua família”. (my translation) 
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prevention [ibid]. But Mozambican PLWA groups are weak in terms of resources and 
capacity. There is one central reason for this, which reflects the power structures of 
Mozambican society. According to Matsinhe [2005] … 
 
“[…] on the subject of the profile of PLWA, it stands out that the leaders [the well-off], people 
of relatively elevated economic and educational status, functionaries in high positions in 
public or private institutions, rarely involve themselves in public actions to fight AIDS and 
tend to use their resources to find treatment and care in the private clinics in Maputo or 
cross the border to neighbouring South Africa […]” [Matsinhe 2005: 110]30. 
 
Thus, one characteristic common to people who publicly step forward to address the 
question of living with AIDS is their relatively low socioeconomic and educational status. 
These limitations and lack of expertise have important implications for the capacity of 
PLWA groups to act; to formulate strategies; and to apply for donor support [Matsinhe 
2005: 109]. This becomes painfully clear when Kindlimuka—the largest PLWA group—
describes its strategy of financial sustenance: 26 sewing machines operated by 28 women 
and 5 men [Kindlimuka 2006: 27]. Needless to say, there is not much base here for far 
reaching efforts. Therefore, PLWA groups usually act not upon their own initiative, but 
through the integration into activities sponsored by foreign NGOs. 
 In 2001, lobbying and advocacy for a workplace law against the discrimination of 
PLWA was initiated by Mozambican PLWA groups with the support of almost every 
organisation involved with AIDS in Mozambique. This serves to illustrate not the 
popularity or influence of these groups, but their technical limitations and dependence 
upon larger institutions [Matshine 2005: 108]. Although widely celebrated as a conquest 
for the promotion of the rights of PLWA, and though it was approved in May 2002, there is 
no evidence that this law has ever been implemented and there is no legal apparatus to 
ensure that it is. Apart from that, the law concerns formal work relations between 
employer and employee, and since this covers only 8% of the economically active 
population, the potential reach of this law is very limited [ibid; Stewart et al 2004: 15]. 
 The National Network of Associations of People Living with HIV/AIDS (RENSIDA) is 
the national network for PLWA groups. RENSIDA was created to work as coordinator 
between member organisations. Learning from the experiences of existing groups, 
RENSIDA is working to assist in the establishment and strengthening of PLWA groups 
throughout the country. Its strategy has four key considerations: it works only with PLWA 
groups; it encourages replication of PLWA groups to increase coverage; it promotes 
integrated programmes relevant to the local context; and it emphasises sustainability so 
                                                        
30 “[...] ao assunto do perfil das PVHS, nota-se que as lideranças, pessoas de status econômico e educacional 
relativamente elevado, funcionários de instituições públicas e privadas em cargos elevados, raramente se envolvem em 
ações públicas de luta contra a SIDA e tendem a usar dos seus recursos para buscar tratamento e cuidados nas clínicas 
privadas em Maputo ou atravessar a fronteira para a vizinha África do Sul [...]” (my translation) 
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that the groups, their programmes, and effects last over time. RENSIDA is supported 
mainly by the Southern Africa AIDS Trust (SAT). 
 Similar to RENSIDA—but working on a much larger scale—is the Mozambican 
Network of AIDS Service Organisations (MONASO), which was created in 1993 to assume the 
coordination of civil society organisations involved in the fight against AIDS. MONASO is 
becoming increasingly important as an umbrella organisation and provides a meeting 
place, training, and financing opportunities for other NGOs [Kaarhus & Rebelo 2003: 17]. 
MONASO is a member of the Southern African Network of AIDS Service Organisations 
(SANASO) and funded by several international organisations such as the WHO and SAT. 
 The NGO People to People Development Aid (ADPP—Ajuda de Desenvolvimento de Povo 
para Povo) also deserves mentioning. ADPP has worked to aid marginalised layers of 
society in Mozambique since 1982 as a government-funded agency. Since 1992, ADPP has 
had a project specifically concerned with AIDS. Today, ADPP is funded by important 
international donors and has formed partnerships with most major Mozambican NGOs 
[Matsinhe 2005: 53]. Furthermore, the Mozambican Red Cross (CVM—Cruz Vermelho de 
Moçambique) and ACTION AID, which is part of International Action Aid based in London, 
have included HIV/AIDS in their work. 
 Among the most prominent foreign organisations working with HIV/AIDS in 
Mozambique are the African Medical Research Foundation, Care, the William J. Clinton 
Foundation, the Global Fund to Fight HIV/AIDS, Malaria and Tuberculosis, Health Alliance 
International (HAI), Hope, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), Marie Stopes International, 
PEPFAR, Population Service International (PSI), Save the Children Fund, UNAIDS and World 
Vision [Kaarhus & Rebelo 2003: 43; UNAIDS 2004b]. 
 
3.3 – Purchase condoms and dance for us exotically 
There have been two general trends in Mozambican HIV/AIDS prevention: condom 
distribution and later something that can only be labelled as the ‘theatrical approach’, 
which gradually replaced the former. That music, singing, and theatre should become 
such a popular choice of instrument for information dissemination serves to 
demonstrate the attitude of foreign NGOs that these are elements intimately inherent to 
Mozambican culture, and hence a useful gateway to the mind of its people, which is 
perceived as essentially ‘exotic’. The political economist studies, as previously discussed, 
relations and causality. By looking at the (financial and ideological) power relations 
between local groups of people in Mozambique, and the organisations that fund them, it 
becomes apparent in this section that—although it is difficult to actually prove such a 
thing—these Mozambicans are not just dancing for AIDS on their own accord. 
 The National Family Planning Programme has freely distributed condoms in 
Mozambique since 1980, albeit in limited quantities. When PNCS was launched in 1986, 
the CCS turned this into their primary activity and produced a series of posters and 
pamphlets informing about the proper use of a government funded condom branded 
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‘Venus’. Distribution and information occurred through the structures of MISUA with the 
aid of a few NGOs such as AMODEFA and MONASO. The initiative came to operate for 9 years, 
but the campaign was timid in regard to promoting the use of condoms in ‘liberal’ sexual 
relationships. The emphasis was rather on preventing unwanted pregnancy and family 
planning—not on HIV/AIDS. Two issues lie behind this. Firstly, it was unacceptable to the 
societal ideal that was being promoted that the Mozambican ‘new man’ of the socialist 
revolution could have sexual behaviours propagating an epidemic [Matsinhe 2005: 94-5]. 
Secondly, the educational material was produced in the context of limited freedom of 
expression and was subject to the censorship of FRELIMO. 
 In 1995, Population Service International (PSI) was subcontracted by MISAU to 
modernise and revitalise the scene while MISAU continued its own campaign. PSI 
produced a condom named Jeito. This is actually an expression, which calls for some 
explanation: jeito (in Portuguese) means ‘way’, ‘style’, or ‘way-of-doing-things’, also 
connoting moderation or sensible choices. This way, doing things with jeito is to ‘walk-
the-walk’ and ‘talk-the-talk’, as well as doing the ‘right thing’ or ‘getting by’ in the face of 
adversity. PSI sought to popularise Jeito by launching radio and television programmes 
along with promotional merchandise such as caps, key rings, t-shirts, etc. There was also 
a strong effort to turn the perception and significance of condoms away from the dull 
family planning perspective and into the direction of safe sex and HIV awareness. The 
difference between the government campaign (Venus), and that of PSI, was that Jeito was 
to be bought (priced US$ 0.11-0.22). PSI labelled their campaign ‘social marketing’ of 
condoms under the argument that a) people who bought condoms were allegedly more 
likely to actually use them; and b) marketing of the condom would contribute to the 
development of local mercantile networks [Matsinhe 2005: 97]. PSI’s concept of ‘social 
marketing’ serves to demonstrate that with the advent of AIDS, in a context of political 
ideological transition and the entrance of international NGOs supported by powerful 
financial institutions, models and forms of conduct of capitalist societies were being 
progressively introduced and institutionalised in Mozambique [ibid]. PSI incessantly 
worked to improve the image of Jeito through a wide range of publicity efforts. By 1999, 
the campaign encompassed the entire country, yet in 2004, only 9 million condoms were 
sold in Mozambique [Beckmann & Rai 2005: 10]. Do people not have sex more often than 
once a year? According to Beckman & Rai [ibid], a central obstacle is that it is “commonly 
believed in Mozambique that giving condoms to women encourages disrespect and 
promiscuous behaviour”. Whatever the reasons, this is a good occasion for seriously 
questioning whether primary prevention actually works. 
 PSI’s social marketing had another crucial impact. Prior to 1995, the bulk of other 
prevention efforts had consisted in speeches, pamphlets, posters, brochures, cartoons, 
roadside signs, special sports events, and radio and television spots with the 
participation of popular figures such as politicians, actors, sportspersons, comedians, 
and religious figures [Matsinhe 2005: 80-2]. There was as much informative material as 
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there were national and foreign NGOs involved31. After 1995, however, these vehicles of 
communication were tuned down in favour of dancing and singing. PSI started this trend 
by collaborating with a professional theatrical group in staging a play called ‘Only Life 
Offers Flowers’ (Só a Vida Oferece Flores), which included messages about HIV/AIDS, sex, and 
condoms. The piece became extremely popular and was replicated by local groups and 
staged several hundred times all over the country. It became modus operandi of NGOs to 
solicit local folkloristic theatre troupes to devise shows and happenings with an HIV/AIDS 
‘content’. Where these groups did not exist, NGOs simply created them. Most groups, 
however, were already existent and their members were easily encouraged to perform 
for minor benefits such as clothing, free meals, or transportation to otherwise 
inaccessible areas [ibid: 85-6]. Many songs and plays were later recorded and released on 
compact disc. 
 Apart from these two wide reaching trends in the Mozambican HIV/AIDS 
response—condoms and the theatrical approach—other forms of prevention have 
crystallised over the last six years or so. One such approach is known as ‘peer education’ 
(educação de pares), which attempts to recruit HIV ‘activists’ within associations of high-
risk groups such as commercial sex workers or truck drivers, so that these can 
conscienceualise their colleagues. Similar to this model, the national NGO People to 
People Development Aid (ADPP) realises a door-to-door project in which whomever opens 
the door is offered information on HIV/AIDS. Moreover, the public education system has 
various programmes and projects funded by diverse entities [Matsinhe 2005: 88-89]. Most 
prominent is the discourse of the ‘window of hope’ (janela de esperança) that opts to focus 
awareness-raising on HIV-negative youths in school who are not yet sexually active. Just 
as it happened previously with the magic word ‘multisectoral’, the global HIV/AIDS 
discourse is causing changes in Mozambique again due to a consensus on substantial 
gender inequalities in AIDS; that women aged 15-24 are much more infected than men, 
for instance. Thus, initiatives that focus on gender related issues are becoming eligible 
for funding. One example of the concrete results of this is the construction of large 
roadside signs alongside avenues and in cities [ibid 91]. These signs bear messages and 
images that emphasise feminine involvement in HIV/AIDS education. 
  
3.4 – Herbalists and prophets 
Previous sections have touched upon the subject of Mozambique’s ‘traditional healers’. 
Although they are not easily categorised—because they consist of a variegated group of 
some 80,000 multiethnic, multilingual herbalists, prophets, birth attendants, and 
mystics—they are commonly referred to as curandeiros [Kaarhus & Rebelo 2003: 12]. 
From ancient times and up to the time of independence from colonial rule, these were 
                                                        
31 Though these materials surely constitute an interesting ethnographic register of various representations 
and attitudes towards AIDS in Mozambique, any thorough treatment of these is beyond the scope of this 
section. 
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traditionally and almost exclusively the ‘doctors’ in Mozambican society. In the 
following, we shall see why they merit attention in the context of HIV/AIDS. 
 Today, less than 40% of Mozambique’s population have access to primary health 
care services, whereas 100% have access to a healer [Beckmann & Rai 2005: 10; CHG 2004: 
10; Matsinhe 2005: 135]. Therefore, there is good reason to believe that the inclusion of 
curandeiros in the national HIV/AIDS response could hold a far-reaching potential. 
According to Kaarhus & Rebelo [2003] and a study that they performed on the role of 
civil society organisations in the health sector in Mozambique … 
 
 “There is no doubt a potential for expanding contacts and strengthening the communication 
between curandeiros and the formal health sector, both in the field of AIDS and more 
generally. But the success of such contacts depends both on the personality, inclination and 
actual knowledge about traditional medicine on part of the formal health sector staff. More 
systematic knowledge […] on the logic and practices of curandeiros would no doubt facilitate 
communication between formal and informal health service providers” [Kaarhus & Rebelo 
2003: 13]. 
 
In spite of the attempts of the socialist revolution to alienate the curandeiros due to their 
‘backwardness’ and ‘unscientific methods’, they enjoy much respect in society and were 
included in MISAU’s first Medium-Term Plan because “the transmission of HIV/AIDS can 
occur through skin perforating instruments contaminated with blood or other bodily 
fluids utilised during practices of traditional medicine“ [MISAU 1988]32. The curandeiros 
were included on account of the WHO’s recommendations more so than because of 
FRELIMO’s acceptance of them. In fact, the second Medium-Term plan substituted the 
term ‘traditional healers’ with ‘traditional birth attendants’ and healers were repressed 
and excluded [Matsinhe 2005: 47]. Officially, private medical practises were banned at 
independence, but reintroduced in 1992, which saw the establishment of the National 
Association of the Traditional Healers of Mozambique (AMETRAMO—Associação Nacional 
dos Médicos Tradicionais de Moçambique) [Kaarhus & Rebelo 2003: 11]. This organisation 
alone is proof that the traditions of ‘traditional’ healers change over time due to political 
changes and new socioeconomic and educational opportunities. Nonetheless, AMETRAMO 
is a weak organisation composed of mainly younger (literate) curandeiros and thus not 
representative of all traditional healers. Members consider the organisation as a forum 
of contact with the government and the formal health sector, which is often openly 
critical in its attitude towards curandeiros. The health sector is, however, interested in 
raising the awareness of curandeiros in relation to HIV/AIDS and in promoting more 
hygienic practices. On the other hand, healers look to the health sector to test and 
document the effects of the medical plants that they apply in their treatment of HIV/AIDS 
                                                        
32 “[…] a transmissão do HIV/SIDA pode ocorrer através de instrumentos perfurantes da pele contaminados com sangue 
ou outros fluidos corporais, utilizados durante práticas de medicina tradicional”. (my translation) 
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[ibid: 13]. To this day, efforts to effectively include these actors in the national AIDS 
response have come to nought [Matsinhe 2005: 135]. 
 
3.5 – Treatment, voluntary counselling and testing: a competition 
Apart from the introduction of anti-retroviral therapy in 2003—a subject treated 
separately in chapter five—the only available treatment for HIV/AIDS-infected patients 
until 1996 was the treatment of opportunistic infections at regular health facilities. In 
1996 and 1997, government found a ‘politically correct’ solution and inaugurated two so-
called Day Hospitals (HDD—Hospitais de Dia) based on similar initiatives in Côte d’Ivoire 
and Uganda [Matsinhe 2005: 104-5]. These were independent and isolated departments in 
the hospitals of Maputo and Chimoio City. Though medical staff and doctors had limited 
experience in treating AIDS-sick patients, this was the objective of the HDDs33. Some NGOs 
supported the HDDs in efforts of extending treatment to home-based care, especially 
AMODEFA. Today, the HDDs have expanded to an additional four provinces, but they report 
attendance rates as low as 4-10 patients per day [ibid: 106]. The principal causes are 
reported to be the stigma associated with visiting an isolated ‘special’ facility; difficulties 
of access due to lacking patient resources; and little or no knowledge of their existence 
or purpose. 
 After MISAU’s call for the aid of civil society in 1990, AMODEFA, Kindlimuka, and 
MONASO got involved in some forms of HIV/AIDS counselling, but their actions were 
muddled and unsystematic [Matsinhe 2005: 112]. Official counselling was linked to HDDs, 
but in 1998, the first Voluntary Counselling and Testing Centre (VCT) began operations in 
Maputo; its raison d’être being the presumption that knowing ones serostatus would lead 
to positive behavioural changes. VCT centres (in Mozambique known as GATVs—Gabinetes 
de Aconselhamento e Testagem Voluntária) expanded in a virtual boom from 2001 and on. 
The difference between HDDs and GATVs is that the latter are all run by major, principally 
foreign NGOs that compete in marking their presence in the HIV/AIDS effort by building 
GATVs. They all answer to MISAU and have to abide by a set of common protocols such as a 
streamlined databank and education schemes for counsellors [ibid: 113]. 
 According to a MISAU report on GATVs [2004: 6], there are plans to increase the 
number of GATVs to 315 facilities capable of attending 945,000 people by 2008. In PEN II 
2005-2009, CNCS [2004: 22] reported that 80 functioning GATVs had attended 102,896 people 
nationwide and found 25.4% to be seropositive in 2004. The national epidemiological 
monitoring system—discussed in section 3.6 below—reported a national prevalence rate 
of 16.2% that same year [GTM 2005]. The explanation for the difference in prevalence 
figures is probably that many people who seek testing in a GATV do so by 
                                                        
33 More specifically, objectives were to diagnose, treat and control opportunistic infections associated with 
HIV/AIDS; to diagnose and treat STIs; to provide prophylaxis in relation to opportunistic diseases; to nurse; 
to provide physiological support; to educate on issues of hygiene; and to extend some of these services to 
home-based care. 
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recommendation of his or her physician (or curandeiro) because of already pronounced 
HIV/AIDS symptoms. A contributing factor is the chiefly urban locations of GATVs (32% of 
all tested people lived in Maputo City where prevalence is as high as 22%) [GTM 2005; CNCS 
2004: 22]. Moreover, the numbers above translate into a very low attendance rate of 
averagely 4-5 patients daily per GATV. GATVs are staffed by 5 counsellors in average 
[Matsinhe 2005: 114]. Similar to reasons for low attendance in HDDs, the reasons reported 
here are stigma; shame; not wanting to know; fear of a lack of confidentiality; access 
problems; and no knowledge of the existence of GATVs. 
 Worth mentioning is that the GATVs form the base in the establishment of PLWA 
groups, because counsellors direct seropositive patients to these or encourage the 
creation of groups where they are non-existent [Matsinhe 2005: 116]. 
 
3.6 – Mozambican epidemiology 
There are huge regional differentials in HIV prevalence rates in Mozambique. 
Fortunately, we can happily announce that not only can we empirically demonstrate 
these differences, we can also understand exactly how and why they came about thanks 
to the exercise of political economy and social medicine performed in chapter two. This 
section discusses the emergence of an epidemiological HIV/AIDS surveillance system in 
Mozambique and the regional differences that it reports. 
 Most South African Developing Countries (SADCs) with high HIV/AIDS prevalence 
rates—like Zambia and Zimbabwe—have followed a similar ‘S’ pattern of growth of the 
pandemic; a pattern identifiable through three specific stages: a) low but slowly growing 
prevalence rates in capital cities; b) rapid growth with rates doubling every two years 
while spreading to urban areas and then gradually to rural areas; and c) a levelling-off 
plateau stage in which infected people develop full-blown AIDS and die. It is this latter 
stage that sees a devastating impact on economies and local communities [Collins 2006: 
2]. Mozambique’s historical epidemiological HIV/AIDS profile, however, is unique. The 
highest prevalence rates of the 1990s emerged in the central regions along and near the 
two principal transport corridors of Beira and Tete. Prevalence rates grew to be from 
four to seven times higher here than in the southern region (where the capital is 
located). By now, it should not come as much of a surprise that these areas were also the 
areas most targeted by RENAMO violence in the 1980s; the ones with the greatest 
concentration of Zimbabwean troops; and the most traversed by returning refugees and 
IDPs after 1992. In other countries—like Uganda and Zambia—transport corridors also 
raised infection levels significantly [ibid: 3]. 
 The Mozambican epidemiological HIV/AIDS surveillance system is currently 
composed of 36 so-called ‘sentinel posts’ (postos sentinela), which are located in different 
parts of the country (see MAP II: Locations of Sentinel Posts). Apart from quality control and 
continuous refinement of monitoring methods, the system’s core responsibility is to 
report reliable HIV/AIDS prevalence data. Early on, Mozambique chose the antenatal 
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surveillance approach. The system is lead by the Technical Multisectoral Group (GTM—
Grupo Técnico Multisectorial)34. According to the GTM, the system was established in 1988 
and gradually expanded over four phases [GTM 2005]: 
 
• Phase one (1988-1998): Up until 1994, data were available only from Maputo’s general 
hospital. In the following four years, sentinel posts were constructed in Beira, 
Chimoio, and Tete along the two major transport corridors.  
 
• Phase two (2000 surveillance round): In 2000, MISAU enhanced quality control and 
expanded HIV data collection from 4 to 20 sentinel posts: 7 northern, 8 central, and 
5 southern. 
 
• Phase three (2001-2002 surveillance round): Once more, the system was expanded to 
include 10 northern, 16 central, and 10 southern sentinel posts (36 in all). 
 
• Phase four (2004 surveillance round): Readjusting the geographical balance of the posts, 
MISAU shut down two posts (Munhava and Xipamanine) and reopened them 
elsewhere (Marrupa and Chicualacuala). Also in 2004, the HIV prevalence levels in 
all of Mozambique were reassessed. 
 
The full results of the 2004 surveillance round can be viewed in APPENDIX A: Results per 
Sentinel Post (2004). The figure overleaf illustrates these results: 
                                                        
34 GTM consists of personnel from the Ministry of Health (MISAU), the National Institute of Statistics (INDE), 
the Ministry of Planning and Development (MPD), the Ministry of Finances (MF), the Centre of Population 
Studies of the University of Eduardo Mondlane (CEP), the National AIDS Counsel (CNCS), the Ministry of 
Education and Culture (MEC), the Ministry of Agriculture (MINAG), and the Faculty of Medicine of the 
University of Eduardo Mondlane [GTM 2005]. 
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FIGURE 1: HIV/AIDS prevalence rates in Mozambique, 2004 (15-49 years) [GTM 2005]: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 National rate: 16.2% 
 
 (full results listed in APPENDIX A) 
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The apparent interregional differences in prevalence rates merit some attention. FIGURE 2 
provides an illustration: 
 
 FIGURE 2: HIV prevalence by region (2000 & 2004) [GTM 2005]: 
 
 HIV prevalence by 2000 2004 
  
 
 
 Northern Region 5.7% 9.3% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Central Region 16.5% 20.4% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Southern Region 13.2% 18.1% 
 
 
 
The southern region is home to some 25% of Mozambique’s population and the capital 
city of Maputo. This city underwent a rapid growth stage between 1992 and 1998 before 
prevalence rates plateaued [Collins 2006: 5]. The port city of Xai-Xai (Gaza) had rates as 
high as 27.7%. The rising rates of this region can in part be seen as a reflection of the 
increased commercial activity after peace in 1992 and of migrant mineworkers travelling 
south to work in South African mines where HIV rates are very high. As we have seen, 
mineworkers infect wives and lovers upon returning home. This seems to be supported 
by the fact that the province farthest away from the major transport corridors 
(Inhambane) had the lowest rate (11.7%) [ibid; GTM 2005]. 
 The central region houses 42% of all Mozambicans and 52.2% of all PLWA. Here, 
rates of HIV infection are exceptionally high in towns and adjacent rural areas along the 
two major transport corridors [Collins 2006: 5]. In Beira city, at the end of the Beira 
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corridor running from Zimbabwe to the ocean, rates reached a staggering 34.4%. The city 
of Chimoio in Manica hosted major contingents of Zimbabwean troops and a 
Zimbabwean Air Force base during the war and was found to have a rate of 26.6%. In Tete 
province, whose transport corridors link Malawi, Zambia, and Zimbabwe to 
Mozambique’s seaports, Tete city had an HIV prevalence rate of 25.8% [ibid]. Manica, 
Sofala and Tete provinces experienced the earliest rise in infection rates, but these have 
since levelled off, which indicate a maturing of the pandemic, as people develop full-
blown AIDS. According to Collins [2006] … 
 
“The continuing rapid rise in Zambezia’s rate—and to a lesser extent in Tete—reflects the 
continuing impact of the huge numbers of infected Mozambican refugees who returned to 
these provinces after 1992. Rising deaths among economically productive adults and growing 
numbers of AIDS orphans are straining the region’s social, economic and health 
infrastructure” [Collins 2006: 5]. 
 
Home to one third of the population, the northern provinces have prevalence rates 
significantly lower the their central and southern neighbours, as the pandemic was last 
to reach these areas. Niassa province borders Malawi, which hosted 65% of the refugees 
who fled Mozambique during the war. Unsurprisingly, Niassa consequently had the 
highest rate of the northern provinces in 2004 (11.1%) [GTM 2005]. Furthermore, the 
highest rates were found in cities along the Malawi border in towns along rail lines and 
main roads linking Malawi to the coast and port cities (Cuamba’s rate reached 16.7%) 
[ibid]. 
 Apart from already discussed factors, which affect these regional differences (war, 
migrant labour, uprooting, etc), two additional factors should be mentioned. Firstly, 
there seem to be a much lower prevalence of HIV in areas with high numbers of Muslims 
(85% of Mozambique’s Muslims live in the less affected north) [Collins 2006: 6]. Besides 
the fact that this population segment is the least involved in regional migrant labour 
systems, modern research suggests that male circumcision—practiced widely by 
Mozambican Muslims—provides some protection against infection [ibid]. The second 
factor affecting regional differences relates to gender inequalities and the low 
socioeconomic status of women in Mozambique, which is also clearly reflected in 
prevalence rates. 
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 FIGURE 3: Confirmed HIV infections in Mozambique (2003) by age group and gender: 
 
 
 
 Source: figure adopted from Portuguese version appearing in CNCS 2004: 20  
 
FIGURE 3 shows that most children infected with HIV die before they reach the age of 5. 
The few that do survive until 10 years of age constitute the so-called ‘window of hope’, as 
they go almost free of AIDS until they reach the age of 14. As they initiate sexual relations, 
prevalence rates explode, particularly in the feminine gender. The infection rate for 
women aged 20-24 is almost three times higher than it is for men of the same age. This 
trend continues until women reach 30 years of age, where men become the more 
infected, which is in part due to female mortality and the higher level of sexual activity 
of men of that age. 
 There is a range of biological factors underpinning these gender inequalities: a) the 
high velocity by which semen is injected into the uterus whose mucous membrane is 
much less resistant to infection than that of the vagina; b) the greater period of contact 
with sexual fluids (semen deposited in the vagina), since HIV is more highly concentrated 
in the seminal fluids than in vaginal secretions and may more easily enter the 
bloodstream through the extensive convoluted lining of the vagina and cervix; c) the 
difficulties of diagnosing and treating some STIs in women; and d) the relatively early 
sexual debut of girls, particularly in rural Mozambique, with boys usually a few years 
older [CNCS 2004: 19]. According to Farmer et al [1996] …  
 
“Certain studies suggest that per-exposure transmission from man to woman during genital-
genital intercourse is two to five times more efficient than from woman to man. Other 
investigations have prompted researchers to argue that HIV is up to 20 times more efficiently 
transmitted from men to women than vice versa” [Farmer et al 1996: 47]. 
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Women are also typically more stigmatised and discriminated against than men, 
especially if they present for diagnosis or STI treatment without a male partner [Stewart 
et al 2004: 53]. Moreover, an “institutionalised system of patriarchy and financial 
dependence on men” often means that women cannot control when, with whom or 
under what circumstances they have sex [ibid: 54]. It may also be troublesome for 
women to request, let alone insist upon using a condom. Finally, women are frequently 
expected to engage in sexual activities with older, more experienced men—who are 
more likely to be infected already—and men seek younger and younger (and thus more 
vulnerable) sexual partners to avoid HIV infection [ibid: 55]. 
 
3.7 – Impact assessment 
In 2005, Beckmann & Rai conducted a study for the International Labour Organisation in 
which the potential impact of HIV/AIDS on Mozambican society and economy was 
assessed. According to this study, in the absence of AIDS, population’s life expectancy at 
birth is projected to increase from 43 in 2005 to 50 years in 2010. With AIDS, however, life 
expectancy is expected to drop to 36 years [Beckmann & Rai 2005: 6]. By 2010, 1.7 million 
Mozambicans will have died of AIDS-related diseases. The highest losses will be felt in the 
most productive age group of the population (35-44 years). These losses translate into a 
loss of skills and experience built over a number of years and depletion of the labour 
force in their active prime. As younger, less experienced workers replace these older, 
more experienced workers, worker productivity is reduced [ibid: 3 & 8]. Therefore, 
nutritious crops may be replaced by less labour intensive starchy crops in agriculture. 
Since most people rely on subsistence farming, shifts to lower quality foods and failing 
supplies may lead to chronic food insecurity and higher levels of malnutrition [Kober & 
Van Damme 2004: 103]. The economy is expected to be 16-23% smaller in 2010 relative to 
a no-AIDS scenario. Furthermore, it is estimated that 10-15% of all health care staff will be 
lost due to AIDS in 2010. The education sector will lose some 17% of its personnel, while 
there will be 13% fewer children in primary school than would otherwise be the case. 
Worse is the projection for orphans, which are expected to count 1.4 million by 2010 due 
to AIDS in 90% of all cases (7.1% of an estimated population of 19.7 million) [Beckmann & 
Rai 2005: 9-12]. In contrast, 10-15% of the entire population of Swaziland is projected to 
consist of orphaned children in 2010 [Kober & Van Damme 2004: 103]. The civil war did 
provide Mozambique with experience in dealing with the problem, when communities 
and extended families took in many orphans, but they have now reached a point of 
saturation [Beckmann & Rai 2005: 11-13].  
 
3.8 – Retrospective 
Pausing for a while and looking back, we can wonder whether the accounts of the 
previous sections shed light on the initial research questions posed in the beginning of 
this chapter. As for the likely impact of AIDS on economy and society, we were certainly 
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given plausible, albeit hypothetical, answers. We also saw that the regional differences in 
HIV prevalence rates were fully explicable, but notice that they were so only from the 
perspective and through the lens of social medicine. Without this perspective, we would 
have been left without any good explanations as to why the regional differences are so 
pronounced. No! The men and women of Quelimane in Zambezia are not more 
‘promiscuous’ than their countrymen of Marrupa in Niassa—perhaps they even 
purchase PSIs condoms once a year or attend a ridiculous dance show that allegedly fits 
their ‘exotic’ mindset—what is far more plausible is that they have simply been visited 
upon by structural violence; a central teaching of social medicine.  
 Furthermore, political economy demonstrated the structural relationships of 
political and financial power between the national and international institutions and key 
actors that configured Mozambique’s AIDS response. What remains to be said, in 
retrospective, is that Mozambique’s HIV/AIDS crisis emerged in the context of major 
political change and severe problems of war, drought, and famine. Later on, political 
aperture—and the Bretton Woods institutions—facilitated the conditions for insertion 
of global AIDS discourses into the national response, initially through the WHO, and then 
through a variety of mainly foreign NGOs, which then came to dominate and direct the 
actions of less resourceful local NGOs. The state, however, assumed leadership in the 
processes of formulating and negotiating HIV/AIDS plans and strategies, although these 
saw constant changes and modifications, which again reflected the dynamics of an ever-
changing international discourse. The nature of the Mozambican response was never 
minimalistic, but very little of what was planned was actually carried out in reality 
[Matsinhe 2005: 185]. In Mozambique, this is not something exclusive to HIV/AIDS—
especially not when recollecting that FRELIMO declared the 1980s ‘the decade of victory 
over underdevelopment’. The end of the decade told a different story. As we have seen, 
this defeat was largely due to external powers, which gradually internalised in 
Mozambique through western political imperialism and destabilisation. In relation to the 
flawed and fragmented HIV/AIDS response, culpable external powers were the mass of 
donors who themselves proposed and recommended programmes, but without disposing 
the financial resources necessary for their implementation [ibid 2005: 186]. 
 In spite of all difficulties, what has been done in Mozambique has served to 
promote and produce essential knowledge and consciousness of HIV/AIDS in the minds of 
the population. Quantitative studies on the knowledge of HIV/AIDS in different population 
groups demonstrate a high degree of awareness, yet a 2003 survey indicated that 80% of 
young people and adolescents did not use condoms in their last sexual relation [CHG 2004: 
13]. In 2006—like in other SADCs—the most pressing problems are new HIV infections; an 
increased number of opportunistic infections; loss of experienced health care staff; lack 
and loss of human resources; and decreased productivity among employees in most 
walks of life, alongside a rapidly increasing number of orphans unlikely to find care and 
support. 
* 59 *
 
THE AIDS PANDEMIC 
 
 
 So far, we have largely avoided the subject of anti-retroviral therapy. It has been 
hypothesized—and to some extent proven—that anti-retroviral therapy could decisively 
alter the course of the fight against AIDS and significantly ease its grim impact on 
societies and economies. Therefore, next chapter explores an option now open to SADCs; 
namely that of launching interventions of anti-retroviral therapy in conjunction with 
other curative and preventive efforts. 
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4 – Highly active anti-retroviral combination therapy 
 
HIV is a retrovirus. Drugs engineered to disrupt the action of HIV are known as Anti-
Retrovirals (ARVs, henceforth). The internationally recommended drug regimen is known 
as Highly Active Anti-Retroviral Therapy (HAART)35. ARVs come in a variety of 
formulations designed to inhibit the replication of HIV during different stages of its life 
cycle, thus preserving the immune system (or given it a chance to recover) and 
mitigating host susceptibility to opportunistic infections. Since HIV mutates rapidly, the 
retrovirus is highly proficient in developing drug resistance. To minimize the risk of the 
emergence of new drug resistant virus strains, and in order to address problems of 
toxicity and treatment failure, AIDS patients are treated with combinations of ARVs—
usually referred to as ‘cocktails’—which disrupt the virus on several fronts at once. 
Ideally, HAART consists of two ‘lines’ of triple therapy cocktails [Nattrass 2004: 104]. Anti-
Retroviral Therapy (ART) works to reduce the viral load—the number of HIV particles in 
the bloodstream—and to increase the CD4 lymphocyte cell count36 [Bate & Tren 2004: 3]. 
 Albeit not permanently curative, ARVs do hold the potential to significantly delay 
the onset of AIDS and to enhance and prolong the quality and length of the lives of those 
able to adhere to treatment. ART is, in other words, a lifetime commitment, as the virus 
will reactivate in the unfortunate event that treatment is discontinued—in which case 
the CD4 cell count will plummet and full-blown AIDS develop, which eventually results in 
death due to opportunistic infections. Successful adherence to ART, however, is not all 
together unproblematic given that potential side effects range over unpleasant ailments 
such as hallucinations, severe skin rash (Steven Johnsons Syndrome), anaemia, hepatitis, 
peripheral neuropathy, lactic acidosis, pancreatitis, and lipodystrophy. 
 During the 1990s, treatment for AIDS sufferers—developed by government-
sponsored research programmes and the research-based pharmaceutical industry—
became increasingly effective. By 1996, ARVs administered through private and public 
health sectors had become widely accessible for clinically eligible AIDS patients in 
western countries. An individual is clinically eligible for ART when he/she has a CD4 
lymphocyte cell count <200 and/or is classified as WHO stage III or IV37. Resultantly, 
HIV/AIDS mortality rates dropped considerably in these countries before stabilising 2-3 
years later [Stewart 2004: iii]. AIDS patients simply left their hospital wards and began 
                                                        
35 HAART is made up of three classes of drugs: two Reverse Transcriptase Inhibitors (one nucleoside and one 
non-nucleoside RTI) and one protease inhibitor [Bate & Tren 2004: 3]. All classes of drugs interfere with the 
reverse transcriptase enzyme, which is crucial for the early stage reproduction of the AIDS virus [Nattrass 
2004: 104]. 
36 The count of CD4 lymphocytes in a person’s blood, used as a marker for following HIV progression. CD4 
lymphocytes are white blood cells critical in the body’s defence against infections. HIV infects and destroys 
these lymphocytes gradually depleting their numbers, and resulting in a weakened immune system 
[Farmer et al 1996: 363]. A healthy person should have between 500 and 1,000 CD4 lymphocytes per cubic 
millimetre of blood. 
37 See APPENDIX B: Clinical staging system for HIV/AIDS [WHO 1990]. 
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leading healthy, productive, and full lives. In sub-Saharan Africa, however, bedridden 
AIDS-sick people were left untreated, never recovered, and passed away. Today, the vast 
majority of AIDS patients in the developing world still do not have access to ARVs. 
 In order to unveil the realities surrounding this global disparity, our analytical 
strategy initially asked: what are the political and economic reasons why ARVs were not 
introduced in SADCs as soon as they became available? Since these reasons are found to 
be relatively complex, the remainder of the research questions for this chapter are raised 
in the text as they become relevant.  
 
4.1 – A question of feasibility 
In spite of the comparatively larger demand for ARVs of developing countries38 vis-à-vis 
western countries, the governments of developing countries, the global AIDS community, 
and most donors and NGOs were hesitant, or even reluctant, to initiate ART programmes 
(with the notable exceptions of Brazil and Cuba, as we shall see later). Referring to this as 
a “pervasive medical neglect and donor preference for prevention programmes over 
treatment”, Jones [2004: 386] commented as late as 2004 that … 
 
“While the epidemic demands an appropriate commensurate multisectoral pooling of 
knowledge and resources from the local to the global […], it is particularly noticeable that 
access to treatment for HIV/AIDS has hitherto been foregone as a serious policy option by 
most international donors. Although these drugs [ARVs] have been shown to extend life […], 
western donor policy on HIV/AIDS remains largely silent about their provision and is much 
more preoccupied with prevention programmes. […] Moreover, there is also growing 
evidence of the inadequacy of prevention programmes […] to halt the spread of the disease” 
[Jones 2004: 386]. 
 
In accordance, Farmer et al [2001: 404] inform us that “the quasitotality of AIDS assistance 
to the heavily burdened countries has consisted of the promotion of education and 
condom distribution to prevent HIV infection. […] we still have no good evidence that 
primary prevention works”. In fact, prevention efforts continue to be outstripped and 
overwhelmed by the increases in HIV-infected individuals, also in some western 
countries [Jones 2004: 400]. The argument advanced here is that there are three central 
reasons for this (past) predominant emphasis upon preference for prevention. 
 Firstly, the provision of ARV-drugs in resource poor settings was widely agreed not 
to be economically viable—especially in sub-Saharan Africa—due to their high cost of 
acquisition, allegedly kept high by drug patents. 
 Two, ART was thought of as unsustainable and impracticable because ARVs are 
particularly complex to administer—requiring refrigeration and having a short shelf life. 
                                                        
38 In December 2005, sub-Saharan Africa alone had 4.5 million people in need of ART out of the 6.5 million in 
need in the entirety of the developing world [Nemes et al 2006a: 12]. 
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Another serious impediment is the vast demand on already strained human resources 
(professional health care staff) and infrastructure (laboratorial capacity for CD4 cell 
counts, viral load testing, and a system of effective drug procurement). Furthermore, 
much concern was voiced over psychosocial issues such as patient capacity to adhere to 
treatment, stigma, taboo, and food security. In other words, sub-Saharan Africa was seen 
as too lacking in both funds and adequate development to be considered for ART 
programmes [Jones 2004: 396]. 
 A third issue that makes a problem of ART-provision is the unpleasant ethical 
headache summoned by a scenario in which drug demand vastly outstrips supply. In late 
2003, less than 7% of the 5.9 million people in need of ARVs in developing countries were 
undergoing therapy [Nemes et al 2006a: 5]. In late 2005, the figure had climbed to a mere 
20% (with 6.5 million in need) [ibid: 12]. Nevertheless, this increase has—as we shall 
see—required a strenuous effort to achieve … 
 
“New development linking HIV to national, international and human security, together with a 
growing human rights orientation toward people with HIV/AIDS, have contributed to new 
recommendations from organisations such as the World Health Organisation […] to combine 
prevention, support, treatment and care in responding to the HIV/AIDS pandemic” [Galvão 
2005: 1114]. 
 
In the following, we shall look further into the discussion surrounding the feasibility of 
scaling up the provision of anti-retroviral therapy in resource poor settings, and see how 
the global HIV/AIDS discourse has gradually undergone a paradigm shift in the direction 
of promoting a synergy between preventive and curative efforts. 
 In a publication on community-based approaches to HIV treatment, Farmer et al 
[2001: 409] boldly inform us that “we know from experience that repeated claims of 
unfeasibility [of ART] are simply not true”39. This relatively early claim is valid only to a 
certain extent. Farmer was managing just one of many ART pilot projects devoted to 
demonstrating the achievability of good results of ART in resource poor countries around 
the world. While some of the central points of concern have certainly been dispelled 
effectively in the course of time—at least in some settings—some points still stand and 
pose a serious threat to the future expansion of ART programmes. The most challenging 
of these threats—or impediments to ART-provision—will be the subject of chapter six. In 
present chapter, we shall look at the difficulties that anti-retroviral therapy is commonly 
presumed to be fraught with, i.e. factors and obstacles that may hinder ART-provision on 
                                                        
39 Farmer et al were probably emboldened by the recent success of their Directly Observed Therapy (DOT) 
ART pilot programme in Haiti [Farmer et al 2001]. The programme was, however, later criticised by 
Desvarieux et al [2005: 1120] for being unrealistic in High Prevalence High Caseload (HPHC) settings on 
claims that it would entail the lifelong mobilisation of huge numbers of accompagnateurs (treatment 
supporters); a component essential to the Haitian pilot. 
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various levels and to various degrees. As outlined in the above, these factors fall into 
three categories:  
 
• Economic Viability 
 
• Capacity of sustained provision 
 
• Ethics and eligibility 
 
Under these headings, each category is discussed throughout the remainder of this 
chapter. Each category contains several topics and section 4.2 (below) includes 
discussions on drug procurement, cost-benefit, and the potential macro economic 
benefits of an ART intervention. For the sake of readability, these topics have been 
organised in sub sections. Section 4.3 (Capacity of sustained provision) deals with 
organisational considerations, infrastructural shortcomings, psychosocial difficulties, 
and clinical constraints (similarly organised in sub sections). Finally, section 4.4 (Ethics 
and eligibility) rounds off the chapter with a discussion on eligibility criteria, rationing 
of ARVs, and targeting of beneficiaries. Although these sections are not concerned 
specifically with Mozambique, their findings are sought related to previous chapters 
whenever this is conductive to comprehension or provides insights. 
 
4.2 – The irony of it all 
The economic viability of providing ART depends primarily on the costs of acquiring the 
drugs. We are therefore forced to ask that if the costs of drug procurement are 
prohibitive, then what forces cause this economic unviability? The global AIDS 
community did identify one such ‘force’, but there was something that it failed to 
address. In this section, we shall come to see what that was, alongside its grand irony. 
 HIV/AIDS became a politically charged issue when AIDS activists began mobilising 
against the pharmaceutical industry that manufactures ARVs. Companies were accused of 
constituting a major barrier to drug availability and of keeping them out of the reach of 
those requiring them. Reality is rather different. The 1995 international agreement on 
the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) of the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) secured patents on ARVs for up to 20 years for their holders or 
pharmaceutical manufacturers—and accordingly also the possibility for these to 
maintain high monopolistic prices. Although India warned against a scenario of 
decreased ARV availability for the poor, access restrictions did result from TRIPs 
implementation [Richey & Haakonsson 2004: 23]. 
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 By way of vociferous advocacy and aggressive lobbyism, a global movement40 to 
reduce prices and expand access to ART progressively gathered momentum and 
challenged the ‘profiteering’ of pharmaceutical companies and the indifference of 
governments and societies to PLWA [McCoy et al 2005: 18]. Near the end of 2001, the Doha 
Ministerial meeting in the WTO declared that TRIPs ought not stand in the way of national 
and international AIDS responses [Galvão 2004: 1111]. Lamentably, ARV access of poorer 
developing countries did not improve because of legislative and practical complications. 
The TRIPs Council finally found a solution in 2003 referred to as the ‘August 30th Solution’ 
[Richey & Haakonsson 2004: 25]. By way of compulsory licenses, national governments 
could now manufacture generic versions of patented ARVs. Some countries in sub-
Saharan Africa—Mozambique included—subsequently granted such licences to national 
industries [ibid]. However, one could ask what these licences were supposed to achieve 
in the absence of national drug producing industries? But the real question is whether 
the global movement—which was so strongly convinced that patents played a pivotal 
role in blocking access to ARVs in poorer countries—was entirely justified in its stance? 
The argument here is that it was not. In fact, research into the actual extent of patenting 
of ARV-drugs in Africa and of essential drugs in most poor countries “shows that drug 
patents rarely exist” [Bate & Tren 2004] … 
 
“In the 53 countries of Africa, 15 ARV therapies that are most usually required for treatment 
were not patented. Out of a total possible 795 patents, only 172 (or 21.6%) actually exist. In 
addition, there appears to be little relationship between the degree of drug patenting for 
ARVs and access to those drugs. If the ‘patents block access’ thesis were correct, one would 
expect that in countries that have more drug patents, drug access would be reduced and vice 
versa. Yet no such relationship exists. […] Although some drug patents do occur for some 
drugs—such as South Africa, where most drugs are patented—on the whole they rarely exist 
[…]” [Bate & Tren 2004: 4]. 
 
If patents rarely exist, they cannot account for a general lack of access to ARVs (and 
essential drugs) in most poor countries. Moreover, generic drugs are—contrary to 
popular belief—not always cheaper than patented drugs [Desvarieux et al 2005: 1121]. 
Therefore, other more fundamental reasons must underlie the lack of access to ARVs in 
developing countries. Before turning to these, however, other economic aspects deserve 
attention. 
 Another rationale of the protectionist policies of TRIPs—besides that of candid 
capital accumulation—was that a so-called ‘reward system’ would allegedly motivate 
and sustain the high costs of researching and manufacturing new and improved drugs. It 
                                                        
40 National Governments, the UN, The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, the World Bank, 
private foundations such as the Melinda and Bill Gates Foundation, the William J. Clinton Foundation, and 
various NGOs (spearheaded by Médicins Sans Frontières through their ‘Access to Essential Medicines’ 
campaign). 
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seems, nonetheless, that many ARVs were actually developed by public institutions 
(including universities) and not by pharmaceutical companies alone [Stewart et al 2005: 
25]. Whichever raison d’être of TRIPs, or the extent and consequence of patents, fact is that 
differential access to ARV-drugs because of cost “contributes to the uneven global 
experience of HIV/AIDS“ [Jones 2004: 390]. 
 Still, wider availability of generic drugs—along with the pressure of the global 
movement against patents—contributed to ‘persuading’ pharmaceutical companies to 
lower their prices. In 2003, the William J. Clinton Foundation announced that ARV 
‘cocktails’ would now be available for US$ 140 per person per year; a figure that has since 
been frequently quoted in the HIV/AIDS literature like a truism. Nevertheless, it is unclear 
whether any ARVs have been supplied at that price, especially since it does not account 
for price increases caused by taxes and tariffs. 
 In fact, the lowest figure is over US$ 250. Adding import taxes and tariffs, the real 
amount is over US$ 300 in all countries, but exceeds US$ 500 in most [Bate & Tren 2004: 6]. 
In truth, AIDS activists have failed to address the state-imposed price barrier of taxes and 
tariffs. In terms of ARVs, governments are naturally free to decide how much they tax, 
although it does seem peculiar that a government would choose to place tariffs, levies, 
duties, and other taxes on pharmaceuticals, which can save the lives of their citizens 
[ibid: 5]. Mostly, this is not the case, but some countries do tax ARVs: 
 
TABLE 1: Price increase due to pharmaceutical taxation (2004) [Bate & Tren 2004: 5-
6]41: 
 
 Country Taxation 
 Burundi 30.0% 
 DR Congo 43.0% 
 Egypt 30.0%  
 Ethiopia 30.0% 
 Malawi 15.0% 
 Rwanda 9.5% 
 South Africa 14.0% 
 Tanzania 10.0% 
   
 Argentina 21.0% 
 Bangladesh 15.0% 
 Brazil 11.7% 
 Dominican Republic 28.0% 
 Greece 15.0% 
 India 25.0% 
 Turkey 18.0% 
                                                        
41 These taxations include port inspection charges, toll, clearance and freight duties, bank and currency 
charges, import margins and duties, and domestic and sales taxes. 
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It can only be considered deeply ironic, or hypocritical even, that some developing 
countries call for lower prices on drugs when they themselves are responsible for 
increasing prices in order to raise profits at the expense of the health of their own 
citizens. Taxation would be more understandable if ARVs were manufactured 
domestically (thus avoiding at least some of these taxations), but fact is that the vast 
majority of the countries listed in TABLE 1 do not possess a national ARV industry. The 
global movement lobbying against drug patents has obviously suffered from a ‘visual 
field defect’. Perhaps it never occurred to it that national developing country 
governments could possibly be any less ‘good’ than Clinton et al who are fighting to 
lower prices on ARVs. 
 A further preoccupation are the drug registration procedures of SADCs, which often 
constitute a host of bureaucratic red tape and procedural complications and 
conditionality, which greatly add to the cost of developing new drugs [Bate & Tren 2004: 
6]. 
 In any event, the price range of ARV-drugs did become sufficiently low to 
contemplate scaled-up treatment programmes in resource-constrained settings [Stewart 
et al 2004: iii]. Thus, donors and politicians in sub-Saharan Africa began chewing over the 
cost effectiveness of elaborating and implementing ARV delivery programmes. 
 Recollecting the study of the broad, long-term impact of AIDS in Mozambique 
published by the International Labour Organisation (Beckmann & Rai 2005 in section 3.7), 
there were two scenarios: one with AIDS and one without AIDS. But for our purpose here, 
these scenarios are inapplicable as credible economic analysis or prognosis because they 
do not consider the cumulative effects and externalities of AIDS interventions. The 
scenario requested here is one with AIDS plus an effective intervention that combines 
prevention and treatment to include anti-retroviral therapy (ART); voluntary counselling 
and testing (VCT); prevention of mother-to-child transmission (PMTCT); treatment of 
sexually transmitted infections (STIs); and preferably the support of groups of people 
living with AIDS (PLWA). In short (and this is an almost complete listing of the HIV/AIDS 
‘alphabet’): a combined ART+VCT+PMTCT+STI+PLWA HIV/AIDS intervention. Such a scenario 
would—beyond the shadow of a doubt—produce a different outcome than that of the 
aforementioned AIDS-only scenario since combined preventive and curative 
interventions would not only reduce some of the negative impacts of HIV/AIDS, but also 
boost economic growth in several ways. Two economic aspects of that scenario are of 
paramount importance to its cost effectiveness: its direct cost and its potential 
macroeconomic benefits. These two aspects are discussed below in the following two sub 
sections where we ask: in relation to the economic viability of an ART intervention, what 
is the significance of direct cost and what are the potential macroeconomic benefits of 
ART? Answering these questions will hopefully enable us to understand whether or not 
anti-retroviral therapy is ‘economically viable’. 
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4.2.1 – Direct cost 
Compared to other AIDS interventions, the direct cost of an ART programme is substantial 
(expensive) due to the cost of acquiring patented or generic drugs (there are further 
price variations between first and second line drug regimens) and due to import taxes 
and tariffs. Additionally, laboratorial testing42 and medical personnel must be paid for 
[Nattrass 2004: 107]. ART causes a sharp drop not only in morbidity, but also in the 
number of opportunistic infections and consequent number of hospital admissions 
[Farmer et al 2001: 408]. Therefore, most direct savings occur as a result of reduced 
hospital costs. Contrary to sub-Saharan Africa, South America’s largest country 
responded promptly to the threat of the pandemic. One Brazilian federal law of 1996 “[…] 
lays out the public health system’s obligation to universal and free access to anti-
retrovirals” [Brazilian Ministry of Health 2006]43 & 44. With national production of roughly 
half of its ARV consumption, the Brazilian programme has been successful although the 
country is still marked by profound economic disparity, and the sustainability of the 
programme and its transferability to other countries still need to be analysed [Galvão 
2004: 1110 & 1116]45. Nevertheless, Teixeira et al [2003: 80] estimated total Brazilian net 
savings at US$ 200 million between 1997 and 200146, mostly in hospital costs. The 
interplay between benefit, cost, and effectiveness naturally varies across differing 
settings. It should therefore not be taken for granted that ART-provision automatically 
results in direct savings on the hospital bill. In fact, direct savings—such as those 
calculated in Brazil by Teixeira et al [2003]—will be attained only insofar as AIDS-patients 
would otherwise be hospitalised for care; a proposition often absent in sub-Saharan 
Africa, where many die from their initial opportunistic infections (South Africa 
excepted) [Desvarieux et al 2005: 1117]. In Mozambique, the potential direct savings 
resulting from averted hospital admissions are therefore likely to be less than in Brazil, 
though an estimate is impossible to ascertain with any level of precision. 
 In an analysis that integrates a detailed costing exercise with the output of the so-
called ASSA2000 Intervention Model—which was designed to estimate the likely impact of 
various HIV/AIDS health policy interventions—Nattrass [2004] explores the prospects of 
ART-provision in South Africa. The analysis is “one of the most detailed” and “one of the 
                                                        
42 Lactate dehyrdrogenase, CD4 cell count, and differential and amalyse tests [Nattrass 2004: 107].  
43 “[…] dispõe sobre a obrigatoriedade do acesso universal e gratuito aos medicamentos anti-retrovirais pelo sistema 
público de saúde”. (my translation) 
44 India announced similar legislation in 2004, albeit not entirely ‘universal’ [McGough 2005: 1178]. 
45 In 2006, the WHO reported that it has never “systematically explored the potential—and the challenges—
of South-South cooperation”, i.e. the Brazilian experiences and their adaptation for resource-poor 
countries like Mozambique [Nemes et al 2006b: 30]. 
46 The savings to the Brazilian government were more than US$ 1.1 billion because 358.000 AIDS-related 
hospital admissions were avoided. An additional US$ 1.2 billion was saved on ambulatory care (including 
drugs for opportunistic infections). The cumulative savings on ambulatory care and hospital admissions 
were estimated to be approximately US$ 2.0 billion [Teixeira et al 2003: 80]. Meanwhile, US$ 1.8 billion were 
invested in carrying out the policy [ibid]. 
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most sophisticated of its kind”, allegedly due to the richness of South African 
socioeconomic data such as demographic and behavioural variables [ibid: 99]. Though 
similar costing studies of this kind exist, and although they produce different (negative) 
outcomes, these are scrutinised by Nattrass and credibly found to be amiss on several 
counts [ibid: 116-9]. Nattrass’ analysis clearly demonstrates that PMTCT programmes—
through short course zidovudine47 and nevirapine therapy—more than pay for 
themselves because the cost of treating HIV-positive children is higher than the cost of 
preventing them from becoming infected in the first place [ibid: 113]. In other words, a 
government would be throwing away resources by not implementing a PMTCT 
programme. In the presence of an ART intervention, Farmer et al [2001] found that … 
 
“Our experience further suggests that HIV therapy can reinvigorate flagging prevention 
efforts. Although AIDS remains a stigmatised disease […], we believe that access to effective 
therapy has lessened AIDS related-stigma. The demand for HIV testing, and the opportunity 
for counselling, has risen since HAART was made available” [Farmer et al 2001: 405] (emphasis 
added). 
 
As an increasing number of people are counselled and treated with ARVs, their HIV viral 
load will drop, thus causing a fall in HIV transmission [Nattrass 2004: 118]. As HIV 
transmission drops, less PMTCT will be needed. In other words, an ART intervention will 
reduce the costs of both VCT and PMTCT because of the reduction in new infections (and 
hence the need for VCT and PMTCT) [ibid: 111]. The number of STIs, however, will rise, 
since ART-patients live longer and remain sexually active. 
 Reflecting over the ASSA2000 Intervention Model’s estimated impact of scenarios 
involving combinations of ART, STI, VCT, and PMTCT on the cumulative numbers of HIV 
infections and AIDS deaths averted in South Africa, Nattrass [2004] found that the figures 
undoubtedly show that … 
 
“[…] prevention programmes can significantly reduce the level of HIV infections in society, 
but a national HAART programme has the greatest impact in terms of averting AIDS deaths, 
while also manifesting a strong preventive element. An AIDS intervention programme that 
combines prevention and HAART treatment has the best outcome in terms of saving and 
prolonging life” [Nattrass 2004: 109]. 
 
Her findings indicate that an ART+STI+VCT+PMTCT intervention in South Africa would avert 
2,863,000 HIV infections and 2,859,000 AIDS deaths in a scenario between 2002 and 2015 
[Nattrass 2004: 115].  
 As we have seen, the ART component will significantly reduce the costs of the VCT 
and PMTCT components while increasing the cost of the STI component of the 
                                                        
47 The first anti-retroviral used to treat HIV. It inhibits viral reverse transcriptase, an enzyme that permits 
HIV to replicate itself [Farmer et al 1996: 362]. 
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intervention. But what of the cost of ART itself? Is ART likely to ‘pay for itself’ as was the 
case with PMTCT? The answer to that question is negative. For even if we add the 
potential savings from averted hospital admissions (and care for opportunistic 
infections), the total cost of an intervention including an ART component is still higher 
than one that does not [Nattrass 2004: 114]. But an assessment of the economic impact of 
ART must see beyond the narrow financial perspective of expenditure of the public 
health sector. The following section does so. 
 
4.2.2 – Potential macroeconomic benefits 
That direct costs outweigh the savings of an ART intervention is of less importance when 
other potential macroeconomic benefits are taken into consideration. Ultimately, the 
benefits of ART should be “measured in terms of outputs such as longer life expectancy, 
fewer orphans, etc” [Nattrass 2004: 108]. What is referred to here is the potential role of 
ART in decreasing morbidity and mortality, which are placing devastating financial and 
social burdens on states—as those outlined in the ominous AIDS impact study of the 
International Labour Organisation [Beckmann & Rai: 2005]. 
 Hence, we must bear in mind that direct costs represent only the tip of the iceberg, 
so to speak. Underneath the waterline lies a much larger sum, not of costs, but of the 
substantial financial and social benefits of averting the lost contributions to society of 
AIDS-patients (inter alia). But the waters are murky in the sense that this sum is “difficult 
to tabulate”, to use Farmer’s expression (citation below). In this relation, food insecurity, 
the rapid increase in orphaned children, and worker absenteeism are areas in which ART 
could surely have a mitigating impact [Jones 2004: 401].  
 
“Leaving aside all moral arguments, any economic logic that justifies as acceptable the 
orphaning of children is unlikely to be sound, since the cost to society, though difficult to 
tabulate, is far higher than the cost of prolonging parents’ lives so that they can raise their 
own children” [Farmer et al 2001: 408]. 
 
Desvarieux et al [2005: 1118] apparently agree in that “in the end, the long-term 
economic (and social) impact of raising generations of orphans may be the most 
staggering, albeit delayed, draw on resources”. These are strong arguments in favour of 
ART-provision, not only from a humanitarian perspective, but certainly also from an 
economic angle. In this respect, one could question the rationale of preventing HIV in 
infants (through PMTCT), while ignoring the treatment of their mothers, without whom 
they will be orphaned. Raising the life expectancy (and quality) of HIV-infected mothers 
with ARVs would concurrently reduce the number of future orphans. A cynic might add 
that this is an argument against both PMTCT and ART, but such an argument must be 
dismissed as morally corrupt and misanthropic. 
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 Similar to the positive effects of PMTCT, it is a reasonable assumption that drugs 
capable of prolonging the lives of otherwise sick or dying people will have a beneficial 
effect on their productivity as workers. An increase in productivity would subsequently 
entail a reduced demand on schooling, job training, and other productivity-related costs 
to both the private and the public sector. The effects would be especially pronounced in 
the health care sector as it is hit harder by AIDS than other sectors due to work-related 
HIV transmission—though certain areas of the informal sector suffer more (i.e. 
commercial sex-workers). Nattrass [2004: 171] lends credence to this hypothesis by 
analysing the subject within three macroeconomic models. All three models indicate a 
consequential boost to economic growth, and thus also in government tax revenues 
[ibid]. In other words, there is an essential financial bonus to be had from an AIDS 
intervention that involves an ART-provision component and the size of this benefit will 
grow parallel to the level of programme coverage; the more PLWA in therapy, the greater 
the boost to economy. 
 There is, however, one more potential macroeconomic benefit to be considered; 
namely that of the effect of ART on consumption (and demand). This issue is more 
troublesome. According to Nattrass [2004: 172], the impact of AIDS on the overall level of 
consumption is unclear, and thus “it follows that the macroeconomic benefits of a 
national HAART programme are similarly unclear”. This conclusion is drawn because the 
impact of ART-provision on consumption depends on how the programme is financed. 
Nattrass continues from the above citation by concluding that … 
 
 “[…] we have no way of knowing whether the broader economic benefits of HAART (in terms 
of averting the AIDS-related shifts in consumption and averting the negative impact of AIDS on 
productivity) will offset the costs (of higher government expenditure on health and thus 
higher levels of taxation)” [Nattrass 2004: 172]. 
 
But there is one scenario that Nattrass neglects to consider, most probably because of the 
South African context of her analysis. She assumes an ART programme to be financed by 
either taxation; by re-allocation of resources from other priorities; or by borrowing. But 
what if a full-scale AIDS intervention was funded—not necessarily exclusively, but to a 
considerable extent—externally, i.e. by donors through diverse channels of foreign aid? 
What if there were no (internally sourced) “higher government expenditure on health” 
and “higher levels of taxation”? This is, as we shall see, the case in Mozambique. But it is 
not as much a question of ‘how much aid’ as it is an issue of how much that the 
bureaucratic public sector structures can actually absorb, and then the issue pours over 
into the realms of capacity, governance, and public administration. We shall discuss this 
when our attention turns to the capacity of Mozambique’s ART programme (section 6.2). 
 The following figure illustrates the broader macroeconomic benefits of providing 
ART: 
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 FIGURE 4: Broader macroeconomic benefits of providing ART: 
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 Source: figure adopted from Nattrass 2004: 172 (fig. 6.1) 
 
Summarising this discussion on the economics of ART-provision, much points in the 
direction that the inclusion of ART in a comprehensive HIV/AIDS intervention may hold 
the potential of generating both direct savings and macroeconomic benefits. On the 
other hand, it is unclear whether these paybacks will fully compensate for the 
substantial costs of implementing such a programme. If there are indications that cost-
benefit might actually balance, and if nothing speaks for an ensuing economic disaster in 
the wake of an ART intervention, then one might question the social morality of a 
decision to hold back. While governments tabulate whether or not they can ‘afford’ to 
keep their citizens alive, people are dying. Therefore, however rosy or gloomy the 
economic prospects, public access to ART is not merely a financial issue; it is also a social 
question about how society should respond to the moral challenges of AIDS. We shall turn 
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to these questions of ethics after a comprehensive discussion on the more practical 
constraints to ART-provision.  
 
4.3 – Capacity of sustained provision  
ART-provision is far from being a simple matter of procuring and prescribing drugs. 
There is obviously also need for an adequately sized staff of skilled health care workers 
to enable regular consultations for patients, and a sufficient overall health care 
infrastructure with laboratory equipment for diagnostics and testing [Jones 2004: 386]. 
Additionally, consideration needs to be given to a range of psychosocial issues, which 
operate at a variety of levels. For the purpose of discussing constraints to ART-provision, 
these issues have here been organised into four sub sections that address issues 
important to the formulation of ART policies: 
 
• Organisational considerations 
 What are the possible institutional channels through which ARVs can be 
delivered? 
  
• Infrastructural shortcomings 
 What are the logistic- and health care infrastructure and human resource 
capacities required for an ART intervention to perform satisfactorily? 
  
• Psychosocial difficulties 
 What is the significance of the role of the community, stigmatisation of PLWA, 
and adherence to the successfulness of ART? 
  
• Clinical constraints 
 What is the significance of drug resistance, toxicities, and adequate nutrition 
to the successfulness of ART? 
 
As we shall see, these problems and prerequisites represent a serious challenge for 
Southern African Developing Countries (SADCs). There is no universal consensus on how 
to effectively expand access to ART, and each national setting is unique in itself. Pilot 
programmes have nonetheless been up and running for some years now. Apart from NGO 
pilots—which are discussed later on—worth mentioning are UNAIDS and Uganda’s Drug 
Access Initiative (DAI) that commenced in 1998 and Botswana’s ART programme Masa48, 
which began in 2001. Delivering ARVs through the public health sector, these 
programmes have provided us with valuable experiences and shown that people with HIV 
                                                        
48 Setswana word meaning ‘New Dawn’. Masa was developed by the Ministry of Health in partnership with 
the African Comprehensive HIV/AIDS Partnership, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, the Merck 
Company Foundation, and McKinsey & Company [Stewart et al 2004: 11].  
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can be successfully treated in SADCs with clinical outcomes similar to those seen in highly 
resourced settings [WHO 2006]. These pioneer interventions, however, had the technical 
support of external academic and non-governmental institutions, and so it still remains 
doubtful whether their results can be replicated on a wide scale without additional 
resources [Stewart et al 2004: 8]. In the following four sub sections, we shall come to 
understand why such doubt is fully justified. 
 
4.3.1 – Organisational considerations  
There are five key financial mechanisms and service delivery models through which an 
ART intervention can be realised. These vehicles of implementation are: 
 
• Public sector: provision by way of government funds or government administered 
(‘channelled’) donor funds at hospital-, district-, or community level. 
 
• Non-profit sector: any kind of international or national NGO, CBO, or FBO. 
 
• Corporate sector: provision through private businesses or corporations. 
 
• Private for Profit sector: private pharmacists, general practices, medical aids, etc. 
 
• … and combinations of the above (most probable): also referred to as Public Private 
Partnerships (PPPs). 
 
The latter point will most likely be the case in most settings. It is also likely that changes 
in legislation will occur to regulate and accompany an ART intervention. In Mozambique, 
we saw that only certified doctors can prescribe ARVs; there was a law against workplace 
discrimination of PLWA in 2001; and a ministerial diploma approved public sector role-out 
of ART that same year [CHG 2004: 8; Matsinhe 2005: 121]. It can be argued that the private 
health sector and businesses have a responsibility to bear some of the burden and 
alleviate the impact of the pandemic on the public sector. Governments can give 
incitement to such ‘corporate social responsibility’ through the encouragement or 
subsidisation of assistance programmes, health insurances, and disability, death and 
sickness benefits for employees [Stewart et al 2004: 7]. Public Private Partnerships 
combine the knowledge and resources of two sectors and hold the potential to render 
the delivery of ARVs to a country’s citizens more effective. Several SADCs are providing 
ART through their public health sectors. 
 Additionally, many non-profit organisations provide ART throughout Southern 
Africa. As demonstrated later on, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) is the most prominent 
organisation in this relation. MSF and other NGOs have contributed with valuable services 
to communities and have played a crucial role in developing models for wide-scale 
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provision. On the other hand, these organisations are small and possess resources that 
are scarce elsewhere in the countries where they operate, i.e. funds, highly educated 
staff, sophisticated equipment, etc [Stewart et al 2004: 15]. It is the rule rather than the 
exception that such NGOs partner with the public sector. Therefore, they are in fact 
partnerships between public, private, and non-profit institutions.  
 Apart from delivery of free or low-priced ARVs, NGOs are also involved with 
psychosocial support, advice on nutrition, and palliative care to PLWA [Stewart et al 2004: 
13]. Many NGOs, CBOs, and PLWA groups provide ARVs through their own structures, 
because alternative options are frequently non-existent. Particularly national low-
resourced organisations are experiencing problems with sustaining such treatment 
programmes, because they rely on fund- or drug donations—in Mozambique principally 
from foreign NGOs, which integrate these lesser NGOs into their activities. Hence, their 
efficiency is limited due to stock-outs of supplies, lack of drug information, and drugs 
close to expiry dates or inappropriate to local needs; problems that contribute to drug 
resistance [ibid: 14]. 
 While both financial and ethical reasons for providing ART through the corporate 
sector can be argued to exist, this practice is not widespread, and it is often only larger 
corporations that offer ART programmes for their employees. In many SADCs, the 
informal sector of the economy is very large. In Mozambique, the vast majority of the 
labour force is employed in the informal sector, which, in 1997, “accounted for more 
than half of the total value of production in the economy and continues to do so, even 
today” [Beckmann & Rai 2005: 5]. The impact of private business programmes is 
therefore limited by default [Stewart et al 2004: 15]. Businesses must overcome the 
stigmatisation of their employees who will need to access VCT services, and there is 
reason to be concerned about the fate of employees who can no longer work, or retire, 
and about extending ART to include spouses and children [ibid: 16]. Furthermore, ART-
provision through private businesses runs the risk of creating undesirable inequities, 
especially in the absence of international frameworks to support private ART initiatives. 
Even if legalisation did exist to obligate the corporate sector to provide ARVs to their 
employees, unethical methods could easily be applied to circumvent this reasonability by 
ways of reduced employee benefits; pre-employment screening to exclude HIV-positive 
workers; selective retrenchments; restructured employment contracts; outsourcing; and 
changes in production technologies that substitute capital for labour [ibid: 17]. 
 For those fortunate enough to be able to purchase their ARVs out-of-pocket, the 
private for profit sector represents an alternative ART provider. But private medical 
practitioners or pharmacies tend to offer ARVs—sometimes paid for by medical aid 
companies—without counselling for treatment adherence and at irregular prices 
[Stewart et al 2004: 17]. When costs are prohibitive, people are much more likely to buy 
ARVs erratically or discontinue treatment when they feel better. Moreover, private 
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providers acquire drugs according to what the supply chain has in stock or wants to 
provide, which does not necessarily coincide with customer needs [ibid]. 
 At this point, one might reasonably ask how and through which channels ART is 
being provided in Mozambique? This issue, however, is more appropriately integrated in 
the context of a larger discussion on ART in Mozambique—which is the subject of 
chapter five—and so we shall let the subject rest for now and turn our attention to the 
infrastructural shortcomings hindering ART. 
 
4.3.2 – Infrastructural shortcomings 
The HIV/AIDS pandemic and its treatment exacerbate pre-existing structural and 
systemic deficiencies in the primary health care sectors of SADCs, and lead to the 
emergence of new ones as the quantity of patients accessing services increases. It is 
therefore an imperative prerequisite that the overall infrastructure and systems of a 
health care sector are strengthened before widespread public sector provision of ART is 
implemented [Hills-Jones & Kanabus 2003 in Stewart et al 2004: 20]. First of all, adequate 
and continuous programme financing mechanisms must be in place. Secondly, a stable 
system of drug procurement must secure a sustained and satisfactory inflow of ARVs in 
accordance with demand. These issues have already been discussed. Further issues—
which do not involve financing or drug procurement directly—relate to the challenge of 
strengthening health systems. Present section identifies and discusses a number of 
infrastructural shortcomings such as the critical lack of human resources and skills; the 
importance of integrating prevention and treatment efforts; the training of health care 
workers; and the management of ARV-drug supplies, laboratory infrastructure, and 
patient information systems. 
 In 2004, the World Health Organisation published revised treatment guidelines for 
a public health approach to scaling up ART in resource limited settings. The WHO referred 
to this document as “a cornerstone of the WHO 3 by 5 plan” [WHO 2004: 5]49. Based on 
“availability of human resources, health system infrastructures and socioeconomic 
contexts”, it is stated therein that ART requires a number of prerequisites to be in place 
in the public health sector prior to scale-up [ibid: 7]. These include HIV counselling and 
testing and psychosocial support services to ensure adherence; the capacity to manage 
HIV related illnesses and opportunistic infections; adequate laboratory equipment; a 
continuous supply of ARVs; reliable regulatory mechanisms; and an HIV drug resistance 
surveillance system [Stewart et al 2004: 27; WHO 2004]. 
 Intrinsic to a comprehensive AIDS intervention is that prevention and treatment 
efforts are not seen as two unrelated strategies, but rather fully integrated throughout 
                                                        
49 The 3 by 5 initiative (meaning treat 3 million by 2005) was a UNAIDS/WHO initiative launched in December 
2003 in an (over)ambitious effort to expand access to ART in poor- and middle-income countries. In terms 
of achieving this goal, the campaign failed with only 18 nations meeting the target, two thirds of them in 
Latin America [Zarocostas 2006b]. 
* 77 *
 
THE AIDS PANDEMIC 
 
 
 * 78 *
the entire health network such as in the ‘integrated network approach’ (rede integrada) 
pursued in Mozambique since 1988 and later modified in the ‘integrated approach’ 
(abordagem integrada) to include ART, as we saw in chapter three [Matsinhe 2005: 68]. 
Treatment is complementary to prevention, because it provides a lure for people to get 
tested due to the availability of life-saving ARVs. The primary objective of the integration 
of services is to eventually attain a capacity to provide a self-complementary continuum-
of-care that encompasses all levels of the health care system to form a symbiosis of 
PMTCT programmes, family planning and reproductive health care, VCT, STI management, 
PLWA groups, and community-based home care50 [Stewart et al 2004: 28]. The figure below 
illustrates one possible continuum-of-care cycle: 
 
 FIGURE 5: Hypothetical continuum-of-care cycle: 
 
District hospitals, HIV
clinics, specialists, 
and specialised care 
facilities. 
 
Social and legal 
support services. 
Peer support and 
voluntary services. 
Homes, community 
services, and 
hospices. 
 
Health centres, 
dispensaries, and 
‘traditional’ healers.
HIV voluntary 
counselling and 
testing sites. 
 
 PLWA SEEKING OR NEEDING CARE
 
 Source: altered version of figure appearing in Stewart et al 2004: 29 
 
NGOs and CBOs should be integrated in the continuum-of-care, as is the case in 
Mozambique, where we have seen auxiliary actors such as AMODEFA, MONASO, and RENSIDA 
(see section 3.2), however limited their contributions. 
 VCT services and tuberculosis (TB) control programmes serve as the principal points 
of entry to ART programmes. If VCT services are not far-reaching, the uptake of ART will 
inevitably be limited [Stewart et al 2004: 30]. There is also evidence that people who 
undergo VCT will change their sexual behaviour in the direction of safer sex, thus also 
benefiting prevention [ibid]. In many SADCs, there is a tendency for VCT sites to be located 
in urban areas, where they can serve the largest number of people. This is cause to 
                                                        
50 According to the WHO, community-based home care includes “any form of care given to ill people in their 
homes. Such care includes physical, psychosocial, palliative and spiritual activities” [WHO 1993: 6]. 
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rural/urban inequity and the exclusion of vulnerable segments of society. This is also the 
case in Mozambique, where one third of all people tested lived in Maputo [GTM 2005; CNCS 
2004: 22]. VCT services are likely to be more efficient if they are available in different 
settings (in TB-, STI- or antenatal clinics for example), which they are not in Mozambique, 
where they constitute specialised entities built by foreign NGOs (see section 3.5). 
 TB is one of the leading causes to AIDS deaths. One third of all PLWA has a TB co-
infection and as much as 70% of all TB cases are also HIV-positive. According to Stewart et 
al [2004], experiences from TB programmes … 
 
“[…] provide useful lessons for HIV treatment and care. The scale of the TB epidemic, the need 
for long-term combination therapy, and issues related to monitoring requirements and drug 
resistance and adherence are similar for TB and HIV/AIDS” [Stewart et al 2004: 31]. 
 
Although TB therapy is a short intervention compared to ART, there is a strong argument 
here for the integration of TB and AIDS interventions. Not only could TB programmes act 
as additional gateways to ART; AIDS morbidity and mortality would also be reduced 
significantly. The potential synergies between TB- and ARV therapy is an example of the 
beneficial effects that referral systems in a continuum-of-care cycle could generate. 
Although the published HIV/AIDS strategy of Mozambique’s National AIDS Council [CNCS 
2004] does not contain a single statement regarding the integration of TB and ART, a TB 
programme does exist in parallel to AIDS services in the National Programme to Fight 
Tuberculosis and Leprosy (Programa Nacional de Luta contra a Tuberculose e a Lepra), and 
Mozambique’s integrated approach “links the different services, including the 
tuberculosis programme […]” [CHG 2004: 10]. Nevertheless, the WHO reports that 
“[i]ntegration of HIV and AIDS services in the health system is weak, and linkages with the 
Tuberculosis Programme are still weak“ [Nemes et al 2006b: 30]. One the other hand, it 
merits attention that just as weak health care systems can be overburdened by ART 
without prior strengthening, so can adding an ART component to weak TB programmes 
similarly be imagined to result in even greater dysfunctions. 
 One argument central to this paper is that the most severe impediment to ART 
scale-up is the lack of skilled health workers across all levels. Here, this particular 
shortcoming is discussed in general terms, but the matter is explored in depth and 
specific to the context of Mozambique later on in section 6.1. The underlying causes to 
health worker shortages throughout developing countries in Southern Africa is the high 
annual levels of attrition due to transfers, migration, NGO- or transnational brain drain, 
or AIDS deaths since a significant portion of health workers are infected with HIV during 
work-related activities (in addition to the general threat of the pandemic) [Stewart et al 
2004: 32]. Low levels of knowledge on AIDS and opportunistic infections of therefore 
poorly qualified health workers result in difficulties in correctly informing and 
counselling AIDS patients [CHG 2004: 9]. Moreover, bureaucratic procedures in human 
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resource management of governments hamper the allocation and posting of staff and 
delay payments of salaries. Low salaries and poor living conditions, overcrowded 
hospitals, and potentially hazardous working environments cause a lack of motivation in 
the workplace and “chronic moral erosion” [ibid: 9].
 There are three pathways that may eventually lead to an improvement of these 
circumstances. Firstly, professional staff can be sourced externally and funded by 
international partners. This is a particularly common practice in NGO pilots. Botswana’s 
ART intervention, however, are experiencing problems related to the fact that 90% of the 
doctors involved in the programme are foreign, do not speak local languages, and are 
unfamiliar with local culture [Frederiksson-Bass and Kanabus 2003 in Stewart et al 2004: 
32]. Secondly, tasks customarily performed by physicians can be shared by other health 
care workers—such as clinical officers and nurses who exist in greater numbers—
thereby alleviating some of the burden [ibid: 33]. In fact, this approach can be taken 
much farther to also include large numbers of non-medical personnel. This underscores 
the importance of the inclusion of PLWA groups and CBOs in community home-based care 
and support schemes. According to Friedman [2002], such organisations can play a 
crucial role in scaling up ART programmes … 
 
“[…] due to their accessibility to community members, their ability to conduct home visits 
without abandoning vital functions in a formal health care setting, and their ability to link 
communities to resources and services. They also provide a vital service in educating 
communities about health problems, can play an important role in mobilising communities 
and in identifying community needs and priorities, and can act as agents for change” 
[Friedman 2002 in Stewart et al 2004: 33]. 
 
One segment present in all communities in SADCs is of particular interest when 
discussing the involvement of civil society: the ‘traditional’ healers. On the continent of 
Africa, some 80% of the population make use of traditional medicines and healers (or the 
like) [King 2000 in Stewart et al 2004: 45]. Since healers constitute such an integral part of 
the care seeking behaviour of the peoples of Africa, there is good reason to believe that 
collaborating with them on AIDS could have a far-reaching potential. If healers were well-
informed on AIDS and ART, they would become a powerful weapon in the fight to diffuse 
stigma and discrimination. Furthermore, they could work to dismantle some of the silly 
but dangerous myths about HIV/AIDS that exist in SADCs, and extinguish rumours about 
bizarre and occult miracle cures—such as ‘have sex with a virgin and be cured’ (?!). 
Healers could also increase uptake in VCT by encouraging community leaders to show an 
example and get tested [ibid: 47]. We have previously seen how 100% of all Mozambicans 
have access to one of the nation’s 80,000 curandeiros [Kaarhus & Rebelo 2003: 12; 
Beckmann & Rai 2005: 10]. Unfortunately, we also learned that efforts to initiate an 
effective HIV/AIDS collaboration between the healers, their national association 
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(AMETRAMO), and the formal health services have amounted to absolutely nothing 
[Matsinhe 2005: 135]. This is certainly a lamentable waste of community resources and 
ways should be found to include healers in partnerships with western medical 
practitioners in the formal health network (MISUA). Disappointingly, there is “a dearth of 
solid and reliable research on the potential role of traditional healers in providing care 
and treatment to those infected with HIV and AIDS”, and the research that has been 
conducted has produced contradictory results [Stewart et al 2004: 45-6]. Perhaps one way 
ahead could be the creation of more formalised structures for the participation of 
traditional healers such as in South Africa’s Traditional Healers Bill or the ‘traditional 
indigenous knowledge arm’ of the ministry of health, which provides a forum for the MRC 
and healers to develop and evaluate standardised treatment and care efforts. Healers are 
also employed within South Africa’s National HIV/AIDS Directorate to work with other 
healers.
 PLWA groups—such as Kindlimuka, Kulupira, or Kubatana in Mozambique, which 
were presented under the heading of key actors in section 3.2—are organisations that, 
similarly to the potentially important role of traditional healers, have a crucial role to 
play in treatment information, literacy, and advocacy. In the HIV/AIDS literature, this is 
referred to as Greater Involvement of People with AIDS (GIPA) from time to time. PLWA can 
also be formally employed to assist in planning for appropriate training for health 
providers; in educating communities; in nutritional support schemes; in forming ARV 
treatment- and adherence support groups; in diffusing stigma; and in the planning and 
management of treatment services [Stewart et al 2004: 47-8]. In some countries—take 
GIPA in Uganda or South Africa for instance—PLWA organisations have played pivotal 
roles in AIDS advocacy and in guiding and assisting ART projects. In Mozambique, we 
found PLWA groups to be weak and low-resourced (poor), and that wealthier, better-
educated population strata tend to avoid involvement in public actions in favour of 
private initiatives (see section 3.2). Hence, these organisations are unlikely to achieve 
much without support. According to Matsinhe [2005] … 
 
“[…] the State has much more power and manoeuvring space to recruit different kinds of 
expertise than the emerging associations and groups of Mozambican civil society, also taking 
into account the present scenario in which a significant part of the national intelligencia is 
about to migrate to the private sector or to the big NGOs, which offer relatively more 
attractive and competitive working conditions and pay” [Matsinhe 2005: 109]51. 
 
Local PLWA groups will doubtless be last in line to attract qualified human resources 
when competing with the government and foreign NGOs, especially when recollecting 
                                                        
51 “[…] o Estado tem muito mais poder e margem de manobra para recrutar diferentes tipos de expertise do que as 
emergentes associações e coletividades da sociedade civil em Moçambique, mesmo tendo em conta o cenário atual em 
que um parte significativa da inteligentsia nacional está a migrar para o sector privado e para as grandes ONGs que 
oferecem condições de trabalho e remuneração relativamente mais atraentes e competitivas”. (my translation) 
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that the national AIDS response has always suffered from limitations in terms of qualified 
human resources to implement and manage programmes. It seems that GIPA in 
Mozambique is unlikely to augment progressively without financial and organisational 
support. It might therefore prove fruitful to form partnerships with PLWA groups within 
the formal structures of the national AIDS response, as was also the case with traditional 
healers.
 The curandeiros are not the only ones poorly informed about AIDS. The lacking 
knowledge of official health care workers on opportunistic infections, HIV transmission, 
side effects of ARVs, drug storage, and adequate nutrition also needs rectification. 
Knowledge can, of course, be improved through training and education, but this is costly 
and requires health care staff to divert attention away from routine duties, which can be 
difficult in the context of heavy workloads and staff shortages [Stewart et al 2003: 34]. 
Alternate training measures must therefore be taken. Such could consist of team training 
of entire facilities at once; of on-site training by HIV specialist mentors; or of integrated 
training packages (ART+PMTCT+STI+TB) to reduce hours spent away from work [ibid]. It is 
also important to create a central register of doctors with expertise in prescribing ARVs, 
so as to avoid uncontrolled and unqualified delivery, especially in the private health 
sector. In Mozambique, only accredited doctors can provide ART and there are 
standardised treatment guidelines, but these do not always—as we shall see—harmonise 
with the practices of international NGOs that ‘compete’ with government in ARV delivery 
[Matsinhe 2005: 113]. 
 Before ARVs are delivered, however, they need to be procured, stored safely, and 
finally distributed in accordance with demand in order to assure the sustainability and 
accountability of the entire programme. Recollecting that ARVs require refrigeration and 
have a short shelf life52, appropriate storage conditions for drugs become particularly 
important in hot southern African countries [Stewart et al 2004: 35]. The dangers of theft 
and corruption must also be taken into account given that ARVs are valuable (potentially 
lifesaving) commodities. Hence, it may be necessary to store them in a fashion similar to 
narcotics. Botswana’s ART programme experience suggested using air-conditioned, 
lockable trucks for transportation; increasing security at storage sites; limiting the 
number of people with access to pharmacies; and ensuring that patients take drugs as 
prescribed by way of pill counts or monitoring dates of prescription pick-ups 
[Government of Botswana 2003 in ibid: 36]. Furthermore, improving ARV-drug supply 
management may have a positive spin-off on the broader health system in the sense of 
improved conditions for all drug supplies. 
                                                        
52 This is not always the case. In November 2005, Abbott Laboratories launched a new version of their 
protease inhibitor lopinavir/ritonavir, which does not require refrigeration, but only in the US. Due to 
intense pressure from Médecins Sans Frontières, however, such ARVs are becoming increasingly available 
worldwide [MSF 2006g].  
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 Well-trained and professional health care workers are required not only for ARV 
delivery, but also for the staffing of laboratories indispensable to any ART intervention. 
Prior to initiating ARV therapy, the clinical eligibility of an HIV-positive patient must be 
biologically tested (i.e. initial CD4 lymphocyte cell counts and viral load testing). During 
ART, the effectiveness of the drugs must be monitored along with their side effects. 
Rapidly increasing the laboratorial capacity of health care sectors is therefore essential 
to ART scale-up, but represents a costly challenge to SADCs [Stewart et al 2004: 36-7]. 
Moreover, before additional laboratories are constructed, their geographical locations 
must be carefully planned in relation to specific logistical and infrastructural contexts, 
since samples and information must be transported/transmitted between ART-sites and 
laboratories. This can be difficult in a setting with non-existent roads and lack of basic 
communication equipment such as fax machines and direct phone lines. The presence of 
a single electronic patient information system can lessen this problem and reduce the 
workload on staff. However, experience from Botswana showed that computer literacy of 
health workers was low due to “a long-standing familiarity, and dependence on, paper 
based systems […]” [Government of Botswana in ibid: 37]. The measures undertaken to 
deal with this problem included the development of user-friendly software packages; 
onsite support and trouble-shooting visits; refraining from making sudden changes to 
the system; and using already trained staff to train their co-workers [ibid]. 
 Apart from financial, organisational, and infrastructural issues, which we have 
discussed here, there are also difficulties in ART-provision that are much less material in 
nature and relate to the spiritual constitution of the population. This is the subject of the 
following section. 
 
4.3.3 – Psychosocial difficulties 
Two further issues that seriously hamper both HIV/AIDS prevention and successful anti-
retroviral therapy are those of stigma and poor adherence to treatment. The latter may 
lead to complications and treatment failure as well as the development of drug 
resistance. It is imperative that solutions be found to these problems. As touched upon in 
the above, a greater involvement of civil society in AIDS prevention and treatment can 
have several beneficial effects. Civil society is here meant to encompass GIPA, PLWA 
groups, CBOs, FBOs, and various kinds of local community groups and representatives. In 
relation to the psychosocial difficulties presented in this section, it is argued below that 
such groups are valuable resources in overcoming barriers to access and adherence to 
treatment, as they can dismantle denial, stigma, discrimination, and the shunning or 
abandonment of PLWA through the encouragement of VCT, openness, and disclosure. 
Moreover, forming partnerships with communities will help reveal how PLWA 
understand ART and their health-seeking behaviour through debate and dialogue. 
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 In community based care and support, ‘the family’ is at the centre (i.e. as an entity 
acting from within the community). The capacity of community involvement, however, 
can easily be overestimated. According to Cross et al [1998] … 
 
“The notions of ‘family’ and ‘community’ are frequently poorly defined and romanticised, 
and used as generic catch all phrases. In countries or regions with a history of significant 
social disruption and migration, traditional familial-based structures have often been 
fragmented, and replaced by arrangements based on factors other than kinship or blood 
ties” [Cross et al 1998 in Stewart et al 2004: 42]. 
 
We have certainly found this to be the case in Mozambique where roughly one third of 
the population was uprooted and put into motion due to the war prior to peace between 
FRELIMO and RENAMO in 1992. Matsinhe [2005] informs us that … 
 
“After the signing of the peace treaties, the country began to register high population 
mobility and […] between 1993 and 1996, almost half of the Mozambican population had 
entered into migratory movements, including about 60% of the 5.7 million internally 
displaced, about 1.7 million of the refugees located in neighbouring countries, and about 
270,000 of the demobilised army men and their families […]” [Matsinhe 2005: 35]53. 
 
In a country in which half of the population was uprooted due to civil war, it is a 
reasonable assumption that many people share bonds and ties not exclusively within 
their current place of residence (community), but with friends and relatives in many 
different parts of the country. Furthermore, households already in poverty may not have 
the resources to deal with the additional burdens and costs of care for AIDS-sick family 
members. In fact, Beckman & Rai [2005: 11-13] informed us that Mozambican families 
have reached the point of saturation for what concerns their capacity to take in orphans, 
which suggests that additional burdens may be unbearable. The consequence might be 
that children drop out of school to either work or care for the sick, and that productive 
activities may suffer. The latter can be particularly harmful if it affects the already 
meagre agricultural production, as we saw in our impact assessment in section 3.7. 
Therefore—though still of importance—care must be taken not to overestimate the 
capacity of (especially rural) community involvement in Mozambique. Perhaps in their 
eagerness and haste to render an ART intervention more efficient through the 
(hypothetically beneficial) mobilisation of civil society, donors may not fully realise this, 
and so the outcome of such efforts could turn out to be disappointing. This is a crystal 
                                                        
53 “Após a assinatura dos acordos de paz, o país começou a registrar uma alta mobilidade populacional e [...] entre 1993 
e 1996 quase metade da população moçambicana teria entrado em movimentos migratórios, incluindo os cerca de 60% 
dos 5,7 milhões de deslocados internos, cerca de 1,7 milhões de refugiados que se encontravam nos países vizinhos, e os 
cerca de 270.000 militares desmobilizados e suas famílias [...]”. (my translation) 
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clear example of how the problem cannot be directly addressed without also addressing 
its underling social and economic realities. 
 The first and foremost concern of ART in relation to communities is ensuring that 
these are well prepared and that they possess adequate information. This is an area fit 
for collaborating with community organisations, which can map community needs and 
beliefs about ARVs; conduct consumer education on HIV/AIDS related treatment; and 
promote local-level knowledge and understanding [Stewart et al 2004: 42]. But since 
there are few incentives for health workers to form such partnerships, ART programmes 
should include mechanisms for local capacity building as a component of budgeting and 
planning. Each individual must know what treatment is: how drugs should be used, how 
they work, and their possible side effects. If they do not, there is risk of inappropriate 
treatment and poor adherence. PLWA in successful ART have special credibility as sources 
of information and treatment support [ibid: 43]. Therefore, these may well serve to 
educate health workers in general who—first of all—frequently need treatment 
themselves and—second of all—are especially important since they often represent the 
first point of contact for patients and should therefore be able to properly diagnose and 
inform them. 
 Another way of disseminating information was introduced in Botswana in 2003 
where educational videos about condoms, VCT, ART, and adherence were shown in 120 
clinic- and hospital waiting rooms [Stewart et al 2004: 43]. The stories were told in the 
Batswana people’s own languages. In Mozambique, Swahili and the more than 20 Bantu 
languages spoken constitute a barrier to information dissemination, especially since not 
everyone masters the official Portuguese [Hansson 2004: 4]. Because 54% of the nation’s 
people are illiterate, radio is the chief means of communicating about AIDS54 [Ayisi 2006]. 
In an Inter-Press Service article of January 31 2006 [ibid], linguist Esmeralda Xavier 
discusses the language of prevention messages in Mozambique. Xavier states that she 
was “impressed by the number of publications and radio programs that are put out in 
local languages”. According to Elias Cossa, coordinator of communication and advocacy 
at the National Council to Combat HIV/AIDS (CNCS) … 
 
“The government understands the need to produce materials appropriate to communities. 
Authorities have established a policy that information, education and communication 
materials must be produced locally and in a participatory way” [Ayisi 2006]. 
 
Ngenge [2003] analyses video as a tool in informing about HIV/AIDS among young people 
in rural Mozambique. In her conclusions, she states that … 
 
                                                        
54 Radio Mozambique's soap opera ‘Ruth and Her Friends’, which deals with AIDS, is broadcast in 11 
languages [Ayisi 2006]. 
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“Overall, the audience said that they felt more comfortable to discuss sex and other related 
subjects (HIV/AIDS, pregnancy, relations, etc) after the film than before. This proves that as a 
medium, video seems to be not only a popular but also a successful way of reaching young 
people in Mozambique. It allows for them to access information that otherwise is taboo, or 
problems that are not addressed in daily life. It also contributes to creating a comfortable 
and safe atmosphere to discuss sex and HIV, and brings the subjects up to discussion among 
friends afterwards” [Ngenge 2003: 55-6]. 
 
Other findings presented in that same study appear to accentuate the value of such 
‘edutainment’ in that “[…] you can not speak about sex with your parents because it is 
taboo. If you do you will be punished” and “[after the screenings] none of the children 
felt comfortable enough to speak about these topics with their parents” [Ngenge 2003: 54 
& 56]. Apart from gossip and hearsay, videos may thus be the only source of correct 
information, especially in case of illiteracy, or if children do not attend school, which is 
particularly common for girls. 
 The presence of an AIDS-taboo also suggests that even if people do get the message 
and comprehend AIDS related information accurately, there is still a major barrier to walk 
into an HIV testing facility; namely that of stigmatisation. Stigma therefore seriously 
undermines prevention efforts and fosters the growth of the pandemic. Problematically, 
stigma is hard to combat and is a rather abstract concept. In accordance with their 
unique cultural trades, societies have gradually formed collective social responses to 
AIDS. Unfortunately, reactions often range from complete denial to severe discrimination 
of PLWA, which are the physical manifestations of stigma. Stigma is sometimes enacted, 
sometimes it is felt, and at other times it is applied to oneself [Stewart et al 2004: 44]. It 
may occur domestically; in the workplace; in the community; or even in health care 
facilities. If AIDS is taboo or somehow frowned upon—if it is stigmatised—the result in 
many PLWA is secrecy and shame, which works against ARV treatment adherence. If one 
has to hide medicines and seek privacy, it can be difficult to be punctual about taking 
doses. Hence, successful adherence to ART is largely dependent upon acceptance and 
openness. Fear can also be added to shame and concealment, since PLWA are at risk of 
being abandoned or shunned because of the heavy burden that they place on their 
families and relatives [ibid]. Apart from the burden of caring for AIDS-sick individuals, 
their families and relatives often have to raise the children of these individuals once they 
succumb to disease. At times, it is then more convenient to simply assume the stance 
that HIV-positive people ‘deserve’ their fate because they have behaved immorally (often 
meaning promiscuously). But ART revitalises AIDS-sick people, thus reducing the need to 
care for them or their children, which may then not have to suffer the fate of 
orphanhood. Nothing, in fact—except stigma—impedes that an individual on ARVs holds 
a job and contributes to family income. According to Grubb et al [2003], scaled-up ART 
programmes can thus “reduce strained family structures, reversing the breakdown of 
family life in high prevalence, low-income, stigma-dogged settings” [in Stewart et al 2004: 
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45]. When AIDS is no longer perceived as a death sentence, people will naturally feel less 
anxious about it. 
 But this is not entirely unproblematic. Some suggest that it might even prove 
counterproductive as people might ‘ease up’ on condom usage. It has been hypothesised 
that in some western countries, ART have contributed to an increase in risky (sexual) 
behaviour among men-having-sex-with-men (MSM). However, according to Nattrass 
[2004: 119], “there is no empirical basis to assume that a presumed sexual subcultural 
response among some of the members of the [male] gay community in advanced 
capitalist countries is likely to be replicated in a heterosexual pandemic in Africa”. One 
might respond to this argument by stating that nor is there any evidence suggesting that 
it will not. This way, lower viral loads could be somewhat counterbalanced by an 
increase in HIV transmission caused by longer life spans [ibid]. 
 At this point, the attentive reader will have noticed that the latter part of this 
section has left the realms of social medicine. The above belongs to a discourse 
concerned with individual sexual behaviour (change). It has, nevertheless, been included 
here because just as it is necessary to accentuate the contributions of social medicine to 
our comprehension of the AIDS crisis, we must also exemplify—at least once—that this 
particular theoretical orientation cannot account for everything. This is not arithmetic, 
not quantitative true/false statements; it is social science and as such a science of either 
more or less plausible. But if weighed against vaguely based and poorly substantiated 
statements about individual behaviour, social medicine is still the heavier stone on the 
scales of plausibility, albeit not all-encompassing. 
 Having now discussed the psychosocial difficulties associated with AIDS and ART, 
next section returns to the realms of social medicine and concentrates on purely clinical 
constraints. 
 
4.3.4 – Clinical constraints 
Much emphasis has been put on improving adherence to ART. This is because successful 
virologic suppression is highly associated with high adherence rates (ideally >95%). 
Failure to suppress viraemia will dramatically increase as adherence decreases, and 
strains of mutated drug resistant HIV will eventually develop [Schneider 2003 in Stewart 
et al 2004: 38]. As drug resistant HIV develops additional resistances to other drugs of the 
same class, future treatment options will require extra drugs, which are more expensive 
than first-line treatments. This is also why ARVs should be administered as combination 
therapy and why it is paramount that drug supplies remain uninterrupted (to avoid 
stock-outs). As such, there is an argument here for not introducing ART in (African) 
countries where adherence rates cannot be guaranteed. However, surveys from 
Botswana, Senegal, South Africa, and Uganda demonstrate an average adherence rate of 
90%. Since the average figure for the US is 70%, the argument is easily dismissed, as it 
appears that Africans are in fact remarkably better at following drug regimens than 
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North Americans [Stewart et al 2004: 38-9]. Some of the factors that have been found to 
enhance adherence are: on-site NGO support; ongoing tutoring by peers also on ART; the 
involvement of family members; individual counselling support at each clinic visit; 
simplified drug regimens; pill boxes; daily schedules; self-monitoring of side effects; and 
pill counts [ibid: 39-40]. 
 Because of the importance of adherence, it is common practice in settings where 
ARVs are rationed—where demand outstrips supply—that NGO pilots or government 
programmes make an eligibility criteria of the capacity of individuals to successfully 
adhere to treatment. These criteria are based on assumptions about the economic, 
material, and psychosocial circumstances of a candidate [Stewart et al 2004: 40]. The 
more support an individual is likely to enjoy, the greater that persons chance of being 
deemed eligible. So when pilot NGO projects boast about the successfulness of their 
patients treatment adherence, it should be kept in mind that these were chosen exactly 
because they were more likely to adhere than others. Whether this is perceived as elitist 
favouritism or as a sound utilitarian principle is a matter of ethics, which is discussed in 
section 4.4. It should also be kept in mind, though, that some socio-behavioural factors—
alcoholism, substance abuse, depression, homelessness, etc—seriously hamper 
adherence. Other issues are equally problematic, especially child-adherence when 
caretakers are ill or non-existent. 
 While the possible short-term side effects of ARVs are relatively easily managed, 
long-term toxicities—such as liver and kidney damage; imbalances in blood lipids; and 
diabetes—require more complex treatment interventions and monitoring technologies. 
This represents a clinical constraint to ART where health care infrastructures are not well 
developed. Furthermore, not much is known about how well ART is tolerated in 
individuals in SADCs where HIV strains different from those in western countries are 
prevalent [Stewart et al 2004: 48]. 
 Another critical clinical constraint to ART relates to nutrition. An HIV-infected 
individual experiences changes in metabolism, poor nutrient absorption, diarrhoea, 
fever, thrush, and anaemia (inter alia). Nutritional deficits also increase the host’s 
susceptibility to (chronic) infections and illnesses and advance viral replication 
[Stillwaggon 2002: 9-13]. Increased nutritional needs and physical wasting are therefore 
common characteristics of HIV/AIDS … 
 
“At the household level, HIV/AIDS and food security are closely linked. An HIV-affected 
household increasingly risks food insecurity and malnutrition through declines in labour, 
income and time available for care of younger children, together with increased expenses for 
health care. Food insecurity may in turn further increase both the risk of being exposed to 
HIV and a household’s vulnerability to its increasing impact as the disease progresses. Clean 
water supplies are also important to reduce the burden of household chores and avoid 
additional illness” [Stewart et al 2004: 49]. 
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With three fourths or more of Mozambique’s population living for less than a dollar a 
day (‘absolute poverty’)—and under the threat of drought and flood—access to food is 
an overwhelming priority for most Mozambicans whose immunities are already 
comprised by lack of varied food supplies, sanitation, and clean water [Hansson 2004: 18 
& 24-25]. It is questionable how effective it will be to provide ART in settings where 
outcomes will be sub-optimal due to people’s poor nutritional status, especially as taking 
ARVs without adequate food can be dangerous and counterproductive [Stewart et al 2004: 
49]. Fortunately, supplementing diets with multiple micronutrients has been shown to 
reduce mortality [ibid]. Nutritional support programmes—ranging from the prevention 
of nutritional depletion to provision of nutrition, care, and support—are both 
preventive and curative and must be considered fundamental to any ART intervention in 
settings with food insecurity. Such programmes are inexpensive; they do not require 
medical staffing; and they can easily be imagined to couple with other educational 
HIV/AIDS related activities [ibid: 50]. 
  The importance of food support underscores—once more—the potentially 
significant impact of involving civil society organisations in an AIDS intervention. In 
Mozambique, MONASO works with food support to AIDS-affected households [Beckman & 
Rai 2005: 14]. It does so with the blessing of the government, albeit without financial 
assistance, which is discouraging given that the national HIV/AIDS strategy fully realises 
the devastating impact of malnutrition … 
 
“[…] chronic malnutrition in children will generate adults with low productive capacity with 
highly increased susceptibility to illnesses, which will lead to many lost working days, and 
with a higher rate of mortality. All this will generate lower levels of productivity on the 
national level, which will lead to new cycles of poverty” [CNCS 2004: 98]55. 
 
Underpinning such ‘cycles of poverty’, the high levels of HIV and malaria infections could 
become the principal causes of malnutrition and food insecurity in Mozambique during 
this decade due to reduced productivity and deaths among the adult population. At the 
same time, HIV/AIDS will provoke an elevated number of orphans in critical need of 
nutritional support, thus adding to the malevolence of the cycle [CNCS 2004: 99]. Food 
insecurity, however, is linked to much broader structural weaknesses and is a major 
developmental issue. While efficient in the short-term, nutritional support programmes 
can be made obsolete in the long-term by income generation, education, and poverty 
eradication (or reduction)56. It also merits attention that integrating food aid can 
                                                        
55 “[…] desnutrição crónica nas crianças vai gerar adultos com fraca capacidade produtiva, com susceptibilidade às 
doenças muito acrescida, o que ocasiona muitos dias de trabalho perdidos e com taxa de mortalidade acrescida. Tudo 
isto vai gerar baixa da produtividade ao nível de todo o país, o que vai condicionar novos ciclos de pobreza”. (my 
translation) 
56 Mozambique does have a poverty eradication programmes called PARPA II—Plano de Acção para a Redução 
da Pobreza Absoluta, 2006-2009—but this is an entirely different matter and shall not be discussed here. 
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increase the attractiveness of HIV/AIDS services. School feeding projects, for example, 
provide a strong incentive for the children of poor families to stay in school. Food aid is 
also used as an incentive in projects involved with orphans and (so-called) street-
children. 
 
4.4 – Ethics and eligibility 
Having now examined both the financial and the more practical aspects of ART-provision, 
we have yet to discuss the third major issue that we initially labelled as ‘a constraint to 
ART’ and set out to investigate; namely that of ethics, which relates to how patients are 
deemed eligible for ARV treatment. But ‘ethics’ do not cost money. Nor can they be 
imagined to pose a practical obstacle in terms of lacking physical resources. Still, they 
represent a problem. Hence the question: how can ethical problems and considerations 
come to influence the policies of an ART intervention? 
 Moral—or ethics—is the power by which we attempt to control our social 
surroundings. Usually, there is a general public consensus on what is considered either 
‘moral’ or ‘immoral’. This consensus is fluctuant, flexible, and changes over time through 
alterations in accepted discourse and other complex variations in (cultural) narratives 
and (religious) beliefs. Definitions of morality must be reconsidered if the philosophical 
foundation upon which they rest is shaken. In a very candid exemplification: in most 
societies, we do not eat our fellow human beings to satisfy hunger (indo- and/or exo 
cannibalism), although nothing impedes it biologically. Nonetheless, if the base of this 
moral codex is stirred by a seemingly permanent absence of food, we can opt to either 
stick to our moral foundations and consequently starve, or simply change the moral 
codex provisionally. Change of moral code, however, requires justification. In fact, ‘war’ 
is exactly such justification, when it is perfectly legitimate to slay other human beings, 
whereas such acts are frowned upon and considered immoral crimes in times of peace. In 
an example, we could imagine a large lifeboat full of shipwrecked people lost and adrift 
at sea. They have no idea as to their whereabouts, or as to when they will be saved or 
make landfall. Soon they begin to starve. Once justified by starvation, they would 
subsequently have to justify whom to initially consume. The considerations would 
involve questions such as ‘do we eat the weakest because they stand the slimmest chance 
of survival’ or ‘do we eat the fattest because they would feed the most people’, etc. Such 
consideration is moral philosophy. 
 For HIV-infected people, ART can be the determining factor between live or death. If 
the supply of ARV-drugs is insufficient for everyone in need, decision makers similarly 
have to choose who (presumably) gets to live and thereby also who dies because of 
rationing. The cardinal questions of that moral philosophy are: how can we ethically 
justify our choice of beneficiaries—those eligible for ART and life—and how do we assure 
the equitability of that choice? As reality is that ARV-drugs will be rationed in SADCs for 
the next several years, decision makers are forced to consider those questions, although 
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the feasibility of ART has been such a serious concern that issues of equity and fairness 
have received comparatively less attention so far [McGough et al 2005: 1177]. The 
question of justification of patient selection criteria is, nonetheless, morally problematic, 
and this is why ‘ethics’ constitute a genuine problem. 
 As it happens, medicine has previously been faced with those exact questions. In a 
study published in 2005, McGough et al examine ethical reflections brought about by 
certain historical precedents for resource allocation; namely the discovery of insulin for 
diabetes in 1922; the release of antibiotics for civilian use in 1943; the development of 
chronic haemodialysis programmes in 1961; and finally contemporary allocation of liver 
transplants. It becomes clear that moral and ethical considerations on access to 
treatment have gradually become more and more sophisticated and that a variety of 
ethical principles have crystallised over time. These principles represent considerations 
of moral values and are—as we shall see—present in the ethical discussion specific to 
ART-access. Furthermore, it becomes clear that the ‘problem’ is inherently unsolvable 
because “doing the ‘most good’ is itself a controversial process involving value 
judgements […]” [ibid: 1176]. ‘Good’ and ‘fair’ are merely subjective opinions. 
 Due to similar ethical preoccupations about patient selection, the World Health 
Organisation commissioned a guidance document on ethics, equality, and access to ART. 
Macklin [2004] consequently published an outline of the primary considerations on 
ethics and equality in access to HIV treatment in relation to the UNAIDS/WHO ‘3 by 5 
initiative’ (meaning ‘treat 3 million by 2005’). A number of useful categorisations 
reflecting the most advocated principles are made therein. First of all, she acknowledges 
the unsolvable nature of the problem in that … 
 
“Several ethical principles, in addition to specific principles of equity, are potentially 
relevant and can provide justifications for choosing one or another scheme for fair access to 
ART. These principles point to criteria or concerns that must be considered; but the principles 
can conflict, and it then becomes necessary to balance competing concerns. There is no 
uniquely correct way of doing this balancing. Moreover, there is no consensus on how the 
different principles ought to be weighted […]. Different people often have different 
weightings” [Macklin 2004: 3]. 
 
Apart from purely clinical eligibility (which is based on CD4 cell counts) and psychosocial 
criteria (which we found to concern adherence and social support issues), the following 
key ethical principles are of importance when choosing candidates for ART—also 
referred to as the ‘substantive principles of equity’: 
 
• The utilitarian principle: maximise benefits to society. 
 
• The egalitarian principle: reduce disparities in society and promote ‘fairness’. 
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• The ‘maximin’ principle: target those most immediately in need. 
 
• Justice as reciprocity or compensation: reward or compensate those who have deserved 
it. 
 
The stance of the utilitarian principle is that of maximising overall social benefits. The 
problem is what is actually meant by ‘benefits’—again this is a subjective value 
judgement. Usually, it implies ‘efficiency’, meaning that a maximisation of the health 
benefits to society, as a whole, is supposedly attainable by making the most efficient use 
of existing resources. In relation to rationed ARVs, this entails the direct targeting of the 
well-educated, most productive, and high-income generating workforce. 
 The egalitarian principal does not imply the equal (or ‘fair’) distribution of 
available resources or goods among all members of society; rather it suggests a strategy 
of reducing the disparities among different groups or strata in society. In fact, in terms of 
health care, equal resource distribution would produce inequities. For instance, an HIV-
infected person has considerably less health care needs than a pregnant woman with HIV 
and tuberculosis or malaria. Thus, the egalitarian principle clearly conflicts with the 
utilitarian principle given that the equalisation of public health status would divert 
significant resources to interventions that “produce very small benefits for people who 
require enormous resources to obtain any benefit at all” [Macklin 2004: 5]. 
 The so-called ‘maximin’ principle simply suggests that the worst off, or the least 
advantaged, should be prioritised, i.e. the lowest socioeconomic stratum; the most 
vulnerable; those marginalised or discriminated against; or those with the lowest level of 
access to health care services (far off rural dwellers). In relation to AIDS, this could also be 
taken to mean ‘the sickest’. Again, this conflicts with maximising overall health benefits. 
 When seeing justice as reciprocity or compensation, ‘fairness’ becomes associated 
with the concept of justice. Reciprocal justice is a something-for-something strategy in 
which individuals or groups, which have contributed to society in some form or way, are 
rewarded with ART. When justice is seen as compensatory, ART is provided in 
compensation of HIV infection caused by substandard medical practices such as 
unsterilised needles or unsafe blood collection [Macklin 2004: 6]. See APPENDIX C: Unsafe 
Practices for examples of such. 
 One simple principle—which is not part of the ‘substantive principles of equity’—
could be called the ‘lottery’ principle or the ‘draw straws’ principle. Here, fairness is 
conceptualised such that it is guaranteed by choosing ARV beneficiaries completely 
randomly among all those in need; like rolling a dice. This principle conflicts with all 
other principles. It is not the most beneficial to society; it hardly reduces disparities; it 
does not always help the sickest; nor does it intentionally reward or compensate—but 
everyone stands a ‘fair’ chance. However, this principle could be imagined to be the first 
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choice in our lifeboat example because it is the simplest and renders decision makers less 
blameworthy. 
 The categories and groups of people that may be selected as priorities for ARV 
treatment depend upon which of the above principles that are emphasised over others. 
Overemphasis upon a single principle will comprise the legitimacy and fairness of a 
programme. It therefore seems that the question of ethics is best answered by posing yet 
another question: how is the problem of ‘fair chances vs. best outcome’ solved? The 
answer is that it is not—it is balanced. The possible ethical contemplations and 
considerations that this entails are virtually endless; essentially because selecting one 
individual or group simply means unselecting another whose reasons for receiving 
priority may be justified just as well, but on other grounds, and then you would have to 
justify that choice too ad infinitum. Macklin [2004] discusses several possible candidates 
for ARV treatment. We shall content here with the mentioning of only four possible 
groups, which all merit priority on different ethical grounds, so as to illustrate the 
conflictive nature of these choices (notice also how several ethical justifications are 
possible for the same group). 
 Group one (equity): mothers identified with HIV through sites offering PMTCT. Since 
the infants of these women will receive treatment (zidovudine or nevirapine), fairness 
dictates that these women be given priority “on a par with the benefit of their infants” 
[Macklin 2004: 7]. Furthermore, this could be justified on grounds of social utility, since 
treating HIV-positive mothers promotes the goal of fewer orphans.  
 Group two (‘maximin’): orphans and ‘street-children’ are frequently marginalised 
and completely excluded from society. Moreover, they may lack parents, caretakers, and 
homes [Macklin 2004: 9]. Therefore, the ‘maximin’ principle justifies that they be given 
priority, as they are—beyond a shadow of a doubt—the worst off in society. Prioritising 
these children would also promote an egalitarian reduction of disparities in society. 
 Group three (compensatory justice): people who have contracted HIV through 
unsafe blood collection, or the use of unsterile medical practices, are clearly the victims 
of the inexcusable failure of the health care system [Macklin 2004: 8]. As such, they are 
owed compensation in accordance with the principle of compensatory justice.  
 Group four (utility): this group consists of teachers, high-level government 
officials, and other indispensable human resources who make essential contributions to 
the viability and stability of society. Since these people benefit society in several ways, 
the utilitarian principle of benefit maximisation gives priority to them based on an 
assessment of who are the most essential [Macklin 2004: 9]. Perhaps they also merit 
reward (justice as reciprocity) for their contributions. 
 These groups illustrate the conflictive nature of the ethical principles for 
prioritising ART beneficiaries. There is nothing fair (equity) about opting for group four, 
but it is efficiency enhancing. There is, conversely, no benefit maximisation (utility) to 
be had from helping the unfortunate worst off of the second group. And why should 
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group three be compensated on account of being infected by accident and not through 
unsafe sex. Why should a pregnant mother and her infant be prioritised over her 
childless sex-working sister whose increased knowledge on AIDS due to ART would be just 
as likely to produce social utility as would the mother’s child not being orphaned? One 
can almost hear the heated shouts of an infinite ethical quarrel in which only the few are 
wrong and almost everyone is right. 
 Another issue of equity concerns the (fair) geographical distribution of AIDS 
services. This is an issue in which the utilitarian principle clearly conflicts with the 
egalitarian in that an equitable geographical distribution calls for instituting AIDS 
services in places where there may be fewer candidates for ART so that the minority in 
need of treatment will not be neglected [Macklin 2004: 11]. Perhaps the only (ethically 
sound) solution is to encourage a balance of equity and utility in diverse health services 
(public hospitals, STI clinics, VCT, antenatal and family planning clinics, etc). The private 
sector can hardly be controlled in this way. 
 But then given the often-conflicting reasons that might exist for giving priorities 
to particular groups of people or particular locations or areas in a country, how might 
those responsible for formulating policy decide on an acceptable policy for equitable 
access to ART? First of all, for the sake of utility, candidates are usually chosen among 
those who are medically eligible and are able to comply with psychosocial criteria. Then 
the ‘real’ process of selection begins. One way of going about it is to select the priority 
scheme that employs the greatest number of ethical principles in choosing among all 
groups eligible for ART [Macklin 2004: 15]. However, according to whichever principle 
that takes precedence, and the order in which other relevant principles are applied and 
the weight that they are given, the choices will produce different—but not always the 
most equitable—outcomes [ibid: 17]. Another option is to choose a selection of different 
health service facilities within the widest geographical area possible, then randomly 
select subsets of the diverse institutions, and finally consider all eligible individuals 
within these institutions as candidates for ART, while at the same time achieving an 
equitable distribution among men, women, and children of various groups [ibid: 16]. 
Ultimately, the approach deemed most ethical for a nation, region, or facility is best 
determined by its specific characteristics. 
 
4.4.1 – By what right? 
But it is not merely the choosing of ART beneficiaries that can be problematic; so can also 
the choosers themselves. Who are these decision makers and what gives them the right 
to choose life for some while excluding others? Of course, there are two sides to this 
coin. There are the larger political questions of the legitimacy and level of sovereignty of 
governments—of ‘what gives rulers the right to rule’—and there is the more pragmatic 
question that inquires about the constitution and impartiality of ARV ‘advisory boards’. 
The latter is addressed first. 
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 From an ethical perspective, there must be some kind of mechanism for procedural 
fairness for how can choices be fair if the body that makes them is not? This body and its 
decisions must be transparent, inclusive, impartial, ensure due process, and be 
accountable [Macklin 2004: 12]. For reasons already discussed, there are multiple benefits 
to be had from involving communities in AIDS interventions. Besides community 
members in general, decision makers or ‘advisory boards’ should also include different 
types of stakeholders such as academic institutions, CBOs, donors, drug regulatory 
authorities, FBOs, government officials, health care workers, medical associations, NGOs, 
PLWA, and representatives of the private health sector. Some of these, however, should 
be excluded in some situations, as—for instance—FBOs are likely to discriminate against 
commercial sex workers or MSM [ibid: 13]. In order to secure impartiality, stakeholders 
should similarly not be included in making decisions affecting their own group. Ensuring 
due process and accountability is a matter of administrative regulations and rules of 
conduct. Finally, transparency can be assured by democratically developing 
unambiguous selection criteria and by making the rationale of any decision accessible to 
the public [ibid: 12]. 
 But what about the larger political perspective: what affects government policy on 
ARV beneficiaries? This is a complex question and one that lies at the very heart of 
political economy. On the national scene, it is often the most powerful political coalition 
that has ‘the right to rule’. But it is always a mistake to believe that the powers that be 
are only accountable to the wishes and wants of the voters that granted them this power 
in the first place (presuming democracy). A strong political coalition is often dependent 
upon the financially powerful structures within society, i.e. industries, landowners, those 
who control resources and commerce, etc. Sometimes they are one and the same. In a 
scenario of rationalisation, it is therefore more than likely that such forces will utilise 
their influence to guarantee a place first in line to gain access to scarce items. It can also 
be more trivial. Appointing a popular person to an important seat can reflect some of 
that popularity, or some of those votes, on a politician. So why not elect a popular 
supermodel, soccer player, or comedian if you get to embrace them on the front page? 
Moreover, on the international scene, developing country governments must pay close 
attention to the moods and wishes of donors. Numerous times have we seen how foreign 
aid or loans were conditioned by the implementation of policy change. Hence, donor 
policies, demands, and conditions can easily have ramifications on local policies, as we 
certainly saw demonstrated in chapter three. Would it be unfair to at least suggest a 
mechanism for procedural fairness before supporting a rationed ART intervention? 
 
4.4.2 – Triage 
When dealing with the ethical problems of rationing ARVs, one cannot ignore Nattrass’ 
[2004: 57] discussion on the concept of ‘triage’, which “rose to prominence in field 
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hospitals in the Crimean war […]”57. Here, many more wounded soldiers needed 
immediate medical attention than doctors had resources for. Their solution was to divide 
the wounded into three categories: a) those who stood good chances of recovery without 
treatment; b) those who had good chances of recovery if given treatment; and c) those 
with little chances of survival in any event [ibid]. Category ‘b’ received treatment first 
and then category ‘c’ when resources sufficed; the rationale being to apply the limited 
means so as to save as many lives as possible. A triage strategy could very well be 
imagined to be a sound choice for the ART interventions of SADCs. But one way of relating 
the triage metaphor to the question of ART-provision is to place HIV-positive individuals 
in category ‘c’ based on the argument that since resources are scarce, PLWA cannot be 
saved, and resources are better spent trying to save others (through other 
developmental efforts) [ibid: 58]. However, the AIDS situation differs from the scenario of 
the Crimean war on two counts, which Nattrass [2004] herself acknowledges. Firstly, ART-
provision is not a zero-sum game, so as to mean that when resources are spent then 
‘that’s it and that’s that’. Numerous times have previous sections lend credence to the 
hypothesis that the total impact of resources spent on ART is likely to include several 
benefits (less infections, averted deaths, economic boosts, etc.). But this hypothesis is 
based on the assumption that resources are available for a full-scale intervention, i.e. ART 
for all in need [ibid]. If this is not possible, then it is only because of the limitations of the 
health sector in terms of funding, human resources, and required infrastructure, which 
could be improved as a result of a political and social choice. In other words, we can—
contrary to the Crimean field hospitals—choose to ‘drop supplies’, which is the second 
point where ART-provision differs from triage. But who makes this choice? Who decides 
the level of commitment to humanitarian issues? Since resources could be found through 
increased taxation, the question is whether the public (the ‘people’) would be in support 
of this. Since PLWA are often blamed for their own condition, it may not be. As this relates 
to stigma, taboo, and discrimination, it is imperative for a strengthening of resources 
through increased taxation that the public comes to see PLWA as ‘deserving’ rather than 
as the opposite [ibid: 59]. In any event, the question of finding financial resources for ART 
is relevant only insofar as they are (currently) limited, which—as we shall see—is not 
the case in Mozambique. 
 In Nattrass’ Crimean field hospital analogy, resources are limited “only as long as 
the fighting lasts” [2004: 59]. Applying this metaphor to HIV/AIDS, one could say that ART-
provision is an issue only as long as AIDS cannot be completely cured. What if the ‘war’ 
could be won much sooner by spending all resources on armaments, which would end 
the resource problem of the hospitals and halt the inflow of wounded soldiers? In 
                                                        
57 The Crimean War lasted from 1854 until 1856 and was fought between Imperial Russia on one side and an 
alliance of the United Kingdom, France, the Kingdom of Sardinia, and the Ottoman Empire on the other. 
The majority of the conflict took place on the Crimean peninsula in the Black Sea, with military conflicts 
also occurring in western Turkey, the Baltic Sea region, and in the Pacific Ocean. 
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HIV/AIDS, ARVs would quickly become obsolete if an amazing cure came into existence. So 
perhaps all resources should be cast into the effort of finding it; perhaps this would be 
ethical even. Although the argument is valid, we cannot perform a ‘military’ estimate of 
the probable duration of the AIDS ‘war’, nor do we know the strength of the enemy with 
any reasonable degree of certainty, and as such we cannot defend the diversion of 
resources away from the wounded.  
 The past two chapters were concerned with the acquirement of an understanding 
of the political economy of Mozambique’s AIDS pandemic. As present chapter has now 
also presented anti-retroviral therapy, and the host of problematic issues associated with 
its provision, a foundation has now been laid for a deeper analysis of ART-provision in 
Mozambique, which is the cardinal subject of next chapter. 
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5 – Anti-retroviral therapy in Mozambique 
 
According to the analytical strategy presented in chapter one, the following inquiries 
must be performed in present chapter: how can a national health intervention in a sub-
Saharan Africa be seen as a reflection of larger international political and economic 
forces and interests? What are the political realities behind the relatively late 
introduction of ART in Mozambique? To which extent is Mozambique’s ART intervention 
dependent upon the funding and administration of foreign powers? Moreover, social 
medicine cued us to ask: to what extent can social inequalities be a determining factor in 
limiting access to ART? 
 
5.1 – A sudden change of mind 
Prior to 2001, the Mozambican government maintained a stance officially against the 
inclusion of ARVs in its national AIDS response [Matsinhe 2006: 119-20]. In order to 
comprehend the political economy of this stance, it might prove fruitful to ask not only 
what international forces inclined this policy, but also what made the government 
change its mind in 2001? The majority of international donors dictated the position 
against ARVs as they expressed considerable concern on a number of issues related to the 
introduction or rapid role-out of ART in Mozambique; concerns very similar to those 
raised by the settings of other SADCs. As we saw in the previous chapter, these concerns 
were primarily linked to a) the high costs associated with the acquisition of ARVs; b) poor 
logistic- and health care infrastructure and the absence of adequate laboratorial 
capacity; c) insufficient numbers of skilled and well-educated staff; d) concerns about the 
capacity of poor people to consistently adhere to complex ARV-drug regimens 
(augmented by the hazard of emerging drug-resistant virus strains); and e) concerns 
about the capacity of poor people to economically sustain a diet convergent with 
therapeutic requirements. Therefore, Mozambican policy was that the only sustainable 
treatment available to the public would be that of STIs in addition to the care offered at 
the previously discussed Day Hospitals (HDDs, see section 3.5). 
 Conversely, 3 international NGOs pioneered and devoted themselves to 
demonstrating the feasibility of ART in Mozambique: Italian Community of Saint Egidio, 
Médecins Sans Frontières, and Health Alliance International. Nationally, a handful of MISAU 
doctors—incentivised by the profits to be reaped in—initiated expensive ARV therapy in 
private clinics (at US$ 6,000 per year), which involved testing and analysis in South 
African laboratories. Consequently, a few private pharmacies began importation of ARVs 
to meet the new demand [Matsinhe 2005: 120]. Needless to say, only the elite stratum of 
population could afford such treatment. 
 Though still hesitant, international discourse became increasingly optimistic as a 
growing body of positive reports on pilot projects were published (see, for example, 
Farmer et al [2001]). Because of these changes, and the efforts already underway in 
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Mozambique, MISAU turned in favour of an official introduction of anti-retroviral therapy 
and prevention of vertical HIV transmission, i.e. prevention of mother-to-child 
transmission (PMTCT). Furthermore, donors became gradually more willing to invest in 
ART scale-up. These events culminated in a law (ministerial diploma 183-A/2001), which 
officially approved ART introduction in Mozambique in December 2001 [Matsinhe 2005: 
121]. As we have seen, the administration and implementation of ART programmes in 
resource poor settings is fraught with practical and ethical complications. The new 
legislation did recognise this, stating that nationwide coverage would not be possible in a 
setting where only 30-40% of the population have access to public health institutions 
[ibid]. Contrary to almost all other health services in Mozambique, ART would be given 
free of charge. 
 MISAU developed norms and protocols for the administration of ARVs in public and 
private clinics, and an elaborate system for the regulation of pharmaceutical entities 
trading in ARVs. Treatment was silently initiated in the Day Hospitals of Maputo and 
Beira in 2002. The scheme was not subject to a public information campaign, probably 
because of limited resources and the unethical nature of eligibility criteria. Besides 
clinical eligibility—a CD4 cell count <20058 and/or WHO stage III or IV59—other criteria 
included “the capacity to prove that the candidate possess ‘minimum conditions’ of 
perseverance and adherence, such as resources to support expenditures of adequate 
nutrition, or a ‘fixed home’ in order to comply with regular control consultations”60 
[Matsinhe 2005: 122]. Another reason for the timid introduction of ART was the fear of a 
‘relaxation’ in the population with respect to its attitude towards AIDS, which could 
potentially damage prevention efforts if people got the wrong idea that AIDS was curable. 
Public officials and some NGO personnel working within the ambit of HIV/AIDS—who 
knew about the programme—gained access to free ARVs. Moreover, professional health 
care staff also gained access in case of work-related HIV infection. Paradoxically perhaps, 
the AIDS patients already in expensive private treatment were given free public ARVs. 
This was done in order to avoid loosing health staff to the private sector; to be able to 
better monitor the treatment system; and to improve control over drug resistant virus 
strains [ibid]. 
 But what are the implications of these patient selection criteria? The short answer 
is inequity. Applying the ethical terminology from the past chapter (section 4.4), these 
criteria largely abide by the principles of utilitarianism and compensatory justice, 
whereas ‘maximin’ is ignored. We have already established the degree of ‘absolute 
poverty’ in Mozambique (70-80% or about 14.5 million people) and have had a discussion 
                                                        
58 See footnote 36, p. 62. 
59 See APPENDIX B: Clinical staging system for HIV/AIDS [WHO 1990]. 
60 “[...] a capacidade de provar que o candidato reúne ‘mínimas condições’ de seguimento e adesão, como dispor de 
recursos para suportar as despesas com alimentação adequada, ou ‘domicilio fixo’, de modo a comparecer às consultas 
regulares de controle”. (my translation) 
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on the capacity of civil society in general. Needless to say, the privileged and advantaged 
can no doubt live up to criteria of ‘adequate resources’ and a ‘fixed’ residence, especially 
since they are no longer required to pay for their ARVs. The disadvantaged mass, 
however, is not likely to enjoy such resourcefulness and will hence be denied access to 
ART for not possessing ‘minimum conditions’. All in all, this approach to patient selection 
appears to support the existent power structures “in a markedly hierarchic and holistic 
society such as the Mozambican” [Matsinhe 2005: 185]61. Thus we see that social 
inequality is a determining factor in limiting access to ART.  
 2001 had seen the Doha Declaration on TRIPs and compulsory licensing, and later 
further drops in ARV-drug prices occurred due to generic competition [HAI 2006a: 8]. 
What happened in Mozambique following the ‘August 30th Solution’ of the TRIPs Council 
in 2003 (see section 4.2) can be seen as a regrettable example of the mistaken belief of the 
global movement against patents (that patents were blocking access to ARVs). 
Apparently, this belief was not confined to activist circles, but extended as far as to the 
World Health Organisation. In May 2003, the late Dr. Lee Jong-wook, director-general of 
the WHO, announced that … 
 
“In March, the government of Mozambique issued a licence for manufacturing a triple 
combination of anti-retroviral drugs to meet national needs. In doing so they became the 
first African country to take this important step in implementing the Doha Declaration” 
[Bate & Tren 2004: 4].  
 
Embarrassingly, the WHO and the government of Mozambique failed to realise that the 
ARV-drugs to be compulsorily licensed had never been patented in Mozambique. In the 
words of Bate & Tren [2004: 4], there was “no point in the move at all”. Moreover, 
Mozambique promised to pay up to 2% royalties to the original patent holders—
payments to which they were not entitled [ibid]. But rather than a complete blunder, it 
makes more sense to view this as a political stage act arranged simply to stay in line and 
keep up with the patent ‘discourse’. The same discourse that kept its eyes so firmly fixed 
upon the ‘evil’, albeit rarely existent, patents that it remained blind to the ill effects of 
import taxes and tariffs, as we learned in section 4.2. 
 As already touched upon (in section 3.1.3), 2003 was also the year in which 
Mozambique diverted much attention to intense negotiations with several important 
foreign donors; namely the World Bank (MAP—Multi Country HIV/AIDS Programme for 
Africa), the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, and the William J. 
Clinton Foundation. This was to be the first time that major donor organisations 
seriously included plans about anti-retroviral treatment in their aid packages. The World 
Bank aid package envisioned the training of health care personnel for the administration 
of ARVs in the event of HIV infection of health care staff and the orientation and training 
                                                        
61 “[…] numa sociedade marcadamente hierárquica e holística como a moçambicana”. (my translation) 
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of NGOs and private institutions in ARV administration, but the package never considered 
full-scale national access to ART [Matsinhe 2006: 68]. The Global Fund package committed 
to funding the ARV-drugs of 31,000 AIDS patients by the end of 2008. Hereafter, 
negotiations commenced with the Clinton Foundation. As it turned out, this foundation 
also opted to support Mozambique through “general improvement of services and 
amplification of the health network so as to guarantee the sustainable provision of anti-
retroviral therapy and other health services” [Matsinhe 2006: 70]62. The foundation chose 
Health Alliance International as the principal vehicle of implementing its plan, as 
discussed later on. 
 After Clinton’s visit to Mozambique in 2002, the climate had already become 
favourable to the further strengthening and implementation of ART initiatives, which 
also becomes increasingly apparent in contemporary MISAU documents. As we have 
seen—just one year earlier in relation to the ARV legislation—government had expressed 
official concern about the capacity of a health care system with only 30-40% national 
coverage to rapidly expand the provision of ART. In 2003, we are contradictorily told that 
“Mozambique has a strong primary health care system […] Primary care must now be 
adapted to both serve chronic disease, and to active tracking of healthy HIV+ individuals” 
[MISAU 2003: 24]. This MISAU evaluation of Mozambique’s health care system as being 
‘strong’ must be seen as a justification of the scale-up of ART in the face of hectic ongoing 
negotiations with multiple donors. Nevertheless, some commentators—be it for a lack of 
information or reluctance to investigate fact—seem to concur with the idea of 
Mozambique having a ‘strong’ health care system. Beaumont [2004], a US trade and debt 
specialist, wrote that … 
 
“Mozambique is in a unique situation to effectively administer such a program [an ART 
programme] because of its comprehensive national health care system [sic] and network of 
primary health care facilities that were created throughout the country shortly after 
independence” [Beaumont 2004: 6] (emphasis added). 
 
A published statement in which Mozambique’s health care sector is deemed 
‘comprehensive’ does not seem to correspond with the descriptions of this sector 
articulated in chapter two. Therefore, we must hypothesise as to the reasons behind such 
a statement. In a more objective paper published the very same year, the Commission on 
HIV/AIDS and Governance in Africa (CHG) reported on Mozambique’s public health care 
sector … 
 
“The number of doctors and nurses per patient is very low, if compared with other African 
countries […] The quality of care it provides [the public health care sector] is hampered by 
                                                        
62 “[…] melhoria geral dos serviços e ampliação da rede da saúde de modo a garantir o provimento sustentável da 
terapia anti-retroviral e outros serviços de saúde”. (my translation) 
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the minimal qualifications of health personnel placed in the remote areas; chronic moral 
erosion, low motivation and professional ethics resulting from the difficult work conditions, 
difficult conditions of life and low salaries; poorly maintained infrastructures and deficient 
hygienic conditions; no or badly maintained equipment, deficient supervision from higher 
levels, and low quality perception from the users […] The avalanche of HIV/AIDS patients take 
up most of the beds, and other patients have to be discharged to give room […] fewer than 50 
percent of births are attended by skilled personnel. The roads and means of transportation 
available in some areas of the country do not allow proper communication to/from health 
centres. The number of people diagnosed and treated is still only a fraction of those actually 
needing treatment” [CHG 2004: 9-10]. 
 
Moreover, chapter two told us a depressing tale in which half of the public health care 
sector (and schools) was destroyed in civil war and never fully recovered due to Bretton 
Woods restrictions on government expenditure. In other words, Beaumont’s [2004] 
statement is not just wrong; it is pure nonsense. But instead of writing Beaumont off as 
nonsensical, it is the task of the political economist to unpack the power relations from 
the geopolitical context of such a statement. In other words, there must be a reason; a 
reason that is not ‘nonsensical’. Two years earlier, MISAU had itself performed a 
surprising u-turn—a sudden change of mind—in which the health care sector went from 
‘30-40% coverage’ to ‘strong’. In fact, these (published) statements represent nothing 
more than a political stage act in favour of the introduction of ARV treatment in 
Mozambique. This can be taken as an example of what happens when a recipient country 
is just as eager to attract funding as the donors are stepping on each other’s toes to be let 
in. Perhaps, this is also an example of how powerful international developmentalist 
discourse can be; respected organisations (such as the WHO) officially support the 
pointless issuing of compulsory licences for drugs that have never been patented and an 
obviously weak health care sector is transformed into a ‘strong’ one by recipients and 
donors alike. Thus can international political interests reflect upon health care 
interventions in sub-Saharan Africa (or elsewhere in the third world for that matter). 
 So just as had already happened with Voluntary Counselling and Testing (see 
section 3.5)—where diverse organisations rapidly began building and managing VCT 
centres to mark their presence—so it happened that global discourse and international 
NGOs reached a consensus: that ART was the road ahead in the fight against AIDS. Of 
course, MISAU wholly agreed … 
 
“[…] proven interventions such as provision of anti-retroviral therapy […] effectively reduces 
illness and death due to the disease […]. Due to a plummet in prices, increase in political will, 
and experiences demonstrating that they are effective in resource poor settings, these 
medicines have never been more accessible, providing a light of hope for countries where 
HIV/AIDS has reached catastrophic levels” [MISAU 2003: 6] (emphasis added). 
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It is an argument of this paper that the positive ‘experiences’ (see emphasis) 
acknowledged by MISAU in this citation can—in the case of Mozambique—be ascribed 
directly to the three NGO ART pioneers; namely the Community of Saint Egidio, Médecins 
Sans Frontières (MSF), and to a lesser degree, Health Alliance International (HAI). 
Therefore, each of these NGOs is presented below where is it highlighted how these 
organisations apply their own approaches to ART-provision. 
 
5.2 – The pioneers 
The Community of Saint Egidio (Comunità di Sant’Egidio)—a Catholic lay group based in 
Rome and affiliated with the Vatican63—manages a number of projects in Southern 
Africa called ‘Drug Resource Enhancement against AIDS and Malnutrition’ (DREAM). 
According to Saint Egidio … 
 
“DREAM [is] the most successful international anti-AIDS project in the whole of sub-Saharan 
Africa. […] Starting four years ago, the DREAM programme […] is a holistic (education, 
prevention, and cure) response to AIDS, malaria, malnutrition, TB and other principal 
opportunistic diseases. Mozambique has been the first venue for what is today becoming a 
pan-African model strategy of great therapeutic efficacy, a model for its light structures and 
skill in the education of socio-sanitary staff and for its economic sustainability” [Saint Egidio 
2006a]. 
 
In a press conference in Maputo (July 2006), special representative on AIDS of UN 
Secretary General Kofi Annan, Stephen Lewis, acknowledged and accentuated the 
successfulness of the DREAM programme and praised it as a model to be followed [AIM 
2006b]. Furthermore, DREAM have effectively dispelled some of the initial concerns 
related to ART, especially with respect to the issue of adherence as 95% of DREAM’s 
patients have adhered to treatment. This is the highest figure in sub-Saharan Africa, and 
as good as, or better than treatment schemes in Europe or the United States of America 
[AIM 2006a]. Furthermore, babies born to women in the DREAM programme are HIV-
negative. Saint Egidio has achieved this by abandoning the use of just nevirapine for 
pregnant women. Instead, all HIV-positive women—regardless of their CD4 cell count—
are given a full ‘cocktail’ of three drugs64 as from their 25th week of pregnancy. This is 
continued until six months after birth65. Subsequently, newborn infants are given a 
single dose of nevirapine to make certain [ibid]. In addition to ART and PMTCT, Saint 
Egidio’s work in Mozambique includes testing for HIV infection; training of local staff 
(doctors, nurses, laboratory technicians, health workers, etc.); health education (prisons, 
                                                        
63 The Community of Saint Egidio has a favourable reputation in Mozambique because it facilitated the 
FRELIMO/RENAMO peace talks in Rome (1990-1992). 
64 AZT, nevirapine, and lamivudine [Saint Egidio 2006e]. 
65 … unless the woman’s CD4 lymphocyte cell count is already below 200 in which case she will be on the 
drugs for the rest of her life [AIM 2006a]. 
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sex workers, maternity and childcare centres); monitoring of blood donations; 
prevention and care of STIs; nutritional sustenance for AIDS patients; home based care for 
the seriously ill; and creation of molecular biology laboratories to monitor ART [Saint 
Egidio 2006d]. Saint Egidio purchases three genetic drugs in India to form a tri-therapy of 
AZT, nevirapine, and lamivudine at an annual cost of US$ 300 per person per year, or less 
than half the price quoted by western pharmaceuticals for that ‘cocktail’66 [Saint Egidio 
2006e]. 
 The second ART pioneer in Mozambique, Médecins Sans Frontières, is an international 
humanitarian aid organisation that provides emergency medical assistance to 
“populations in danger” in more than 80 countries [MSF 2006a]. Since November 1999, 
MSF has been pushing its ‘Access to Essential Drugs Campaign’ (see MSF 2006b for details). 
When the price of ARV-drugs plummeted in 2001, MSF extended treatment to thousands 
of people in developing countries. As of November 2005, MSF had 29 HIV/AIDS treatment 
programmes worldwide with 57,000 people on ARVs [MSF 2006c]. The only country in the 
world where MSF is more active than in Mozambique is Kenya [ibid]. Their programmes 
in southern Africa (and elsewhere) have demonstrated that with strong community 
participation, drug adherence rates higher than those of western countries are 
achievable. MSF gets 84% of their generic ARVs from India [MSF 2006f] and is one of the 
key actors in the struggle to lower drug prices and improve access. 
 In order to ensure the sustainability of its ART sites in Mozambique, MSF has 
emphasised skills transfer by way of training and capacity building with the aim of 
handing over the running of its sites to MISAU near the end of 2008 or further into the 
future [IRIN 2006]. Saint Egidio, however, does not plan to hand over the DREAM 
programmes to national governments, on the contrary, they seem bent on massive 
expansion67. In an interview with the Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), 
MSF’s coordinator in Mozambique, Patrick Wieland, commented that …  
 
“It is not our role to substitute government and take over its responsibility to its citizens. As 
a relief organisation rather than a development agency, MSF did not seek a permanent 
presence in Mozambique […] We proved that a certain model of ARV treatment could work in 
poor settings, using non-medical people and community involvement” [IRIN 2006]. 
 
The treatment efforts of Saint Egidio and MSF have been successful so far, albeit concern 
has been voiced about the capacity of government ART-provision sites to achieve the 
same impressive levels of adherence with limited and less professional staffing [CHG 2004: 
                                                        
66 The annual treatment cost per patient at Santo Egidio, however, is US$ 700 because of an additional US$ 
400 for tests and other support [Saint Egidio 2006c]. 
67 “Bringing us, now in 2006, to the forthcoming opening of the DREAM centres of Conakry, in Guinea, of 
Blantyre, in Malawi, and of Abuja, in Nigeria, and to the joint venture with centres run by religious 
congregations in the Democratic Republic of Congo and in Angola” (excerpt from interview) [Saint Egidio 
2006b]. 
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12]. Commenting on such concerns in an IRIN interview, MSF’s press officer in southern 
Africa, James Lorenz, said that “MSF is never going to pull out and leave people without 
treatment: that would be ethically and medically unacceptable” [IRIN 2006]. In 
Mozambique, Amos Sibanda, executive director of the National Network of PLWA 
(RENSIDA), commented that “we have doubts about the efficiency of the public service, its 
bureaucracy and lack of training. The success of the handover hinges on government's 
commitment, [but] at the same time, this process may boost it [government 
commitment]” [ibid]. 
 The autonomy and self-determination of these NGOs have, nonetheless, caused a 
number of glitches in terms of planning and coordination with MISAU. MISAU, for 
example, grumbles about Comunità di Sant’Egidio’s involvement with prison inmates who 
ought not—at least not through the lens of MISAU—be eligible for treatment. 
 Conversely, William J. Clinton Foundation-funded Health Alliance International has 
been cooperating directly with MISAU since 2003 on ART related tasks such as monitoring 
and evaluation; adult and paediatric clinical care models; laboratory upgrading; scale-up 
coordination; and drug supply [HAI 2006c]. However, HAI has been involved in 
Mozambique since 1988 and aims primarily at strengthening the managerial skills and 
general capacity of Mozambique’s public health sector (i.e. MISAU), and does not 
constitute a ‘pioneer’ effort or an independent ART programme as such. According to this 
NGO … 
 
“[…] programmatic activities [in Mozambique] have expanded to include HIV/AIDS, maternal 
and child health interventions and malaria. However, the focus on strengthening the 
national public health infrastructure remains a basic tenet of the organization. […] Our 
Maputo office works closely with national Ministry of Health [MISAU] departments, 
particularly the Department of Medical Care, which oversees the national scale-up of 
HIV/AIDS treatment and care” [HAI 2006d]. 
 
HAI previously purchased brand name ARV-drug regimens made in the US due to US Food 
and Drug Administration restrictions, but now purchase generic drugs from the 
Mozambican government because Mozambique “suggested that the US take its money 
elsewhere if it insisted on brand name drugs” [Silverman 2005]. With donor funds, the 
government purchases generic ARVs from two South African companies, and is also 
exploring options in India and constructing its own generic drug factory in partnership 
with Brazil [Beaumont 2004: 6].  
 In the following, the accomplishments of the ART programmes in Mozambique are 
assessed in terms of numbers. 
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5.3 – Tables & figures: a tale of dependency 
ARV treatment began in 2002, and during 2003, 10 health care facilities capable of 
performing CD4 lymphocyte cell counts and viral load testing provided ART in 6 of 
Mozambique’s 11 provinces (Maputo City & Province, Sofala, Tete, Zambezia, and Niassa): 
 
 TABLE 2: ART beneficiaries in 03.2004 and prognosis for 12.2004 [CNCS 2004: 82] 
 
 Institution March December 
 Saint Egidio 1,702 3,000 
 MSF 1,200 1,800 
 MISAU 150 800 
 HAI (Clinton) 126 1,800 
 Private sector 50 70 
 ________________________________ 
 Total 3,228 7,470 
 
In March 2004, an estimated 200,000 AIDS patients68 were in need of ART [Matsinhe 2005: 
122]. The figures in TABLE 2 indicate that less than 2% of these were being treated. The 
prognosis for scale-up suggests that each of the 10 functioning ART facilities start an 
additional 53 patients on ARVs in average per month. International NGOs were responsible 
for the treatment of no less than 95% of all ART patients in March 2004. 
 It must be said that Mozambique’s ‘strategic plan’ [CNCS 2004] mentions no 
confirmable sources for the figures in TABLE 2, and hence there is some doubt as to the 
veracity of these numbers. They do, however, correspond largely with figures appearing 
in various contemporary documents, especially those of MSF and Saint Egidio (see, for 
instance, MSF 2006d-e). Whether entirely correct or not, the target quantity for December 
2004 was reached69 [HAI 2006b; Saint Egidio 2006c]. 
 During the next year and a half, donors continued to support Mozambique’s 
ambitious scale-up programme. By March 2006, the number of specialised AIDS treatment 
facilities (Day Hospitals and Clinics) had increased to 3070 and were servicing 61,000 
people of which 22,545 were receiving ART (of an estimated 217,500 people in need) [HAI 
2000b]. 
  
                                                        
68 This number represents the total number of people in Mozambique who would be hypothetically eligible 
for treatment based on their clinical presentation (estimate that 15% of a given population of treatment 
naïve HIV-positive patients will have a CD4 <200 and/or WHO stage III or IV) [HAI 2006b]. 
69 Again, there is no absolute certainty about the veracity of these numbers. Saint Egidio [2006c] mentions 
5,900 ART beneficiaries in November 2004, while HAI [2006b] has 6,071 in September and 7,667 in December. 
70 Data from July 2006 indicate that half (15) of the 30 ART sites in Mozambique were managed by MISAU (in 
cooperation with Health Alliance International) [HAI 2006c]. 
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 TABLE 3: ART beneficiaries in Mozambique, July 2004 to March 2006 [HAI 2006b]. 
  
  
 
These numbers represent a near quadrupling of the numbers of March 2004 (a 388% 
increase) and a 10% national coverage. TABLE 4 was included for the sake of comparison. 
 
TABLE 4: ART coverage in selected developing countries and regions (all figures from 
December 2005): 
  
 Country Coverage Region Need ARVs On ARVs Coverage 
 Cuba 100% Sub-Saharan  
 Botswana 85% Africa 4,700,000 810,000 17% 
 Brazil 83% ‘Latin America’  
 Thailand 60% & the Caribbean 465,000 315,000 68% 
 Uganda 51% East, South & 
 China 25% Southeast Asia 1,100,000 180,000 16% 
 Zimbabwe 8% Europe &  
 Ethiopia 7% Central Asia 160,000 21,000 13% 
 Ghana 7% North Africa 
 India 7% & Middle East 75,000 4,000 5% 
 Nigeria 7% ___________________________________________ 
 Tanzania 7% Total 6,500,000 1,330,000 20% 
 Russia 5% 
 DR Congo 5% Sources: (left) Zarocostas [2006b]; (right) Nemes et al [2006a: 12] 
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For the purpose of this paper, an inquiry was performed in order to assess the quantity 
of beneficiaries that each (major) ART provider in Mozambique was servicing in March 
2006. The findings were as follows: 
 
 TABLE 5: ART beneficiaries in Mozambique per provider, March 2006: 
 
 Institution March 2006 Sources  
 Saint Egidio 5,000 Saint Egidio [2006b]  
 MSF 6,000 IRIN [2006]  
 MISAU & HAI 13,500 HAI [2006c] 
 Private sector no data none 
 _________________________________________________ 
 Total 22,545 HAI [2006b] 
 
Unfortunately, not much was accomplished through personal communications with the 
three ART providing NGOs. In response to questions regarding quantities of ART 
beneficiaries, Health Alliance International’s Andrea Chateaubriand responded that 
22,545 PLWA were in therapy, but “[t]he numbers are nationwide and HAI does not treat 
but rather supports the Ministry of Health to treat. So there is no way for me to give you 
a breakdown”. That is an odd reply considering that HAI’s website provides the 
information as indicated under ‘sources’. MSF’s Mikkel Dalum and Caroline Veldhuis 
responded that they would forward the questions to their ‘field experts’, but they never 
got back. The Community of Saint Egidio simply did not respond. Fortunately, the figures 
presented in TABLE 5 can be verified in international news media (AEGIS, AIM, IRIN, 
Reuters), which have conducted interviews with these NGOs. In all probability, the total 
number of beneficiaries lies somewhere between 25,000 and 28,000 (July 2006) [AIM 
2006b]. 
 As demonstrated in TABLE 5, Mozambique alone—at least if this is taken to mean 
MISAU—does not provide ART for some 25,000 PLWA. In fact, Mozambique (strongly 
supported by HAI) provides for only half of these, as the other half is the merit of MSF and 
the Community of Saint Egidio. Without the involvement of HAI, the number of ART 
patients provided for by MISUA alone would be dwarfed compared to the number of those 
provided for by international NGOs—as it certainly was in March 2004 (see TABLE 2). On 
this basis, it can safely be argued here that the future of ART-provision in Mozambique 
depends almost entirely on the continued support of international donors for funding 
and international NGOs for implementation. It still remains to be seen whether or not 
MISAU will be able to successfully manage MSF’s ART sites in the future. 
 March 17 2006, international news agency Reuters published an article stating that 
“[h]ealth Minister Paulo Ivo Garrido said Mozambique expects to provide free anti-
retrovirals to some 50,000 HIV/AIDS patients by the end of 2006, more than double the 
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number of people who now receive them” [AEGIS 2006]71. With this, Mozambique 
definitely intends to continue the role-out of free anti-retroviral therapy. This, however, 
may be easier said than done. In our next chapter, we shall see why. 
                                                        
71 The official target for 2006 is actually 55,000 [AIM 2006b]. 
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6 – The greatest challenges 
 
Is it at all believable that Mozambique will reach full coverage in the foreseeable future 
(ARVs for more than 200,000 PLWA)? Throughout chapter four, a wide array of issues was 
presented as constraining or impeding the scale-up of anti-retroviral therapy in SADCs. 
Having looked more closely at the situation, or status quo, in contemporary Mozambique 
in chapter five, we can now clearly identify and discuss the issues that represent the 
‘real’ challenges of the future. Moreover, our analytical strategy promised ‘implications 
for future policy advice’, and so we must ask: what are the political and economic 
circumstances, which directly or indirectly generate the most severe obstacles to 
effective ARV role-out in the public health care sector, and what measures might be taken 
to appease such forces? 
 Many of the ART related issues—over which concern was voiced in the past—are 
now ‘off the table’, so to speak. At least when seen as constraining to ART-provision. 
Adherence is no longer of concern; funding seems to suffice; the debate about cost-
effectiveness of ART versus that of prevention has subsided, and so on and so forth. 
However, two very serious obstacles remain. Firstly, the lack of human resources for 
health is deplored as “the single most serious obstacle for implementing the national 
treatment plans” [Kober & Van Damme 2005: 103]. Secondly, the capacity problems of 
public institutions and organisations are worrisome indeed, as we shall see below. 
Therefore, what follows here are two discussions; first on the ‘human resources for 
health crisis’ and then on the capacity issues that partially underpin this crisis. 
 
6.1 – Health workforce requirements 
According to Bate & Tren [2004: 4], “addressing the severe lack of health infrastructure is 
one of the first necessary steps to improving access to medicines”. Needless to say, 
without such a step, there can be no progress in improving health care in Mozambique. 
The prospects of scaling up without any prior strengthening of the health care sector 
appear rather bleak … 
 
“Nigeria […] attempted to roll out ARV treatment when it imported cheap generic versions of 
ARV-drugs from India in 2002. The programme failed, however, with less than 10 percent of 
people requiring treatment actually getting the drugs. The drugs have since expired in 
warehouses because the sophisticated infrastructure that would deliver those drugs, store 
them correctly, and ensure that patients who received them adhered to strict regimens, was 
absent” [Bate & Tren 2004: 4-5]. 
 
In part, the problem lies in the lack of infrastructure and basic training of physicians and 
nurses (as discussed in section 4.3). But the problem mainly lies in the fact that there is 
simply not enough staff to man a full coverage intervention, and the staff that does exist 
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is seriously overburdened already—especially because of an immense surge in HIV/AIDS 
related hospitalisations. According to Hirschhorn et al [2006: 1], “one of the greatest 
challenges to scaling up will be the limited supply of adequately trained human 
resources for health, including doctors, nurses, pharmacists and other skilled providers”. 
Addressing the gravity of this shortcoming, Hirschhorn et al published a study in 2006 
entitled ‘Estimating Human Resources for Health’, which investigates human resource 
needs for ARV treatment sites and the impact of different staffing models and patterns 
through a structured survey and site visits. The complexity of the matter becomes 
painfully clear in this study. Notwithstanding this complexity, Hirschhorn et al [2006] do 
provide us with a tool for tabulating a relatively credible estimate of Mozambique’s 
human resource needs in relation to the additional workforce that an ART intervention 
will require in order to perform satisfactorily. Before assessing the required resources to 
care for all ART-needing PLWA in Mozambique, we should first understand the nature of 
the problem of limited medical staff. 
 Apart from its more trivial causes (see section 4.3.2), there are three issues 
contributing to what could be referred to as a ‘vicious circle of health staff attrition’. 
Each is a consequence of the other. In neighbouring Malawi, five to six fold increases in 
health worker illness and death rates due to HIV/AIDS has been reported [Kober & Van 
Damme 2004: 105]. The situation is likely to be similar in Mozambique, especially in rural 
areas. Resultantly, a health care staff dwindling in size has to cope with “ever higher 
work loads, and the remaining health workers’ fear of infection with HIV in unsafe care 
situations contributes to growing emotional and physical stress and job dissatisfaction” 
[ibid]. Therefore—and due to the higher attractiveness of other employers—many 
health workers migrate to other countries or find employment outside the public health 
sector. In an article published in the British Medical Journal, Zarocostas [2006a] inform 
us that “out of a total of 82,417 doctors trained in 11 sub-Saharan African countries 
18,556 (23%) worked in eight recipient rich developed countries”. In other words, almost 
one quarter simply left Africa all together72. Health workers also migrate to more 
attractive countries within Africa. In South Africa, for instance, “only a quarter of rural 
doctors were nationals, with most of the remainder coming from other countries such as 
Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Congo” [Kober & Van Damme 2004: 105]. 
 There is also an internal mobility to be accounted for when health workers move 
from public to private sectors, rural to urban areas, and from primary to tertiary 
facilities [ibid]. In 2005, MSF commissioned a paper [Kober & Van Damme 2005] that 
explored these problems in depth. This study also provided a figure, which is included 
overleaf to illustrate the ‘vicious circle of health staff attrition’: 
                                                        
72 Roughly one third of the doctors working in New Zealand (34%), the United Kingdom (33%), and in the 
United States (27%) had trained abroad [Zarocostas 2006a]. 
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FIGURE 6: Flow model: human resources for health in sub-Saharan Africa: 
 
Source: Kober & Van Damme 2005: 8 (fig. 1) 
 
In that same MSF commissioned study, Kober & Van Damme [2005] summarise that … 
 
“To confront the resulting HRH [Human Resources for Health] crisis, countries in the South 
are following various strategies, from increasing the intake of medical and nursing schools, 
over importing foreign doctors, to implementing retention schemes for the existing staff in 
the public sector. Yet, in most countries, for a variety of reasons, such measures remain quite 
timid, and do not manage to turn the tide fundamentally” [Kober & Van Damme 2005: 3]. 
 
This whole discussion on attrition in the public health sector was included here, albeit in 
a very simplified form, in order to underscore the gravity of the crisis of insufficient 
numbers of health workers. In Mozambique, the situation is especially gloomy. In 
addressing Mozambique’s health staff attrition, the Commission on HIV/AIDS and 
Governance in Africa [CHG 2004: 9] reported that “annually the districts lose 7 percent of 
their staff, mainly due to transfers or death. A study was conducted and showed that 10-
15 percent of staff could die from AIDS between 2002 and 2010”73. Another source states 
that … 
                                                        
73 The study referred to is Beckman & Rai [2005: 11]. 
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“Health care is also unevenly spread: 80 percent of doctors are in Maputo, the capital; among 
all health staff, those in the provinces have the lowest qualifications. Due to AIDS-related 
deaths, Mozambique needs to train 25 percent more doctors and nurses every year just to 
maintain the existing low levels of staffing” [Saint Egidio 2006c]. 
 
According to the CHG [2004] … 
 
“There are 17,000 health workers in Mozambique, of which 11,000 are trained. Only 6 percent 
are doctors, consequently less than 50 percent of the districts have a doctor. Until now, a 
very small number of doctors are credited to prescribe anti-retroviral treatment. The 
number of doctors and nurses per patient is very low, if compared with other African 
countries. For instance, the number of nurses per patient is 1:1298 in Malawi, 1:704 in 
Zimbabwe, 1:610 in Zambia, 1:457 in Botswana and 1:215 in South Africa, while in 
Mozambique it is 1:5000” [CHG 2004: 8]. 
 
The CHG [2004: 8] reports Mozambique to have less than 40 trained pharmacists, and 
another source reports that “there are 800 doctors, 300 of them expatriates” [Saint 
Egidio 2006c]. 
 These figures enable us now to tentatively estimate the human resource needs of a 
full-scale ART intervention in Mozambique. Hirschhorn et al [2006] tell us that … 
 
“We found a range of staffing patterns and patient provider-provider ratios in existing 
planned treatment programmes. Many factors influenced health workforce needs, including 
task assignments, delivery models, other staff responsibilities and staff size. Overall, the 
number of health care workers required to provide ART to 1,000 patients included 1-2 
physicians [doctors], 2-7 nurses, <1 to 3 pharmacy staff, and a much wider range of 
counsellors and treatment supporters” [Hirschhorn et al 2006: 1] (emphasis added). 
 
Assuming that some 200,000 PLWA need ART in Mozambique, this translates into … 
 
TABLE 6: Estimate of human resource needs to treat 1,000/200,000 PLWA: 
 
 Type of Lower Average Upper Current 
 Health worker bound estimate bound staff 
 Physicians 1 200 1.5 300 2 400 800 
 Nurses 2 400 4.5 900 7 1,400 3,700 
 Pharmacists <1 <200 <1.5 300 3 600 40 
 __________________________________________________________________ 
 Total 4 <800 <7.5 1,500 12 2,400 4,100 
 
Under the assumption that the overall estimates of staff requirements of Hirschhorn et al 
[2006: 1] are correct, Mozambique will need somewhere between 800 and 2,400 
professional health care workers for a full-scale ART intervention. The real figure is likely 
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to lie in the high end given that 80% of the population live in rural areas, which require 
more resources than urban areas [Hirschhorn et al 2006: 6]. Having already found that 
the primary health care sector reaches only 40-50% of the population; that current staff 
is already overburdened; that current staff suffers a 7% annual attrition; and that 10-15% 
of staff could be lost to AIDS between 2002 and 2010, it is imperative to stress that the 
numbers estimated here indicate additional staff requirements. It must not be concluded 
that Mozambique already employs sufficient physicians and nurses and only lack 
pharmacists, but rather that there is an absolute and urgent lack of staff. 
 According to Hirschhorn et al [2006: 1], “the total number of staff, including 
[additional] counsellors, administrators and other cadres [treatment supporters], could 
be substantially higher”. It can safely be argued here that no, it could not be, it surely will 
be substantially higher. These numbers, however, are difficult to calculate with any level 
of precision … 
 
“In reviewing available data, it was often difficult to distinguish treatment and adherence 
support from other support activities, such as supportive counselling. This absence of more 
detailed task assignment information and other factors such as frequency of home visits, 
distance and available transportation made interpreting the range of numbers required or 
proposed difficult” [Hirschhorn et al 2006: 13]. 
 
It was found, nevertheless, that “in an existing programme in Mozambique, one activista 
[a trained layperson or PLWA who provides Directly Observed Therapy (DOT)] can have a 
case-load up to 10 patients (100 for 1,000)” [Hirschhorn et al 2006: 13]. Unfortunately, 
Hirschhorn et al [2006] do not mention exactly which programme that they are referring 
to, but if we were to assume these figures to be generally valid for Mozambique, then this 
entails that some 20,000 activistas would probably be needed as treatment supporters in 
addition to professional health care staff. 
 But what then, one might reasonably ask in a concerned tone of voice, has been 
and is being done in Mozambique to address this problem? For the purpose of a paper 
published in the Lancet in 2004, Kober & Van Damme visited Malawi, Mozambique, 
Swaziland, and South Africa in order to evaluate the situation of human resources for 
health. While staying in Mozambique, they interviewed key actors … 
 
“In our interviews with national policy makers, human resources always surfaced as a major 
concern, and we learned of many ideas and initiatives to tackle this most important 
bottleneck. Thus, in Mozambique the Ministry of Health [MISAU] is planning to substantially 
increase the output of medical schools and training institutions for paramedical staff. 
However, as Avertino Barreto, Deputy Director of Health in Maputo points out, ‘this is a long-
term measure and in the short term we will have to resort to intermediate solutions such as 
importing medical doctors from Cuba’ […] In all four countries people tell us not only about 
measures to increase the production of health workers but also about retention measures to 
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keep them in rural areas, in the public sector or in the country. In Mozambique and South 
Africa, for example, medical graduates are obliged to do a period of community service 
before being allowed to register in an urban centre” [Kober & Van Damme 2004: 106].  
 
In spite of these and similar efforts in the countries that they visited, Kober & Van 
Damme [2004: 103 & 106] worryingly concluded that “[…] the lack of health workers is 
acknowledged everywhere as the most seriously lacking resource for realising the 
national AIDS plans […] yet, none of the countries has developed an urgently required 
comprehensive human resource strategy”. This corresponds with their conclusions in 
the more detailed study that they performed for MSF one year later [Kober & Van Damme 
2005]. It should be mentioned, though, that Mozambique recruited 120 doctors from 
Cuba and India in 2005, but the source of this information does not indicate that their 
skills were to be applied in ART-provision specifically [Saint Egidio 2006c]. 
 Similarly to what we have seen throughout the history of HIV/AIDS in Mozambique 
(see chapter three), something has been done to address the situation, but never nearly 
enough, and from what we have found in the above there is good reason to believe that 
the size of Mozambique’s trained health care staff is not likely to increase significantly, 
at least not without further intervention. 
 These findings of staff requirements, and the prospects of meeting them, are of 
crucial importance to a discussion on the perspectives of scaling up anti-retroviral 
therapy in Mozambique, which is, the reader is reminded, one of the cardinal tasks of 
this paper. Only one issue remains to be addressed before we can finally conclude on the 
matter. 
 
6.2 – A matter of capacity 
In late 2005, Mozambique was “the only Portuguese-speaking country in Africa visited 
for an in-depth analysis” during the World Health Organisation’s evaluation of the 3 by 5 
initiative [Nemes et al 2006b: 29]. Although the 3 by 5 evaluation is a massive publication, 
this ‘in-depth analysis’ of Mozambique was annexed as a simple two-page report. 
Nonetheless, for our purpose here, this country visit report is of interest. 
 Some issues received a positive evaluation: “planning, procurement, and 
distribution of first-line ARV-drugs are taking place smoothly, and there is no report of 
stock-outs or other problems” [Nemes et al 2006b: 30]. But this does not change the fact 
that the WHO aimed for the treatment of half of those eligible for ART in poor- and 
middle-income countries, which translates into a target of some 100,000 ART 
beneficiaries in Mozambique. By the end of 2005, as we saw in TABLE 3, less than 20% of 
this target were receiving treatment (some 19,000). On the global level, Zarocostas 
[2006b] informs us that “only 18 nations met the target, two thirds of them in Latin 
America”. According to the WHO, Mozambique had “followed the ‘worst-case scenario’ 
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(what would happen without any prevention effort) estimated 10-15 years earlier” 
[Nemes et al 2006b: 29]. 
 So all in all it seems that Mozambique failed miserably in reaching targets. Perhaps 
one should rather ask who actually determined those targets? In reality, Mozambique—
and other SADCs—has not ‘failed’ as a result of their own underperformance, but because 
of over-optimism on their behalf by others. Therkildsen [2005: 37] argues that “this 
makes, yet again, African countries vulnerable to criticism: despite much more aid, they 
do not meet expectations—they are failures”. This may well prove counterproductive. 
While many an effort is being made to raise funds for development aid, such criticism (of 
failure to meet externally defined targets) may undermine the credibility of recipient 
countries and “the basis for fundraising in the longer run” [ibid]. 
 But the initial emphasis on ‘failure’ is the least worrying of the statements in the 
country visit report. The far most worrying finding of WHO’s evaluation team is that 
“[f]unding does not seem to be a problem: the consolidated annual budget for HIV/AIDS 
from various donors amounts to around US$ 180 million (against US$ 204 million of the 
total funding for Mozambique’s health sector for 2004)” [Nemes et al 2006b: 29]. Why is 
this worrying? It is because the report also states that by November 2005, MISAU had 
utilised less than 30% of the 2005 budget (some US$ 54 million). This fact reveals that 
Mozambique (MISAU) suffers from a weak absorption capacity. This section discusses the 
implications. 
 By now, capacity problems should come as no surprise, especially not since we 
have identified the gravity of the human resources for health crisis—along with 
infrastructural shortcomings—as the most daunting challenge to ART scale-up. But the 
fact that less than one third of the donor funds earmarked for HIV/AIDS has been spent 
tells us something about the nature of these capacity constraints. Such constraints 
cannot simply be done away with by major additional donor funds, because successful 
capacity development is recipient-driven, not donor driven [Therkildsen 2005: 37]. 
Money cannot provide ART—people can (given the appropriate means and training). In 
other words, attempting to rapidly role out ART by channelling huge amounts of money 
to MISAU is like giving a little food and a lot of money to people in a famine where there is 
no food to be bought. There are several reasons why increased funding can be “a mixed 
blessing for capacity development” as Therkildsen [2005: 28] puts it in a study discussing 
such risks. 
 McCoy et al [2005: 19] warn that a narrow focus on increasing staff for ART-
provision “could ‘overmedicalise’ the HIV/AIDS response and divert attention and funds 
away from the more fundamental political, social and economic determinants of poverty 
and the AIDS pandemic”. But such uneven resource allocation may also occur within the 
health care system itself, because the pressure of donors and international organisations 
(such as the WHO) to quickly achieve HIV/AIDS relevant goals is often considerable. 
According to Therkildsen [2005] … 
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“If put under such pressure, any organisation that has little or no excess capacity to start 
with, will respond by shifting attention to the high-profile activities. Such goal displacement 
is a well-known and age-old phenomenon. The high-profile focus on ARV treatment may 
therefore lead to reduced performance with respect to other health-related […] targets (e.g. 
malaria, tuberculosis, child mortality and maternal health)” [Therkildsen 2005: 35]. 
 
In other words, the rapid and well-funded improvement occurring in one part of the 
health care system occurs at the expense of deterioration in the capacity elsewhere in 
the system. Hutton [2004: 19] states that “it is becoming clear that funds for HIV/AIDS will 
not contribute to general capacity development, but will lead to gross inefficiencies in 
resource allocation” [in Therkildsen 2005: 35]. Thus, rushing health programmes may 
cause collateral damage in other parts of the system that does not receive similar 
attention [ibid]. 
 This unfortunate effect on capacity also works to worsen the crisis in human 
resources for health, especially on three counts. Firstly, with the current lack of capacity 
in the public health care sector, NGOs and the private sector will be mobilised and funded 
in order to reach targets. This will provide a further incentive for staff to leave the public 
sector [Therkildsen 2005: 35]. 
 Secondly, there are already pronounced geographical inequities (rural/urban) in 
the distribution of health personnel. Therkildsen [2005: 35] suggests that the enormous 
staff requirements of an ART intervention “may make it even more difficult to attract 
staff to these [rural] areas”. There is evidence that this skewing has already occurred. 
The WHO [Nemes et al 2006b: 29-30] reports that “equity of access is still a major issue. For 
instance, more than 50% of people on ART are in Maputo City. Reaching the underserved 
rural areas is MOH [Ministry of Health, i.e. MISUA] policy, but the infrastructure is not yet 
in place”. In fact, 80% of all Mozambique’s doctors work in Maputo [Saint Egidio 2006c]. 
  Thirdly, the staff of health care facilities—wherever they might be located—is 
likely to move towards the comparatively better funded HIV/AIDS activities. Perhaps now 
we can see why Therkildsen [2005] argues that … 
 
“It can be anticipated that many public sector organisations in poor countries, most of which 
are presently resource staffed, will also experience serious growth pains should major 
additional funding materialise. […] there is a real risk that attempts at rapid build-up of 
organisational capacity will undermine both existing capacity and the prospects for 
sustaining capacity […]” [Therkildsen 2005: 28]. 
 
It is imperative that capacity pitfalls—such as those discussed in the above—be avoided, 
lest existing capacity will be damaged. The principal instruments of that task are 
government staff incentive policies, and thus these instruments become central for 
capacity enhancement [Therkildsen 2005: 36]. ‘Incentives’ should be taken to mean any 
measure that encourages health staff to keep working in the public sector (and in rural 
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areas): better accommodations, higher salaries, and schooling opportunities for children, 
among others. Other measures are of restrictive character, especially in relation to the 
predatory recruitment strategies of external employers. This is, however, part of an 
ongoing and rather heated debate, and it remains limited what can be done in this 
context. From an international conference on migration of health workers held in 
Geneva, Zarocostas [2006a] reported that …  
 
“Francis Kimani, a senior deputy director at Kenya’s Ministry of Health, said that the brain 
drain was unacceptable and called for destination countries to pay compensation to poor 
nations. He told reporters that the migration of skilled staff stifles efforts to improve 
conditions locally and argued that an ethical solution needs to be found. But experts agreed 
that policies to tackle this situation ‘should not disregard the basic principle that individuals 
have the fundamental right to seek opportunities that better their and their families lives’” 
[Zarocostas 2006a]. 
 
Finally—in order to avoid capacity deteriorations—a well-delimited balance must be 
attained between a) prevention and treatment; and b) between HIV/AIDS activities in 
general and other activities in the health care sector [Therkildsen 2005: 32]. From what 
we have seen by now, there can be little doubt that improving health care will require a 
broad multisectoral response to the disease and to its underlying social and economic 
causes.  
 So, in summary of these discussions, not only does the public health care sector in 
Mozambique suffer from an absolute lack of trained personnel and treatment supporters 
to effectively roll out a full-scale ART intervention, there also seem to be a severe crisis of 
human resources for health in general, which is underpinning this shortcoming. 
Furthermore, as paradoxical as it may seem, increased donor funding accompanied by 
overambitious targets may actually result not in improved organisational capacity, on 
the contrary, it may well result in deteriorating capacity; in uneven resource allocation; 
and in acceleration of the velocity by which the ‘vicious circle of health staff attrition’ 
comes spiralling down. Fortunately, we also identified the remedies to counter these 
undesirable developments, yet it remains to be seen how efficiently these will be 
implemented—if at all. 
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7 – Conclusions 
 
Finally, we can respond conclusively to the central questions raised in chapter one: what 
is the theoretical contribution of social medicine to our comprehension of the AIDS 
pandemic; what has it taught us on the area of anti-retrovirals; and what are the 
implications of this for future policy advice on role-out of ARVs in Mozambique? 
 Throughout this paper, we have experienced how the lens of social medicine and a 
political economy reading of the AIDS phenomenon have consistently made us vigilant to 
certain aspects of this phenomenon in a different way than competing contemporary 
theoretical frameworks would have accomplished. The following highlights and 
contextualises these contributions in several dimensions. 
 Perhaps most importantly, social medicine brought to our attention the concept of 
structural violence, which explains and makes apparent a host of complex historically 
given and economically driven geopolitical, environmental, and social processes, which 
severely underpin the existence and spread of HIV/AIDS in Mozambique. Social medicine, 
as a biosocial analytical tool, can be employed in other settings as well, which serves to 
demonstrate that this single and isolated achievement is replicable and that social 
science can expand our comprehension and broader societal contextualisation of the 
pandemic to other developing countries as well. Not only are our eyes opened to the 
forces that shape the biological events of HIV/AIDS, we are also able to understand and 
detail the complex epidemiological patterns of the interregional differences in HIV 
prevalence rates of these nations, as we did in chapter three. 
 Another contribution of major significance is that social medicine allows us to 
seriously question the plausibility of contemporary HIV/AIDS efforts; again we must 
recollect that these mainstream efforts are primarily concerned with changing sexual 
behaviour through information dissemination and education; with abstinence 
promotion; and with condoms. How credible is it that these efforts will accomplish 
anything at all when social medicine so unambiguously teaches us that HIV/AIDS is bound 
to spread and continue to cause devastation in populations where malnutrition and food 
insecurity are widespread; where most STIs go untreated; where absolute poverty is 
dominant; where overloaded health care personnel is poorly qualified and lacks 
equipment; where labour markets force people into migratory movements and 
prostitution to survive; and where social and geopolitical processes result in general 
insecurity and war, just to name a few points? In chapter three, for instance, we saw how 
a nationwide condom campaign failed completely in spite of more than a decade of efforts 
of popularisation, in Mozambique embodied by PSI, who does not distribute, but rather 
sells condoms on claims that this will promote local mercantilism, which political 
economy unmasked as a process of institutionalising liberal market ideologies and 
capitalist conduct in Mozambique. Thus does social medicine differ from mainstream 
discourse. Seeing biomedically explicable HIV transmissions and infections as a direct 
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result of sexual behaviour is, of course, essentially correct, but at the same time it is also 
fundamentally wrong because it utterly neglects the social and economic contexts, 
especially if the scope is an individual behaviour examination. Attempting to explain 
collective behaviour, on the other hand, will inevitably lead to generalisation and 
racially or culturally biased prejudice, alongside ignorance towards essential underlying 
realities. 
 With respect to civil society, the social dimension, the following establishes how a 
political economy reading of Mozambique’s particular circumstances has made certain 
issues stand out as important—issues for which empirical evidence has been presented. 
 The abandonment and shunning of PLWA are likely to occur frequently as the 
majority of households and families are already overburdened. This fatigue was found to 
be a direct result of many years of civil war (inter alia) and its consequent social processes 
that exhausted local communities, which again was a consequence of the geopolitical 
interests of foreign nations. Stigmatisation and discrimination of PLWA are not likely to 
be easily dismantled as the capacity of existing and emerging local NGOs and PLWA 
groups—and other civil society organisations likely to conduct AIDS advocacy and 
education—is still weak. It is so because the AIDS crisis emerged during a period of major 
political change in which local NGOs were not perceived as legitimate actors until as late 
as 1990. Furthermore, larger international institutions are vastly superior—because of 
unequal financial power relations—when they compete for human resources against 
smaller actors in developing countries, whose actions then become subordinate to and 
practically governed by foreign NGOs. Although legislation against workplace 
discrimination of PLWA does exist, it is not implemented, and even if it were, it would 
affect less than one tenth of the working population due to a massive informal sector; a 
situation for which the Bretton Woods institutions are partly culpable due to their 
insistence upon structural adjustment and liberalisation and privatisation of national 
industries and commercial enterprises. 
 From a political perspective, none of these things are particularly surprising in 
light of our account of how foreign powers and international institutions influenced and 
dominated the configuration and formulation of Mozambique’s HIV/AIDS response time 
after time. Social medicine taught us that, firstly, Mozambique was made fertile ground 
for HIV/AIDS through destabilisation due to the malcontent of foreign powers with 
Mozambique’s Marxist ideology and the newborn Southern African Development 
Coordination Conference. Second, international donors and institutions (particularly the 
WHO and UNAIDS) dictated the elaboration of AIDS strategies and programmes, but never 
disposed the funds necessary for their implementation. Thirdly, just as the virtual boom 
in the construction of VCT centres occurred in 2001 as a result of competition between 
international NGOs; and just as the comprehensive AIDS strategies and readjustments of 
2003 resulted from the will and wish of chiefly three external actors that required the 
constant attention of Mozambican government officials; so it happened that the 
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introduction of anti-retrovirals in Mozambique occurred as a reflection of changes in the 
international discourse on HIV/AIDS. Although painfully obvious that Mozambique’s 
health care sector was structurally immature for such an intervention (at least if of full-
scale), everyone turned a blind eye. In fact, when the political lobbyism and 
aggressiveness to promote ART peaked, foreign organisations, ‘consultants’, and 
‘specialists’, and even MISAU itself, got so lost in their determination and eagerness to 
raise funds and generate political will that it led them to publish statements completely 
out of touch with reality, as we saw in the beginning of chapter five. The political ‘reality’ 
was that patents blocked access to ARVs and if prices were reduced they could be 
introduced—aided, perhaps, by compulsory licensing of a few patents that never really 
existed anyway. 
 In relation to the financial aspects of anti-retroviral therapy, we saw that there is a 
large degree of uncertainty as to the economic viability of such programmes. However, 
the economic assessment and analysis of the direct costs and potential macroeconomic 
benefits of an ART intervention presented in chapter four lend solid credence to the 
hypothesis that the total impact of resources spent on ART is likely to entail benefits on 
several fronts in terms of less infections, averted deaths, and boosts to economy. 
 On the narrower subjects of this health intervention we learned that whereas anti-
retrovirals may be provided freely (financed largely by foreign donors), the patient 
selection criteria for treatment eligibility impede that the lowest strata of society gain 
access. These criteria are primarily utilitarian and based upon the ethical principle of 
justice as compensation and will therefore not embrace all PLWA for a ‘fixed home’—or 
‘resources to support nutrition expenditures’—is not a given in Mozambique where 
absolute poverty is the dominant rule rather than the exception. Notwithstanding, it is 
widely propagated in the modern HIV/AIDS literature specifically concerned with ART that 
‘Mozambique provides ART for some 10% of all in need’, but we can conclude that the 
truth of the matter is that Mozambique is utterly dependent upon sustained donor 
assistance since at least 50% of all ART beneficiaries is the merit of two entirely 
independent international NGOs, as chapter five effectively demonstrated (in TABLE 5). 
Therefore, only half of all beneficiaries have been chosen through the official selection 
criteria, but as NGOs choose beneficiaries chiefly for their likelihood to adhere to 
treatment, it can be concluded that patient selection criteria cause ethically problematic 
inequities by disfavouring the disadvantaged and by favouring urban dwellers in 
Maputo, which shows social inequality to be a determining factor in limiting access to 
ART. 
 But social medicine has also taught us things of greater importance to the subject 
of scaling up access to anti-retrovirals in Mozambique. Our political economy reading 
makes these things stand out as especially important because they translate into a range 
of specific future policy recommendations. In the following, these more significant 
findings are readdressed. 
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 Based upon the estimates of human resource requirements performed in chapter 
six, the public health care sector does not employ nearly enough staff to provide ARVs for 
all in need on a responsible and sustainable level; mainly because roughly one quarter of 
all physicians educated in Africa leave in favour of more attractive destinations where 
well-qualified human resources are also much desired. Unfortunately, adequate 
government incentive policies and measures to curb the attrition to health care staff are 
not underway and have not even been formulated in a specific human resource strategy 
as of yet. In addition to this, and contrary to what might normally be expected, the sharp 
focus on HIV/AIDS of (over)ambitious donors and foreign NGOs paradoxically holds the 
potential to deteriorate capacity and skew the public health care sector in the direction 
of uneven resource allocations and contributes to a worsening of the human resources 
for health crisis in terms of increased staff attrition and rural/urban inequities. While 
donor funding for HIV/AIDS is (momentarily) plentiful, and while drug procurement and 
distribution occurs smoothly, the national ministry of health, MISAU, had the capacity to 
absorb only around one third of these funds last year. Whereas political will to address 
the lack of access to ART does seem to be present, it is likely to decline and gradually 
‘wear off’ as ARVs become accessible to the (influential) wealthy population strata and 
the basis for the broadest possible political coalition to fight HIV/AIDS weakens. This is 
particularly likely to occur in a national setting in which AIDS is a highly stigmatised and 
‘unpopular’ topic. Moreover, as Mozambique and other SADCs continuously fail to reach 
unrealistic donor-set targets, the will to politically and financially support such ‘failures’ 
is likely to evaporate. 
 This translates into a range of future policy recommendations for ART 
interventions in Mozambique and other SADCs. Before we discuss those, however, it must 
first be acknowledged and strongly accentuated that these recommendations become 
visible only insofar as we inspect this particular health intervention and its complications 
while wearing the glasses of a scholar of social medicine. We arrived at these 
recommendations through a reading of well-substantiated, conceptual, and analytical 
works of literature that together comprise the theoretical and intellectual foundation of 
social medicine and that is what made the following stand out as significant. 
 The global AIDS community (or ‘movement’), so preoccupied with drug patents, 
ought to vigorously pursue the issue of restricting the international brain drain and 
migratory movements of indispensable human resources away from developing 
countries as well as the predatory recruitment strategies of international NGOs and 
private institutions. Not only would this contribute significantly to the alleviation of the 
human resources for health crisis with respect to ART interventions, it would also benefit 
all health care sectors throughout sub-Saharan Africa on the whole. Additionally, since 
MISAU cannot absorb all donor funds, international partners should direct at least some 
of their funds to the external sourcing of professional health care personnel, thus 
boosting this process. Furthermore, the global AIDS community and international donors 
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could rewardingly put pressure on developing countries to remove the import taxes and 
tariffs that generate unnecessarily high prices on ARVs and other pharmaceuticals, which 
their citizens so desperately need. In developing countries, incentive policies to curb 
health staff attrition—especially in underserved rural areas—should be implemented 
without delay. These incentive policies must apply to the entire health care sector. If 
they do not, they might collide with the interest of avoiding the capacity skew occurring 
in other parts of the health care sector as a result of staff moving towards the 
comparatively better funded HIV/AIDS activities as mobilisation of NGOs and funds to fight 
AIDS increase. Promoting a balanced development of all health related activities—not 
just HIV/AIDS—could also curb this capacity skew. Why allocate more resources to one 
part of the health care sector if it simply means removing them from another? Why 
promote prevention of mother to child HIV transmission if it means increasing child 
mortality elsewhere due to deterioration in the capacity of maternity clinics? 
Furthermore, since Mozambique and other SADCs intend to eventually role-out ART 
interventions for all in need, one can question the need to spend time and resources on 
the elaboration and use of patient selection criteria if these only contribute to an already 
considerable social inequality? However, while resources remain scarce, it might be 
worthwhile to contemplate a targeted rationing of ARVs to critical health care personnel 
and particularly to the education sector responsible for the training of staff crucial to the 
sustainability of ART interventions. Once the human resource crisis stabilises and once 
resources suffice, these entirely utilitarian selection criteria could be removed. With 
respect to pompously announced donor-set targets, these should be kept realistic and 
achievable, lest SADCs will be perceived as failures, which will eventually undermine the 
political will to fund and support them. 
 On a final note, and speaking in much more general terms, it appears 
recommendable that AIDS efforts throughout the world redirect their attentions from 
condoms, abstinence, and exotic behaviour-rectifying dance shows towards the real 
underpinnings of the disease. This should not be taken to suggest that social medicine is 
some universal remedy, but rather that it simply makes more sense; a torch with which 
to illuminate the farthest corners of winding AIDS mazes previously left in pitch-black 
darkness. 
 It remains only to be said here that the role-out of Mozambique’s ART intervention 
and its clouded future perspectives represent—at the very least—yet another daunting 
challenge not only for this country alone, but for the entirety of the global HIV/AIDS 
response. May it be sound and successful. 
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MAP II: Locations of sentinel posts 
 
 
 
Source: Grupo Técnico Multisectorial [GTM 2005] 
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MAP III: Road corridors in Mozambique 
 
 
 
 
Source: map reproduced from Collins [2006: 8] 
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MAP IV: Mozambique: Conditions of accessibility 
 
 
(Febuary 1990) 
 
Source: map reproduced from Hanlon [1991: 35] 
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APPENDIX A: Results per sentinel post (2004) 
 
 Sentinel Post Province District Prevalence 
 C.S. Mandimba Niassa Mandimba 10.7% 
 H.R. Cuamba Niassa Cuamba 16.7% 
 C.S. Mavago Niassa Mavago 4.1% 
 C.S. Marrupa Niassa Marrupa 2.7% 
 C.S. 25 Setembro Nampula Nampula City 10.7% 
 H.G. Nacala Nampula Nacala-Porto 8.0% 
 H.R. Angoche Nampula Angoche 5.7% 
 C.S. Erati- Namapa Nampula Erati 11.0% 
 C.S. Pemba (Natite) Cabo Delgado Pemba City 10.3% 
 H.R. Montepuez Cabo Delgado Montepuez 10.3% 
 H.R. Mocimba da Praia Cabo Delgado Mocimboa da Praia 4.7% 
 C.S. 24 de Julho Zambézia Quelimane 32.9% 
 H. R. Mocuba Zambézia Mocuba 18.4% 
 H.R. Milange Zambézia Milange 22.5% 
 H.R. Alto Molócuè Zambézia Alto Molócuè 14.0% 
 C.S. Ponta-Gêa Sofala Beira 34.4% 
 C.S. Chingussura Sofala Beira 29.1% 
 H.R. Caia Sofala  Caia 19.1% 
 H.R. Catandica Manica Bárue 19.3% 
 C.S. E. Mondlane Manica Chimoio 25.6% 
 H.R. Vila Manica Manica Manica 15.7% 
 H.R. Espungabera Manica Mossurize 12.8% 
 C.S. No. 3 (C.Tete) Tete Tete City 25.8% 
 C.S. Changara Tete Changara 19.6% 
 H.R. Ulónguè Tete Angónia 13.5% 
 C.S. Magoé Tete Magoé 12.1% 
 H.G. José Macamo Maputo City DU2 19.0% 
 C.S. Xipamanine Maputo City DU2 above 
 C.S. 1º de Junho Maputo City DU4 22.7% 
 C.S. Manhiça Maputo Province Manhiça 25.2% 
 C.S. Namaacha Maputo Province Namaacha 18.7% 
 C.S. Xai-Xai Gaza Xai-Xai City 27.7% 
 C.S. Chókwé Gaza Chókwè 22.3% 
 C.S. Chicaulacuala Gaza Chicaulacuala 21.4% 
 C.S. Maxixe Inhambane Maxixe 13.3% 
 C.S Zavala Inhambane Zavala 7.3% 
 C.S. Mabote Inhambane Mabote 8.7% 
 
 Source: Grupo Técnico Multisectorial [GTM 2005]
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APPENDIX B: Clinical staging system for HIV/AIDS 
 
WHO proposed clinical staging system for HIV infection and disease 
 
 
Clinical Stage 1: 
 
1. Asymptomatic 
2. Generalized lymphadenopathy 
 
Performance scale 1: asymptomatic, normal 
activity 
 
 
Clinical Stage 2: 
 
3. Weight loss <10% of body weight 
4. Minor mucocutaneous manifestations 
(seborrheic dermatitis, prurigo, fungal nail 
infections, recurrent oral ulcerations, 
angular cheilitis) 
5. Herpes zoster within the last five years 
6. Recurrent upper respiratory tract 
infections (i.e. bacterial sinusitis) 
 
And/or performance scale 2: symptomatic, 
normal activity 
 
 
Clinical Stage 3: 
 
7. Weight loss >10% of body weight 
8. Unexplained chronic diarrhoea, >1 month 
9. Unexplained prolonged fever 
(intermittent or constant), >1 month 
10. Oral candidiasis (thrush) 
11. Oral hairy leucoplakia 
12. Pulmonary tuberculosis 
13. Severe bacterial infections (i.e. 
pneumonia, pyomyositis) 
 
And/or performance scale 3: bedridden 
<50% of the day during last month 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Clinical Stage 4: 
 
14. HIV wasting syndrome74
15. Pneumocystic carinii pneumonia 
16. Toxoplasmosis of the brain 
17. Cryptosporidiosis with diarrhoea >1 
month 
18. Cryptococcosis, extrapulmonary 
19. Cytomegalovirus disease of an organ 
other than liver, spleen or lymph node (e.g. 
retinitis) 
20. Herpes simplex virus infection, 
mucocutaneous (>1 month) or visceral 
21. Progressive multifocal 
leucoencephalopathy 
22. Any disseminated endemic mycosis 
23. Candidiasis of esophagus, trachea, 
bronchi 
24. Atypical mycobacteriosis, disseminated 
or pulmonory 
25. Non-typhoid Salmonella septicemia 
26. Extrapulmonary tuberculosis 
27. Lymphoma 
28. Kaposi's sarcoma 
29. HIV encephalopathy75
 
And/or performance scale 4: bedridden 
>50% of the day during last month 
 
Source: WHO 1990: 221-4 
 
See also “Stages of HIV Infection”:  
http://www.avert.org/hivstages.htm
                                                        
74 HIV wasting syndrome: weight loss of >10% of 
body weight, plus either unexplained chronic 
diarrohea (>1 month) or chronic weakness and 
unexplained prolonged fever (>1 month). 
75 HIV encephalopathy: clinical findings of 
disabling cognitive and/or motor dysfunction 
interfering with activities of daily living, 
progressing over weeks to months, in the 
absence of a concurrent illness or condition, 
other than HIV infection, which could explain the 
findings. 
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APPENDIX C: Unsafe practices 
 
 
 
 
A laboratory worker collecting blood sample without gloves 
 
 
 
 
The fate of lancets, gloves, syringes 
and other hazard material in health facilities – burnt in the open 
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The fate of wasted liquids 
 
Source: photographs taken in Mozambican health facilities appearing in Chilundo et al [2004: 33]. 
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